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Thesis Abstract 
In resource-restricted micro-firms, there is limited opportunity for owner-managers (for they 
are generally one-and-the-same) to maintain their regulatory awareness and implement 
changes as required. The challenge is achieving this while also managing almost all aspects 
of the business, including dealing with customers. Given that regulations are far reaching 
and constrain the operations of firms, regulatory understanding and compliance are essential 
to running a successful (legal) business. This thesis uses an (unusual) balanced approach to 
explore both the impact of ‘burden’ (which is widely investigated for small firms) and 
‘value’ of regulation (which is not) on under-researched micro-firms. The core of this thesis 
comprises three papers, which each explore a particular aspect (knowledge, performance, 
and compliance) using multivariate techniques across several models, using newly collected 
survey data from English accommodation providers. From this a number of insights are 
made relating to the role of trade-associations in disseminating information, the accuracy of 
owner-manager self-assessment, the actual level of regulatory knowledge, and the role of 
value and burden on performance and compliance. Such findings extend and reconcile prior 
literature, which thus far has been limited by burden-led approaches, one-dimensional 
measures, and contradictory conclusions. Building upon these insights, practical 
recommendations are made which extend beyond a simple “more, better information” to 
include a cross-association campaign (for trade-associations remain best placed to address 
issues identified, despite their current apparent failings and in the absence of an alternative). 
The recommendations comprise better communication and networking, improvements to 
self-assessment skills, as well as a focus on the value (i.e. the benefits) of regulation, and 
enhancing firm performance (using an appropriate performance measure). Finally, a number 
of potential future directions for research, continuing to use the data collected herein and 
original research projects are also identified and discussed. 
 
Keywords: Micro-Firms, Regulation, Trade-Associations, Perceived-Knowledge, Actual-




1.1 Chapter introduction 
Micro-firms, herein defined as firms with 0-9 employees (BIS, 2016; DTI, 1995), account 
for the majority of firms in the UK (BEIS, 2016a) yet they are particularly difficult to 
research for a number of reasons, including “definitional problems, the number and diversity 
of firms in this sector, standard error margins in the classification and conceptualisation of 
research samples and access/data collection difficulties” (Matlay, 1999, p.1). Moreover, 
owners and managers, who are often one and the same in micro-firms (henceforth owner-
managers), are fiercely independent and notoriously difficult to persuade to “undertake 
courses of action that are sub-optimal from a business point of view” (Johnson, 2002, p.292), 
such as taking time away from the business to participate in research. Additionally, while 
their central involvement in the day-to-day operations of their businesses superficially 
appears to make them more accessible (Edwards et al., 2002) (particularly in a tourism 
context, the case covered herein, as they frequently live on the business premises), it is also 
likely to lead to long and unusual working hours, therein reducing the opportunity for 
research (Sauermann and Roach, 2013). Given these issues, micro-firms are generally under-
represented in existing research. 
Regulation is one of the most important determinants of business behaviour (Lynch-Wood 
and Williamson, 2014). Defined herein as the “imposition of rules by government, backed 
by the use of penalties that are intended specifically to modify the … behaviour of individuals 
and firms in the private sector” (OECD, 1993, p.73), it has been termed the “skeletal 
structure of social organisation” (Silbey, 2013, p.4) as it is an all-pervasive component of 
everyday life that often goes unnoticed. Indeed, as Silbey (2013) illustrates, the reader of 
this thesis will: likely be sat in a space which was designed and constructed to building codes, 
lit by lights which are wired to meet electrical standards; with water, itself purified through 
legal recipes, flowing through pipes which are also designed and installed to building codes; 
and possibly eating something that will have been grown under agricultural regulations, then 
cooked and prepared under a myriad of food regulations before being transported and sold 
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under various further regulations, all involving people working under employment 
legislation1. 
This thesis aims to address the shortfall in micro-firm research and does so using regulation 
in the context of English Accommodation providers. The tourism industry is a fitting case 
as it is highly regulated and predominantly consists of micro-firms (Tourism Alliance, 2015, 
2016; Tourism Regulation Taskforce, 2012). It is the sixth largest industry in the UK and 
the third largest employer, accounting for 9.5% of the UK workforce. The industry is also 
particularly important to the economy as it attracts consumers from around the world, who 
then invest in the local (and wider UK) economies. Despite this, there has been little research 
into some areas in a tourism context, such as knowledge and compliance (in part because 
tourism is not seen as a ‘high risk’ industry) (Czernek, 2017; Hasle and Limborg, 2006; 
Hasle et al., 2012; Shaw and Williams, 2009). 
The core of the thesis is comprised of three self-contained academic papers. As such, each 
paper contains a detailed compilation of sections, including introduction, literature review, 
methodology, results, discussion, and conclusions. While there is considerable cross-over 
between the papers, most notably in the methods and the root context of regulation and 
micro-firms, each contains a dedicated and complete exploration of the literature and set of 
arguments relevant to its aims.  
The thesis is structured as follows. The purpose of this introductory chapter is to present the 
core context of regulation and micro-firms. This includes both the pertinent areas, such as 
knowledge, performance, and compliance, that are included in the papers, along with the 
wider issues that are relevant but not detailed in the papers. The chapter presents a broad 
summary of the state of the literature (Sections 1.2 and 1.3), before demonstrating the 
rationale for each individual paper (Section 1.4). Following this, the next chapter, Section 2, 
explores the background and methodological approach taken to conduct the study (a self-
reported survey), again elucidating on the detail within the papers. Then, after each paper is 
presented in turn (Sections 3-5), Section 6 draws together the conclusions and contributions 
of the paper, before exploring potential future research opportunities. 
                                                 




Regulation can be set to both empower groups (as in the case of anti-discrimination laws) 
and restrict or prescribe undesirable behaviour (as in the case of health and safety laws). It 
aims to protect groups, for example consumers or employees, along with the environment, 
from unsafe or unscrupulous behaviour (BRTF, 2007). Indeed, good regulation should be 
proportional, accountable, consistent, transparent, and targeted. However, through either 
poor design or implementation, it can unduly impose costs or hamper the performance of 
firms (BRTF, 2007). 
The omnipresence of regulation is such that few people truly realise or comprehend its reach, 
which serves to both protect and control the public and businesses. Despite this, there is a 
generally negative bias when it is explored and reported upon, although it is not difficult to 
understand why this exists. There are a plethora of regulations, spread over innumerable acts 
of law, originating from the UK devolved governments, the central UK government and the 
European Union (at present)2. The tourism industry alone (the context of this study) is 
considered to be highly regulated, with over 21,000 regulations in effect (Blackburn and 
Hart, 2002; Tourism Regulation Taskforce, 2012); the majority of which are noted to be “ill-
fitted to the world of small businesses that characterise” the industry (House of Commons, 
2015, p.3). Indeed, this is made somewhat more difficult by the structure of government, as 
in this case of tourism firms, the vast majority of regulations which apply to firms originate 
from outside the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (the department currently 
responsible for tourism), who appear to have had little influence in regulatory design and 
limited capacity to articulate regulatory changes. 
Compliance with regulation is necessary to avoid prosecution, fines, temporary closure, and 
reputational damage, the results of which can quickly exceed a micro- (and even small) 
firms’ limited resources (Boustras et al., 2015; Shalini, 2009). However, while compliance 
may be enshrined in law, the acquisition of regulatory knowledge is, in fact, a purely 
voluntary, although necessary, act (Mendoza et al., 2016). With limited ‘official’ guidance 
that is understandable and on time, firms, particularly smaller ones, are forced to seek 
knowledge from any available source, such as personal networks, external professionals, 
                                                 
2 See Section 2.3 for an overview of the four areas of regulation explored in this thesis, including the various 
Acts that constitute them. Also note that given the differences between devolved regions, this study focuses 
specifically on firms in England, thereby removing the complexities of comparing regulations across regions. 
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trade-associations, and media websites (Bennett and Ramsden, 2007; Bennett and Robson, 
1999; BRE, 2010; King et al., 2014; Peck et al., 2012). It is in this that the negative bias is 
furthered by ‘media noise’ (Peck et al., 2012), with many news outlets putting a negative 
spin on reporting; for example, “Could new data laws end up bankrupting your company?” 
(BBC, 2017); whilst also causing confusion by reporting during periods of consultation, 
thereby bewildering readers as to what is finally set in law and what has been considered but 
ultimately disregarded. Indeed, the unregulated, incomplete and potentially biased nature of 
websites makes them particularly troubling for small firms. Legitimate news sites are beset 
by their own biases, while blogs and consultant websites lack credibility and assured validity. 
However, they can nonetheless become prevalent if they appear highly in search results 
(Peck et al., 2012). 
The apparent reliance on non-official sources of information is perhaps unexpected, given 
that a review found regulatory documentation in the UK to be ‘effective’ (Peck et al., 2012). 
However there is considerable evidence to the contrary, such as BRE (2010). Indeed, the full 
official guidance for Equalities Act (2010) was delivered over three months after the 
regulation came into effect and ran to 320 pages in length (although shorter guidelines, still 
12+ pages in length, were created by the government and other sources in the intervening 
time) (Peck et al., 2012). Similarly, improved guidelines for revised fire safety regulations 
arrived almost three years after the law was brought into effect and remained fraught with 
inconsistent interpretations by different fire safety officers (HM Government, 2008; Tourism 
Alliance, 2011; Tourism Regulation Taskforce, 2012). In spite of the opposing views over 
the effectiveness of guidance documentation, what such reviews fail to ascertain is if and 
how such information is processed by firms. Indeed, the guidelines may accurately distil 
requirements into a simple checklist, thus making them ‘effective’, but if firms do not read 
the guidelines (or if they do not understand them, despite the efforts to make them clear), 
then documentation remains an issue. Exploring knowledge acquisition from the perspective 
of firms remains an important area for research. 
Beyond official guidance, much of the exploration of regulation speaks directly of the 
regulatory ‘burden’, this extends from academic research into official government reporting. 
In fact, ‘burden’ is so thoroughly entrenched that many studies include it in the title, such is 
the case for Chittenden et al. (2002): “Regulatory Burdens of Small Business: A Literature 
Review”; Levie and Autio (2011): “Regulatory Burden, Rule of Law, and Entry of Strategic 
Entrepreneurs: An International Panel Study”; and Peck et al. (2012): “Business 
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Perceptions of Regulatory Burden”. This does not suggest a neutral and balanced approach. 
However, few others manage to include both ‘burden’ and other factors, such as Kitching et 
al. (2015), but they remain the minority. Within studies, Kuratko et al. (1999) notes the 
‘regulatory burden’ and ‘adverse impact’ on small firms (‘microenterprises’ in their case), 
while BRE (2010) notes that “businesses in general struggle to comply with regulations” 
(p.4), and BIS (2013) details the government’s commitment to “cut the overall burden of 
red tape”. This commitment, like the use of questions such as those regarding the 
“imbalance between needs of regulation and encouragement of enterprise” (ICAEW, 2005; 
via Kitching, 2006, p.804) presupposes the existence of such an imbalance or the ‘burden of 
red tape’, thereby biasing respondents towards the negative notion. 
This ‘burden’ consists of many facets, identified as ‘direct costs’ and ‘indirect effects’ by 
Edwards et al. (2003). In this taxonomy, the ‘direct costs’ are the tangible monetary costs 
associated with implementing regulation, which includes the time spent researching and 
executing, along with training, equipment purchasing, and premises alterations; or as in the 
case of employment law, higher wages or pension entitlement payments. The ‘indirect 
effects’ meanwhile, consist of the wider time and resource costs on firms, such as the greater 
formalisation of business practices, and the increased time spent on regulatory 
administration; all of which cut into the owner-managers’ available time (and resources) to 
further develop the business. Lewis et al. (2015a) offer an alternative categorisation which 
extends this further. Firstly, the cost of researching and understanding regulation, which 
itself mostly consists of the owner-managers’ time; secondly, the cost of implementing and 
abiding by regulation, such as the purchase of specialised equipment and undertaking 
training, closely matching Edwards et al’s (2003) ‘direct costs’; finally, the ongoing cost of 
demonstrating compliance, such as through continuing paperwork and reporting (although 
they admit the boundary between abiding-by and demonstrating compliance is somewhat 
blurred). It is perhaps best to adopt both views, as while Lewis et al’s (2015a) three-part 
categorisation offers better insight into the research-implementation-demonstration process, 
Edwards et al’s (2003) ‘indirect effects’ category further elucidates the non-monetary costs 
of compliance, through both the time and effort required to understand and implement 
regulation. In the resource limited environment of micro-firms this happens at the detriment 
to other areas of the business that languish when they are not attended to, thus contributing 
to a ‘firefighting mentality’ and approach to management (Falta and Gallery, 2011). In 
addition, it potentially leads to the loss of the informal, family-feel of a small business, as 
12 
formalisation of business practices is required to ensure and demonstrate regulatory 
compliance (Edwards et al., 2003). However, as Peck et al. (2012) and Chittenden et al. 
(2002) identify, it is somewhat difficult to quantify and thus measure the ‘indirect effects’ 
(which the latter term ‘psychological costs’). Furthermore, the issue of implementation, 
beginning with research and understanding is, in itself, problematic for micro-firms, who 
often find official guidance to be late, and hard to follow, with little or no tailoring to 
businesses or industries. 
Where small (and indeed, micro-firms) have been considered, there is surprisingly mixed 
evidence of the effect, direct or otherwise, making it difficult to establish a clear picture. In 
one strand of research, studies have suggested that small firms are indeed disproportionately 
affected by regulation: for instance, BRE (2010) found micro-firm owner-managers spent 
up to two days per week on regulatory issues (and notes further studies which find the cost 
of compliance to be disproportionately high)3; the OECD (2001) found that firms with 1-19 
employees incur regulatory costs up to five times higher than firms with 50-500 employees; 
whilst Collard and Godwin (1999) found that firms with 1-4 employees spend up to £288 
per-employee per-year on regulatory administration while firms with 5000+ employees 
spend only £5 per-employee per-year. Carter et al. (2009) identify a stream of work with 
such conclusions and suggest the basis of such regressive costs on small firms are because 
some compliance costs are (at least partially) fixed and hence do not increase in proportion 
to size, and also that small firms lose out because they are of insufficient size to influence 
the design of regulation like large organisations or industry groups. However, in contrast, 
other studies reached somewhat contrary conclusions. Edwards et al. (2003), whose findings 
are in line with those of Vickers et al. (2005), studied firms with up to 50 employees and 
found that while managers anecdotally complained about additional administrative costs, 
there was little evidence to verify these claims. A review by Kitching (2006) similarly found 
issues with identifying the direct impact of regulatory changes, although did suggest issues 
surrounding “lack of awareness of regulation [and] deliberate noncompliance” (p.803) 
might be responsible for such conclusions. Hart et al. (2008) suggests that “there is no 
necessary correlation between regulation and performance” (p.9) of small businesses (thus 
no direct financial cost), and goes on to outline multiple positive and negative influences of 
                                                 
3 Indeed, through interviews, BRE (2010) detail a number of specific examples of time and monetary burdens 
on micro-firms, such as: “one small B&B owner [who] said that she averaged 45 minutes per day on 
paperwork” (p.6). 
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regulation on firm performance. Such dichotomous strands of research deserve further 
exploration as their diametrically opposed views cannot easily coexist. 
The problem is further complicated by the unintended consequences that inevitably follow 
regulatory changes. For example, safety or environmental regulations may create barriers to 
entry, or indeed, price some firms out of the market (Tan and Rae, 2009). This can be 
observed in the changing requirements of fire safety regulations4 which led to some bed and 
breakfast operators (B&Bs), many of whom were compliant under the old rules, facing 
additional remedial costs of around £15,000 to ensure compliance, which in turn led many 
firms to close (Gerrard, 2011; Tourism Regulation Taskforce, 2012; Walton, 2007). Thus, 
even regulation with the best of intentions can impose costs on firms and even lead to 
closures, particularly for micro-firms for whom the effects may be especially unforeseen 
(Blackburn and Hart, 2002).  
From a business perspective, regulation can be seen as outside interference over which they 
have little influence; imposing new restrictions and costs, seemingly at whim; with the 
majority of regulatory reporting highlighting the burden, thus contributing to the prominent 
negative rhetoric which surrounds regulation. However, there are benefits to regulation, for 
both businesses and the public, though they are generally more difficult to articulate and do 
not result in direct monetary benefits. Firms themselves often struggle to identify the benefits 
of regulation and tend “towards the negative when spontaneously describing regulations” 
(IpsosMORI, 2007, p.3), though this is not surprising given the apparent negativity from the 
outset. Furthermore, few studies even provide an opportunity for owner-managers to 
articulate and consider the potential benefits of regulation (Kitching, 2006). 
Indeed, while the costs are applied to firms, many of the benefits are either indirect in nature 
(i.e. potential benefits to workers, leading to enhanced productivity), or they have a wider 
societal or environmental impact (Fooks and Mills, 2017), thereby contributing to the one-
sided view of ‘regulatory burden’. Perhaps the most prominent regulatory benefit for the 
accommodation industry at present (at least for the serviced sub-sector5) is the promise of a 
level playing field, with all firms expected to meet the same base requirements and thus, 
equally share the ‘burden’. However, the recent upsurge of the ‘sharing economy’, in which 
                                                 
4 Section 2.3.4 further expands on the changes and issues surrounding fire regulations and the impact on B&Bs 
in particular. 
5 The accommodation industry can be separated into two categories: serviced (B&Bs and alike), and non-
serviced (such as caravan parks and self-catering accommodation). 
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the regulatory expectations remain somewhat unclear, has seen apparent competitors enter 
the market without comparative regulatory requirements, thereby (potentially) undermining 
this ‘level playing field6. Further benefits include improved business procedures, a stimulus 
to encourage modernisation and innovation, improved networking, and finding legitimacy 
in existing business practices (Edwards et al., 2003; IpsosMORI, 2007; Ram et al., 2001). 
Clearly, such benefits do not have direct financial aspects to offset the financial costs; rare 
is the regulation that generates money. However, what this demonstrates is the need for a 
truly balanced approach to exploring and investigating regulation, which accounts for the 
ubiquitous existing negative bias and the difficulties of recognising benefits. 
1.3 Micro-firms 
Micro-firms, also known as micro-organisations or micro-enterprises, are generally defined 
as firms with 0-9 employees (BIS, 2016; DTI, 1995), however other definitions are also in 
use, which leads to much confusion in the literature (Devins and Britain, 2003). Indeed, the 
‘full’ EU (and thus, UK) definition, which is part of the wider EU definition of Small and 
Medium Enterprise (SME) firms (Recommendation 2003/361/EC), consists of three criteria:  
• between 0-9 employees; and either  
• annual turnover of up to €2 million (generally also taken as £2 million); or  
• an annual balance sheet total of up to €2 million (generally also taken as £2 million);  
Additionally, the firm must be autonomous (i.e. not a subsidiary of another firm) or remain 
under these thresholds even after a commensurate proportion of the partner firms is 
accounted for (Europa.eu, 2013; European Commission, 2003). This ‘full’ definition is 
rarely recognised (for all sizes of SMEs) and indeed, “it is not possible to obtain data on 
enterprises defined as SMEs, according to a strict application of the SME Definition, using 
all relevant criteria” (Centre for Strategy and Evaluation Services, 2012, p.4). This is despite 
evidence that strict application of the definition does in fact impact analyses. This study 
                                                 
6 The regulatory expectations of firms operating in the sharing economy, in this context ‘hosts’ for businesses 
such as Airbnb, are outside the scope of this study, however it remains a prominent and contentious issue which 
was frequently highlighted by both trade-associations and survey respondents. The perception is that such 
‘hosts’ operate in the same market and provide almost the same experience as, for example, B&Bs, yet they 
are not expected and indeed do not conform with the same regulations. Thus, providing ‘hosts’ with an unfair 
competitive advantage. See Section 6.5.3 for details of how this may be explored in the future. 
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henceforth utilises the most widely adopted 0-9 employee definition7. However, much of the 
existing literature uses alternate headcount based definitions, subsumes micro-firms into a 
broader ‘small firm’ segment, or excludes micro-firms altogether; such is the case with Getz 
and Carlsen (2005), Servon et al. (2010), and Arrowsmith et al. (2003) respectively. 
Despite the definitional confusion and difficulties for research, micro-firms remain an 
important part of the UK economy, given that of the estimated 5.5 million private businesses 
in the UK, 96% are micro-firms, accounting for 32% of private sector employment and 19% 
of private sector turnover (BEIS, 2016a)8. Moreover, BRE (2010) found micro-firms to be 
“the main employers and wealth generators” in rural and deprived areas, as well as “the 
front-runners of urban regeneration” (p.3). It is therefore important that the shortfall in 
micro-firm focused research is addressed. These figures are borne out in the tourism industry 
as well with almost 70% of hospitality firms employing less than 10 people. The industry 
itself accounts for 9.5% of UK employment and contributes 7.1% of UK GDP (Tourism 
Alliance, 2016). Furthermore, their size and limited resources make micro-firms particularly 
predisposed to reveal the effects of regulation, thereby making them an ideal (albeit difficult) 
subject of study (Edwards et al., 2003). 
Much of the extant research into micro-firms explores their intrinsic dissimilarities from 
large and larger-small firms, noting that they must be treated differently as they are not 
simply “little big firms” (Tilley, 2000, p.33). The primary area that distinguishes micro-
firms from their larger counterparts is the role of the owner-manager, who is likely to be 
actively managing the business, as well as running the day-to-day operations of the firm 
(Edwards et al., 2002; Kelliher and Reinl, 2009). This is especially true in firms with no 
employees as the owner-manager really must carry out everything themselves, indeed “the 
smaller the firm, the more power resides at the centre” (Kelliher and Reinl, 2009, p.523). 
With such a wide range of responsibilities and little support (as it is unlikely that employees 
act as ‘area specialists’ in the same way large firms have dedicated departments), owner-
managers frequently fall into the mindset of ‘firefighting’, whereby they deal with what is 
in front of them, rather than dedicate time for business development of any kind (Falta and 
                                                 
7 This study’s survey itself accounts for each of the ‘full’ definition criteria, allowing for future exploration, 
which is discussed in Section 6.5.1. 
8 Furthermore, across the EU micro-firms account for 92% of businesses, yet the European Survey of 
Enterprises on New and Emerging Risks (ESENER) excluded firms with less than 10 employees in its initial 
run (2010) and firms with less than five employees in 2014 (Boustras et al., 2015; EU-OSHA, 2010, 2014), 
demonstrating the widespread obliviousness towards micro-firms. 
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Gallery, 2011). Already stretched to the limit, owner-managers struggle not only with a lack 
of time, but also with a limited skillset (Carson, 1985; Johnson, 2002; O'Dwyer and Ryan, 
2000). 
This owner-centrality is thoroughly embedded throughout micro-firms. The owner-
managers’ attitude to regulation directly effects the way regulations are approached and 
implemented (Edwards et al., 2003; Hart et al., 2008; IpsosMORI, 2007). Given the negative 
bias around reporting and research, it is not surprising that owner-managers display a strong 
negative rhetoric towards regulation, claiming it to be a burden on their firms, an unwelcome 
intrusion and/or a perceived erosion of common sense (Edwards et al., 2003; IpsosMORI, 
2007). This extends to the perceived ‘fairness’ of regulation (Mendoza et al., 2016), which 
encompasses these issues of intrusion and erosion, along with a view of how attainable and 
achievable the goals of regulation are, and thus, whether the costs are considered ‘fair’. There 
could be a strong argument made that the disproportionate costs of compliance (as have 
already been noted) suggest that regulation is inherently ‘unfair’ on micro-firms. 
Furthermore, this attitude also extends to the broader assessment of other firms in the 
industry. Boustras et al. (2015) refer to this as the ‘reference state’, i.e. the baseline from 
which decisions are made relating to the effort expended to comply with regulation (from 
research right through to implementation). For example, this suggests that if the owner-
manager believes that a particular regulation is generally ignored by those in the industry, 
then they are more likely to ignore it themselves. 
Owner-manager centrality further conveys itself through firm performance metrics. While 
generally, businesses are thought to be profit driven, and thus ‘the more the better’ (for 
example: Murphy et al., 1996; Strielkowski, 2012; Wiklund and Shepherd, 2003), owner-
managers of micro-firms are more likely to measure performance through the subjective 
assessment of personal goals (Dewhurst and Horobin, 1998; Greenbank, 2001; O'Dwyer and 
Ryan, 2000). This is important to realise because these factors impact the decisions that 
owner-managers make regarding their firms. For example, while larger firms may 
relentlessly pursue growth, and thus make decisions that lead to expansion, an owner-
manager of a micro-firm may value the social aspects of dealing with customers, and thus 
limit expansion to ensure that they alone have plenty of time to do so (Dunkelberg et al., 
2013; Shinkle, 2012). Furthermore, in an effort to avoid regulation and risk, owner-managers 
may specifically structure their firms to avoid the need for employment (BRE, 2010). 
Moreover, judged solely on financial metrics, many micro-firms would be deemed to be 
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performing poorly, however this is immaterial if the goal is actually to pursue a desired 
hobby or to achieve financial security (profit satisficing rather than becoming ‘wealthy’). 
Thus, the owner-manager is central to the performance of the business and understanding 
their motivations is paramount to research. It is already clear that they are stretched to the 
limit, however as they generally regard outside support agents as interference and refuse to 
engage with supportive activities, such as training sessions (irrespective of who provides 
them), they have limited opportunity to improve. This is in part due to their insular nature 
and because they simply lack the time to do so; a firm with no-employees must shut down 
to attend a one-day training course. Instead, there is a general reliance on support from 
professionals, such as accountants, whom are frequently noted for supporting micro-firms, 
though the true nature of this support has not been thoroughly explored. The overall 
complexities of financial matters can make it almost impossible for an untrained owner-
manager to ‘muddle-through’, thus the reliance on an accountant to handle, for example, 
taxation and payroll. It is unlikely that accountants are in a position to provide robust 
regulatory support in addition to their primary role, nor would they likely relish the 
additional responsibility. Indeed, Pleasance and Balmer (2013) found that despite a general 
reliance on accountants, small firms actually turn to trade-associations for regulatory support 
matters. 
Trade-associations9 play many important roles, particularly for smaller firms. Crucially, they 
provide their members with exclusive access to collective services, such as legal, financial, 
and marketing advice; along with bulk purchasing schemes, possible only due to the breadth 
of the membership; and additionally, collective bargaining power, again due to the overall 
size of the membership (Bennett, 2011; Bennett and Ramsden, 2007; Tomlinson, 2012); thus 
potentially fulfilling many of the common shortcomings of micro-firms10. Further to this, 
trade-associations play a vital role as conduits for disseminating information. Indeed, SMEs 
appear to favour trade-association membership specifically for access to advice and there is 
certainly some evidence of improved awareness of industry issues among member firms 
(Battisti and Perry, 2015). 
                                                 
9 Broadly defined as multi-member meta-organisations in which member firms pay a subscription to sustain 
the association for the benefit of the members, industry and society (Rajwani et al., 2015). 
10 More detail on the role of trade-associations within the tourism industry, along with their role in this study 
is included in Section 2.4.2. 
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Micro-firms are further distinguished from larger firms by their general informality 
(Arrowsmith et al., 2003; Ram et al., 2001). This is in part directly due to their size and the 
centrality of the owner-manager (i.e. active throughout the firm, rather than a CEO locked 
away in an office), but there is also considerable cross-over between the fields of micro-, 
family- and entrepreneurship-firms. Specifically, micro-firms are often noted for their 
‘family feel’ (Hasle et al., 2012). Such informality itself suggests that micro-firms lack rigid 
structures and procedures, thus are likely to fall short of complete compliance with 
regulation. This informality ranges from flexible working conditions to the close personal 
relationship between the owner-manager and their employees, which in-itself can improve 
communication and ease workplace tension (Matlay, 1999). These close relationships not 
only inform many of the decisions throughout the business, such that employees (or family 
members) have a greater degree of influence, but they also offer a rare opportunity for owner-
managers to view the burdens and benefits of regulation from both their position and that of 
their workers. This may indeed alleviate the ‘burden’ of regulation, such that the costs of 
mandated holiday time are offset by observing friends/family enjoying time off. This is not 
to say that this is unique to micro-firms, but the immediacy of the relationship between 
owner-manager and employees is closer, such that it becomes more readily apparently. 
It is not safe to say that a simple solution would be to blanket exclude micro-firms from 
some or all regulation. Whether the consequences are intended or not, regulation is generally 
designed with a positive goal in mind. Those who work-for or deal-with micro-firms should 
not necessarily be disadvantaged by the size of the company. Using the case of Workplace 
Pensions, a micro-firm could view this as a supplementary cost (and therefore ‘burden’) of 
employment, as it is in addition to wages, for example. While this particular example was 
implemented over several years using a phased rollout (defined by firm size), there is little 
argument to justify that workers in micro-firms should not be entitled to a workplace pension 
simply because of the size of the firm they choose to work for. Furthermore, such exclusions 
would likely increase employee turnover, as employees move to (even slightly) larger firms 
for additional benefits, while firms themselves would have an incentive to remain small, thus 
unnecessarily stifling growth in jobs and artificially limiting opportunities for micro-firms. 
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1.4 Thesis aims and rationale for each paper 
Up to this point, this chapter has noted the potential impacts of regulation and the unique 
features of micro-firms, along with the pervasive negativity of existing research. There is 
clearly a need not only to better understand micro-firms, but to also specifically address 
regulatory impacts from their perspective (rather than from the perspective of larger, even 
small, firms, the results of which have generally been applied to micro-firms, despite their 
different requirements). Such an approach must account for the centrality of the owner-
manager, their fierce independence, and their reluctance to accept outside assistance. Herein 
lies the purpose of this study and thus, the rationale for each of the papers. Three key areas 
have been chosen for greater focus, namely knowledge, performance, and compliance; 
knowledge is necessary for an owner-manager to understand regulatory requirements; 
compliance is necessary to avoid penalties (and is likely preferred by owner-managers); and 
it is through performance, which micro-firms measure differently to larger firms, that 
business success is ultimately judged. Having given the wider context in this introductory 
chapter, the papers consider these issues is greater depth. 
In light of Kitching’s (2006) view that extant literature fails to appropriately consider 
regulatory benefits, this study explicitly avoids the existing and pervasive narrow 
conceptualisation of regulation as only a burden or constraint on firms. Instead, it adopts a 
balanced approach, exploring regulation and the three primary areas from multiple 
viewpoints including, types of knowledge, both the benefit and burden, and perceived 
compliance levels. Throughout, the focus remains on owner-managers and their perceptions 
of regulation (given their unique central role in micro-firms).  
The thesis itself has a number of goals (in addition to the goals of each paper), which are 
given as follows: 
• Address the general deficit in micro-firm research; 
• Explore regulation in a micro-firm context, using original survey data; 
• Consider the opinions and perceptions of owner-managers, which, given their unique 
central role in almost aspects of micro-firm operations, thereby elevates these 
perceptions to paramount importance; 
• Critically investigate common research assumptions, such as self-assessment, 
measures of performance, and the pervasive negativity in regulatory research; 
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• Adopt a balanced approach, thereby contributing to existing regulatory literature by 
assessing both the benefit (which is often overlooked) and burden of regulation. 
1.4.1 Paper One: Knowledge 
“Managerial Hubris, Trade-Associations and Regulatory Knowledge in Micro-Firms” 
It is logical that for micro-firms to be compliant with regulation, their owner-managers (as 
the singular driving force of the business) must have and maintain operational knowledge of 
regulation. However, it would seem that doing so is quite difficult as the range and 
complexity of legislation demands a thorough and nuanced understanding of thousands of 
regulations, yet the day-to-day demands of the business leave little time to maintain 
regulatory knowledge. Indeed, BRE (2010) notes that the “government would not expect an 
inspector to have this level of cross-sector expertise” (p.7). Furthermore, it is not simply 
enough to possess knowledge as owner-managers must correctly understand and apply it, as 
well as comprehend their level of knowledge in order to know where it is deficient. 
Essentially, they must know what they know and what they do not, thereby revealing what 
they must learn. This process is not easy and is particularly difficult in the isolated context 
of micro-firms and their somewhat untrained managers. This stands in contrast to, for 
example, medical professions, where the constant self-assessment of knowledge is widely 
practiced (Ward et al., 2002). 
Many existing studies into regulation simply assume knowledge and focus on compliance 
(Kitching, 2016), while others typically investigate only self-assessed knowledge, usually 
through Likert scales which assess the level or confidence of knowledge (Akinboade and 
Kinfack, 2012). However, there is considerable evidence that not only is self-assessment an 
acquired skill in its own right, but it is one that micro-firm owner-managers lack (Sitzmann 
et al., 2010). Without this skill, they are unlikely to realise what they do not know and 
therefore are unlikely to try to rectify their knowledge deficit, to say nothing of lacking the 
time to do so. Moreover, research which relies on self-assessed levels of knowledge are 
likely to suffer from low accuracy, given that self-assessment is poor and knowledge levels 
among owner-managers are likely to be poor also. 
In addition, there is a need to better understand from where owner-managers draw 
information about regulation. Extant literature suggests a number of knowledge sources, 
although what little research exists regarding micro-firms suggests that special consideration 
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should be made for the role of trade-associations. Furthermore, having noted the dichotomy 
between Perceived- and Actual-Knowledge, it is necessary to explore both forms of 
knowledge, thereby identifying any differences between them. Policy, at governmental, 
intermediary (i.e. trade-association), and the firm level can then be discussed in light of the 
findings.  
The goals for the first paper, are as follows: 
• Establish the level of Perceived- (i.e. self-assessed) and Actual- (i.e. tested) 
knowledge of micro-firm owner-managers; 
• Explore the differences between them, therein noting the accuracy of self-
assessment, which is important both for owner-managers and for research which 
relies on self-assessment measures; 
• Explore the factors which influence both forms of knowledge, particularly the impact 
of trade-association membership; 
• Address how self-assessment accuracy and actual knowledge can be improved, given 
the known resource constraints of micro-firms. 
1.4.2 Paper Two: Performance 
“The Impact of Regulation on Micro-Firm Performance”  
This second paper explores the natural consequence of regulation on firms: that of the impact 
on business performance. This may in fact be the single most important aspect from the 
perspective of firms, and one which, particularly in a micro-firm context, is presently 
hindered by misconception. To begin with, the negative reporting on regulation issues 
manifests itself mostly in this area, that regulations are a burden on firms, by imposing costs 
and unwarranted rules. Moreover, one strand of research, including that of some government 
reports, finds this burden to disproportionately impact micro-firms. However, according to 
another strand, the strong negative rhetoric, from research and firms themselves, does not 
always manifest as a quantifiable negative impact on firm performance. There is a clear need 
to reconcile these conflicting strands of literature in order to create a better understanding.  
Such reconciliation may be possible through the exploration of performance itself, with the 
owner-managers of micro-firms, generally favouring broad personal goals over traditional 
financial profit-motivated performance metrics. Thus, while this paper briefly explores 
financial measures, it mainly focuses on subjective goal based measures of performance, in 
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particular, the owner-managers’ satisfaction towards a number of goals. In doing so, it 
becomes clear that traditional approaches to micro-firm performance, be-it in research or in 
efforts to improve performance, may be addressing on the wrong aspects. Hence, the 
contrary strands of prior literature may be resolved through the use of more appropriate 
performance measures. 
Additionally, existing research focuses on one-dimensional scales of attitude, in that it is 
explored as a single level between two extremes; burden or benefit/fair or unfair. In an effort 
to steer away from the negative rhetoric, this paper explores two distinct scales in parallel: 
Perceived-Value and Perceived-Burden. This allows owner-managers to express both the 
negative and positive, as indeed, regulatory measures can be both a strong burden (in the 
cost of implementation, for example) and provide a strong benefit (for example in ensuring 
a lowest common standard throughout an industry) all at the same time, not one at the 
expense of the other. This two-dimensional view of attitude is a unique point of difference 
for both this paper and the study as a whole, allowing for a more nuanced understanding of 
the role of attitude on performance (in the case of this paper) and compliance (in the case of 
Paper Three). 
The goals for this second paper, are as follows: 
• Adopt a broader, non-financial, measure of performance, which is favoured by 
micro-firm owner-managers; 
• Investigate a more robust measure of attitude, through the exploration of the 
Perceived-Value and Burden of regulation; 
• Explore how Perceived-Value and Burden impact both financial and non-financial 
measures of performance; 
• In doing so, seek to reconcile the contrary strands of existing literature on the subject 
of regulatory impacts on performance. 
1.4.3 Paper Three: Compliance 
“Perceived Regulatory Compliance in Micro-Firms: The Case of English Accommodation 
Firms” 
Building on the themes and findings of Paper One, like knowledge, there is likely a 
dichotomy between the owner-managers’ perceived compliance level and the actual level of 
compliance, given that self-assessment is poor and any deficit in knowledge is likely to lead 
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to non-compliance, no matter how slight or intentional. Indeed, knowledge, and the factors 
that influence it (as identified in Paper One), are direct drivers for compliance. Although the 
distinction between Perceived- and Actual-Knowledge is established in Paper One, this 
entirely subjective view of compliance is similarly influenced by the perceived level of 
knowledge. Additionally, the compliance level of other firms in the industry (referred to as 
‘competitors’ throughout) influences the ‘reference state’ from which owner-managers may 
base decisions, i.e. owner-managers may be more likely to follow laws which are believed 
to be widely (at least somewhat) complied-with. As with self-assessment, the assessment of 
others is an acquired skill which owner-managers generally lack and they even lack the 
information required to make detailed observations of other firms, instead forming opinions 
based on hearsay and rumour, influenced by the pervasive sense of their being ‘better than 
average’ (Boustras et al., 2015; Krueger and Mueller, 2002; Kruger and Dunning, 2002; 
Meeran et al., 2016; Moore and Small, 2007). Furthermore, the insular nature of micro-firms 
reduces the opportunities for networking, which might otherwise provide evidence of 
competitor behaviour. Nonetheless, such opinions are developed and they inform decisions 
within the business, even subconsciously.  
In order to better understand micro-firms and regulation, the exploration of Perceived Own-
Firm and Competitor Compliance levels allows for a greater understanding of the wider 
effects of regulation on micro-firms. As with Papers One and Two, policy can then be 
discussed in light of the findings. The goals for this final paper, are given as follows: 
• Establish the perceived level of Own-Firm and Competitor Compliance with 
regulation; 
• Explore the impact of Perceived Competitor Compliance on the level of Perceived 
Own-Firm Compliance (i.e. the relevance of the reference state); 
• Explore the impact of perceived (i.e. self-assessed) knowledge on perceived levels 
of compliance; 
• Explore the impact of Perceived-Value and Burden of regulation on perceived levels 
of compliance; 
• Address how regulatory compliance may be improved in micro-firms. 
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1.5 Chapter summary 
This introduction chapter has presented the core concepts for this study, namely the near-
universal reach of regulation and the unique, ubiquitous, but often ignored micro-firms 
which make up the majority of firms. In doing so it has highlighted a number of areas that 
require further exploration, either due to existing confusion or a dearth of research. Indeed, 
the three primary areas of study, namely knowledge, performance, and compliance, have 
each been previously researched, but generally using a singular perspective and with an 
inherent negative bias towards the ‘regulatory burden’.  
The aim of the study is to address the shortfall in micro-firm research, challenge existing 
research norms, and develop recommendations for both policy and future research. Thus, 
each of the three papers herein explores these areas with a fresh, balanced approach, tailored 
specifically towards these aims and the realities of micro-firms. 
The remainder of the thesis is set out as follows. The next section provides details of the 
background and methodological approach of the study, such as the regulatory context, the 
manner in which data was collected, and the analysis of part of that data. Following that, 
each of the papers is presented in turn. Next, Section 6 provides a summary of the overall 
research findings, conclusions and contributions (both theoretical and practical); before 
detailing future directions for research, both using the existing data collected for this study 
and for prospective research projects. Finally, Section 7 draws this research project to a 





2. Background and Methodological Approach 
2.1 Chapter introduction 
As described by the previous section, the papers herein include all the necessary, although 
inevitably brief, detail regarding their respective methodologies, such as information on the 
survey development, variables, and the analytical methods employed. However, the study 
incorporates further background information which, while important, is not necessarily 
suitable to include in an academic research paper, either in full or even briefly (given the 
limited length permitted). This section then, does not repeat what is already in the papers, 
but expands upon each area. For example, the use of unsolicited survey comments and the 
thematic analysis behind this is only mentioned in the papers as required, thus full detail of 
the process and resulting themes are presented here in Section 2.5. Indeed, wider detail on 
the entire process of the study, from the early pilot study (Section 2.4.1), through to the use-
of a survey and its distribution method is presented (Section 2.4.5), along with a specific 
rationale for including the chosen four areas of regulation, the legislative Acts behind them, 
and their apparent ‘burdens’ and benefits (Section 2.3). Finally, while Section 2.7 provides 
wider information on the characteristics of respondents (such as the proportion of 
serviced/non-serviced firms and respondent gender/age), no detail on the many variables 
constructed from the data or statistical analyses employed are given here, but can instead be 
found in the papers. 
2.2 Research philosophy 
Ontology, epistemology, axiology, and methodology are closely related concepts which 
inform each other and the underlying nature of research, thus it is important to understand 
the approach used in this study. Ontology relates to the assumed form and nature of reality, 
epistemology relates to the nature of the relationship between what can be known and the 
researcher, and axiology relates to the ethical nature of research (Creswell, 2003; Easterby-
Smith et al., 2002; Mertens, 2015). Furthermore, axiology explores how the ontological and 
epistemological viewpoints are brought together to form ethical research, thereby leading to 
a research paradigm, which ultimately informs the research design that is employed (Aliyu 
et al., 2015; Mertens, 2015; Mittman, 2001). 
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While various authors have explored research paradigms, it is generally acknowledged that 
they exist on a continuum ranging from positivism to (some form of) 
interpretivism/constructionism (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002). The core difference stems 
from the ontological perspective employed, with positivism viewing the world as both 
objective and external, while interpretivism/constructionism views the world as subjective 
and socially constructed (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002; Mertens, 2015). From this the 
epistemological approach is then defined, with positivist researchers being independent of 
the world and seeking to hypothesise and deduce causal explanations, while interpretivist 
researchers consider themselves part of the world they are observing and developing theories 
based on their observations (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002; Mertens, 2015). The axiology 
therefore brings these perspectives together, such that positivists hold that the good outcomes 
of research must be maximised while respecting research subjects, whereas 
interpretivists/constructionists assume that a wide ranging, balanced account of views is 
necessary (Christians, 2005; Guba and Lincoln, 1994; Mertens, 2015).  
In this study the ontological view employed is that of an external, observable, discrete world, 
and thus, one in which the author is independent (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). This is in part 
(mostly) due to the personal beliefs of the author, and in part because a small majority of the 
existing research into micro-firms adopts some form of interpretivist view (and therefore, 
qualitative methods), thereby presenting a gap in the literature to be addressed. This 
ontological perspective means that the study assumes there is are observable elements which 
interact in a regular, ordered manner, and thus, can be explained. Consequently, the 
paradigm employed is positivism. The epistemological perspective therefore suggests that 
the researcher and the research subjects are independent, with theories developed from 
existing knowledge which are in turn used to develop hypotheses. These can then be tested 
by operationalising specific variables, resulting in a contribution based on the causal 
explanations of the interactions between the observable elements (Easterby-Smith et al., 
2002; Mertens, 2015). In light of the positivist paradigm adopted, the axiology manifests as 
a duty to conduct ‘good’ research, in which a research should aim to maximise the positive 
outcomes, both for the research participants and society. Furthermore, there is an aim to 
protect research participants from harm and exploitation, while also ensuring they are treated 
with research (Christians, 2005; Mertens, 2015).  
The ethical considerations for this study are detailed in Section 2.6. However, it is noted that 
such matters were actioned at an early stage of the study, through the use of a valid research 
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design, approved by independent academic appraisal, an appropriate sample selection, and 
clear instructions on the voluntary nature of the study, along with the way data would be 
used. This then leads into the research methods which are utilised (detailed in Section 2.4 
and each paper herein). Positivism generally (although not exclusively) uses quantitative 
methods and that is the primary case in this study. Theories are developed from existing 
literature, resulting in specific, testable hypotheses. The required concepts are 
operationalised as variables, which are ultimately collected through a survey, sent to a large 
sample of relevant individuals. The results are then analysed using statistical methods. In 
order to better understand the causal links in the observed results, the study also employs a 
supplementary qualitative analysis of general comments, which are also collected via the 
survey. While this may appear somewhat unusual, mixed method research approaches are 
becoming increasingly common. Across the three papers herein, it is then possible to 
combine the individual results, thereby developing new knowledge which is useful for both 
practical (thus benefitting the research subjects) and academic purposes (thus benefitting the 
researcher and future researchers). 
2.3 Regulatory context 
In order to create a manageable research project, this study focuses on four specific areas of 
regulation which are generally applicable, both within and beyond the tourism industry: 
health and safety; employment; anti-discrimination; and fire. Each area is briefly described 
below, along with the Acts which confer power to them in English law (as the study is 
concerned only with firms in England, due to differences in regulations that exist in the UK’s 
devolved regions). Note that these descriptions were correct at the time of the survey (2014-
2015) and changes since have not been included. While some questions are tailored towards 
the industry, throughout, the study is concerned with broad applicability (hence the 
regulatory areas chosen), rather than industry specific legislation, such as hot tub 
maintenance or gambling machines (for firms with such facilities). Much of the following 
summaries are adapted from the ‘Pink Book’ (VisitEngland, 2012, 2014), which is a 
frequently updated reference guide to tourism regulation that is provided to all (paying) 
members of VisitEngland (the English tourist board). 
For each of the regulations detailed herein, there is a brief assessment of the ‘burden’, 
ranging from the number and complexity of the Acts that define them, to specifics relating 
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to implementation, as well as a view to the benefits. As has already been noted in Section 
1.2, short of promoting compliance in order to enhance reputation and public image (and 
therefore entice customers), none of these regulations offer a direct monetary boost to firms. 
In addition to the potential benefits described below, each regulation should help to enforce 
a lowest set of standards and therefore, a level playing field from which all firms in the 
industry should achieve, thus the ‘burden’ is shared by all firms, although the impact on 
individual firms (particularly when comparing the smallest and largest) may be 
disproportionate in relation to size, turnover and the number of guests. 
2.3.1 Health and safety 
Occupier’s Liability Acts 1957 and 1984, Employers’ Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act 
1969, Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, Bunk Beds (Entrapment Hazards) (Safety) 
Regulations 1987, Electricity at Work Regulations 1989, Gas Cooking Appliances (Safety) 
Regulations 1989, Health and Safety (Display Screen Equipment) Regulations 1992, Manual 
Handling Operations Regulations 1992, Workplace (Health, Safety and Welfare) 
Regulations 1992, Electrical Equipment (Safety) Regulations 1994, Gas Safety (Installation 
and Use) Regulations 1998, Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations 1998, 
Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999, Control of Substances 
Hazardous to Health Regulations (COSHH) 2002, Adventure Activities Licencing 
Regulations 2004, General Product Safety Regulations 2005, Work at Height Regulations 
2005, Health Act 2006 (VisitEngland, 2012)11. 
This is perhaps one of the most complex areas of regulation included in the study as it 
encompasses so many different Acts of legislation. While it is fair to say that in some cases, 
only part of the required behaviours of these regulations apply, or they only apply to firms 
offering certain facilities, the fact remains that firms must at least consider them all (to 
ascertain what action, if any, is required to ensure compliance). It is most likely the breadth 
of health and safety legislation that has led to its (somewhat inaccurate) reputation as an all-
encompassing and troublesome area of law (HSE, 2017b, c). So much so that it is frequently 
criticised for all manner of odd behaviours, the majority of which are not actually covered 
by the various Acts. Thus, because its name is invoked so readily, it imparts a particularly 
strong sense of unease in overcautious owner-managers (of all sizes of business, and other 
                                                 
11 Fire regulations are also included in this chapter of the book, but have been listed separately for this study 
under Section 2.3.4. 
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officials), along with the vitriol is causes in the public. Indeed, the Health and Safety 
Executive has, for many years, hosted a ‘mythbusting’ report, aimed solely at investigating 
and debunking spurious claims of health and safety’s use and scope (HSE, 2013, 2017b) and 
directly responds to many highly publicised cases (HSE, 2017c). Existing research indicates 
that micro- and even small firms exercise poor compliance with health and safety legislation 
(Boustras et al., 2015; Vickers et al., 2005), although given the number of Acts and 
widespread confusion regarding such regulation, this is not necessarily surprisingly. 
Meanwhile, the Tourism Regulation Taskforce (2012) have campaigned for better 
consideration of ‘low hazard workplaces’ and improved, sector specific approaches to 
requirements and enforcement, particularly in the low risk domain of accommodation12. 
However, while health and safety regulation may have a poor reputation, many of the 
measures are essential to protect firms, their employees, and the public. They ensure that 
appropriate safety equipment is available (such as harnesses for those working at height) and 
that people are trained to use such equipment (as misuse of equipment can be as dangerous 
as the absence of safety equipment due to the false sense of security its presence provides). 
Indeed, the Health and Safety Executive host a page listing the benefits of ‘good health and 
safety’, such as reduced costs, reduced risks, fewer accidents, and improved standing among 
suppliers and partners (to name but a few) (HSE, 2017a). For accommodation firms, they 
ensure that the equipment provided to guests is safe to use, prevents injuries to customers 
(as well as employees), and perhaps prevents even death (for example even a simple 
reminder about the dangers of open fires indoors may prevent carbon monoxide poisoning). 
2.3.2 Employment 
Employment Rights Act 1996, Employment Tribunals Act 1996, National Minimum Wage 
Act 1998, Working Time Regulations 1998, Employment Relations Acts 1999 and 2004, 
Employment Acts 2003 and 2007, UK Borders Act 2007, Equality Act 2010 (VisitEngland, 
2012). 
Employment law is limited to considerably fewer regulatory Acts than health and safety, but 
is still complex in its own right. The Acts listed above enforce restrictions on base pay levels, 
                                                 
12 Which is not to say that the sector is entirely without risk. B&B kitchens contain considerable dangers while 
caravan parks require ground maintenance that necessitates specialised and potentially hazardous equipment 
(e.g. hedge trimmers). Indeed, in a recent widely reported case, a park worker was killed while moving a 
caravan, which was ultimately found to have been caused by poor health and safety training (thus implying 
poor regulatory compliance) (BBC, 2015; BH&HPA, 2015). 
30 
the number of hours that can be worked (one of the few areas where UK law specifically 
operates outside of general EU boundaries), the need for firms to check potential employees 
are eligible to work in the UK, and the need to prevent unfair discrimination. Such 
obligations are particularly troublesome for micro-firms who generally prefer to operate with 
greater informality (Arrowsmith et al., 2003; Edwards et al., 2003). Moreover, the 
abundance of micro-firms in the tourism industry, combined with widespread use of informal 
and family labour, increases the risk of non-compliance (intentional or otherwise) in this 
area. Furthermore, regulations which impose specific restrictions, such as 
maternity/paternity leave, can be a particular problem as they often present themselves with 
limited notice and require the firm to both continue to pay an employee who is not working, 
while struggling by with either costly, yet limited, or no cover for the role. 
While minimum wage is included in the study (through this employment law context), 
following the closure of the survey, updates to legislation have increased the complexity of 
minimum wage, thereby providing a clear example of regulatory change over time. 
Originally set with two, age-dependent levels, minimum wage has grown to encompass four 
age-dependent bands and an apprentice rate (which is either age or tenure/training 
dependent). In 2016 the uppermost age band was renamed ‘National Living Wage’ with its 
rate divorced from the common commencement date (i.e. the date that other wage bands 
rates increase, and indeed, other regulations or regulatory changes are brought into force) in 
October of each year. Furthermore, this rate should not be confused with ‘The Living Wage’ 
rate which is devised by the Living Wage Foundation (rather than being recommended by 
the Low Pay Commission), and has no legal authority, but is widely accepted, particularly 
for businesses based in London, where the rate is higher. In short, a simple age-based 
minimum rate of pay which increased around the same time each year, now has age and 
contract-position bands, which change at different times of the year, and largely shares its 
name with a widely accepted, but non-governmental, higher rate with geographic, rather than 
age bands. Such additional complexity is especially troublesome for micro-firm owner-
managers to keep track of and implement (Lewis et al., 2015b). 
The benefits of employment law perhaps reside most with employees, ensuring that they are 
treated well and are paid at least a minimum rate, which has increased annually, generally at 
or above inflation and (given the research of the Low Pay Commission) is regarded as a fair 
rate (LPC, 2016). While there are still cases contentious employment situations (e.g. the 
current wide scale use of zero-hour contracts), employment law prevents the worst atrocities 
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of the past, such as slave labour and sweatshops (at least to the extent of the reach of 
regulation). For businesses, benefits may include a happier, more productive workforce and 
the knowledge that should an employee falsely claim otherwise, they can rely on the legal 
protections granted by following the law. 
2.3.3 Anti-discrimination 
Equality Act 2010 (VisitEngland, 2012). 
This relatively recent Act consolidates and simplifies existing legislation, such as the 
Disability Discrimination Act (DDA) 1995 and the Equal Pay Act 1970 (to name just two), 
into a single package. It covers a number of areas, but for the purposes of this study, 
discrimination relating to employees (potential or otherwise) is included under employment 
regulation, while discrimination relating to customers and the general public are considered 
here. From the public perspective, the Act is designed to prevent discrimination due to 
factors such as gender, race, and religion, along with ensuring equal treatment and access to 
goods and services for those with disabilities. For micro-firms, one area which can be 
problematic is the requirement to make ‘reasonable changes’ to procedures and premises to 
ensure equal service for all potential customers (Charlton, 2011). Not only is this principle-
based term of ‘reasonably changes’ open to vast interpretation but also any changes to a 
micro-firm will likely be difficult given their resource limitations (Gerrard, 2011). A further 
salient issue for the accommodation sector, which remains unresolved, is the apparent 
inability to refuse single-sex groups. Common in the industry, it is generally the intention to 
refuse parties, particularly stag and hen groups whom are often associated with anti-social 
and damaging behaviour. However, legal action found this to be a breach of gender equality 
(BH&HPA, 2009; Government Equalities Office, 2010). It has already been noted (in 
Section 1.2) that the full, 320 page ‘official guide’ was produced more than three months 
after the Act came into force, although shorter guidelines were developed by a number of 
different sources in the intervening time (Peck et al., 2012). 
The benefits of such regulation, while noble and just in its intension, are generally aimed at 
a societal level, given that the purpose is to protect consumers from unconscionable and 
discriminatory behaviours. As with employment regulation, the prescribed behaviours (and 
defined prohibited behaviours) grant businesses a better understanding of what is and is-not 
acceptable, thereby enhancing the experience for guests, while granting assurances that 
compliant firms are protected from false or spurious claims. It is perhaps through vaguely 
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defined benefits such as (potentially) appealing to a wider customer base (VisitBritain, 
2016), that negative rhetoric regarding regulation as a one-sided burden takes hold (Fooks 
and Mills, 2017). 
2.3.4 Fire 
Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 (VisitEngland, 2012). 
Fires can devastate lives and businesses, so prevention and fire-fighting equipment and 
procedures are essential safety measures. As in the case above for equality law (indeed, 
before it), the Fire RRO (as it is generally referenced) consolidated more than 120 Acts of 
legislation (BRTF, 2007), while also shifting from a prescriptive (i.e. owner-managers are 
given clearly defined requirements) to a principle-based approach (i.e. owner-managers must 
interpret and apply regulation based on broadly defined requirements). However, evidence 
suggests that unlike larger firms, micro-firms in particular crave the certainty of clear, 
prescriptive advice (BRE, 2010). Prior to the Act, the fire brigade would inspect a property, 
demand any changes as required and issue a fire certificate as proof of compliance. This Act 
instigated the notion that firms, rather than the fire brigade, were best positioned to consider 
their own fire risks, and therefore requires firms to appoint a ‘responsible person’ to carry 
out an onsite fire risk assessment. However, no training was provided and indeed, reliable 
guidance documents were not provided until 2008, years after the legislation came into force 
(HM Government, 2008). While it was intended as a simplification, owner-managers of 
micro-firms found themselves forced to undertake new responsibilities for which they lacked 
the skills. In addition, different fire brigades, whom still inspect businesses to ensure 
compliance, apply different interpretations of the various requirements/suggestions, thus 
creating vast differences in demands throughout the country (Tourism Alliance, 2011; 
Tourism Regulation Taskforce, 2012). For numerous micro-firms, particularly B&Bs of 
which many are the owner-managers’ home, the new requirements (such as integrated fire 
detection and alarm systems), and (in some cases) intransigent inspectors, found their 
formerly compliant businesses now non-compliant and liable for additional costs of around 
£15,000 for ‘suitable’ equipment (Walton, 2007). Following the “worst UK hotel fire in 40 
years” (BBC, 2011, p.1) enforcement of the RRO became more pro-active, leading to legal 
action being taken out against hundreds of hotels and guesthouses, many of whom were 
compliant under the pre-RRO rules, which in turn led many firms to close down as they were 
unable to meet the ‘unreasonable’ demands for changes and costs (Fire Safety Engineering, 
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2009; Gerrard, 2011; Tourism Regulation Taskforce, 2012). The apparent demands of the 
fire regulations, combined with the confusion caused by variation between regions directly 
led to the creation of two industry trade-association groups: The Bed and Breakfast 
Association and BedPosts (BBA, 2014; BedPosts, 2014), such was the need for greater 
support (through the combined research and experience pool) and representation (to seek 
clarity over requirements and lobby for future changes), thus demonstrating both the scale 
of problem and the importance of trade-associations in the industry. 
The benefits of fire regulations are perhaps the most obvious of those included in the study: 
to prevent fire, and injuries or loss of life in the event of one. While there may be a debate 
over the exact requirements, these regulations should ensure that appropriate fire prevention, 
and firefighting equipment and procedures are in place, while also ensuring evacuation plans 
are prepared.  
2.4 Research approach 
2.4.1 Early pilot study 
While pilot studies may be deployed for a number of reasons, the goal here was to test sample 
generation, ascertain the response rate (through various methods of contact), and assess the 
internal validity and reliability of the questions/measures utilised. Unfortunately, it was 
necessary to commence the pilot during the summer months of 2013, which is the busiest 
time for those in the accommodation industry and so many potential respondents simply 
lacked the opportunity to participate. Additionally, shortly after the pilot survey was 
launched, the British Holiday and Home Parks Association (BH&HPA) sent an advisory to 
its members regarding a government initiative to crack down on tax evasion within the 
industry (HM Government, 2013), resulting in a general weariness towards a study based on 
regulation, which collected revenue information. These factors led to a response rate of only 
6.25%, limiting the statistical possibilities. It had originally been planned that the pilot would 
be analysed using the techniques proposed (and later used) for the main survey, but with so 
few responses, this simply was not possible. Furthermore, a number of questions were 
presented in multiple formats with the twin aim of testing accuracy through triangulation 
and choosing the best format to use in the main survey. For example, in addition to assessing 
the Perceived-Burden (using the methods seen in Appendix 3 and 4) a further question (for 
each regulation) asked respondents to signify the impact of that regulation on a 7-point, 
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bipolar scale from ‘no impact’ to ‘heavy impact’ (Dillman et al., 2014). This was to be used 
as corroboration at the pilot stage, with the potential for the question to be used in the main 
survey. Additionally, where concepts such as Perceived Own-Firm Compliance are 
developed from the responses to one statement in the main survey, a wider array of 
statements were included in the pilot with the intention to assess the best statement (or 
construct of them) to use. Without this pilot data, these assessments were made via informal 
interviews with potential respondents and through discussion with the supporting trade-
associations (see Section 2.4.2). However, the pilot study process was overall successful, 
providing a number of learning points which informed the study at large. These are discussed 
throughout the remainder of this section. 
To begin with, a random sample of 160 firms was created through the use of two websites: 
UKparks.com, the BH&HPA member directory; and BedAndBreakfast.com, an independent 
directory with an extensive collection of firms. This data, mostly containing firm contact 
information, was stored in a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet, along with ongoing tracking 
details regarding various communications with the firms. Through this process, it became 
apparent that a more flexible database-based system would be required for the study, 
containing a greater number of firms and more comprehensive communication tracking. The 
development of the participant database (and final sampling frame) is detailed in Section 
2.4.3.  
Next, the pilot tested different methods of contact: an email containing a link to the survey; 
an email detailing the survey with a promise of a link to follow (which was sent seven days 
later); a telephone call asking for permission to send a survey (online or postal) the following 
week; and a postal survey with covering letter. Each contact group received two follow-up 
communications, which were personalised and written to ensure it was clear that the content 
was different in each round (Cook et al., 2000; Sauermann and Roach, 2013). It is of 
particular interest that none of the firms contacted with an email containing a link (i.e. with 
no prior communication) completed the survey, or even opened the link to explore it. This 
suggests that when using digital communication, prior communication before the survey is 
required, rather than preferred, as the extant literature would suggest (Cook et al., 2000; 
Sauermann and Roach, 2013). Thus, for the main survey, prior contact was made for all 
digital recipients.  
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Beyond this, several other important factors were identified. Firstly, the need to undertake 
the survey outside of the busy summer months, whilst also ensuring that firms which close 
during the winter ‘off-season’ still had ample opportunity to participate. Secondly, the need 
to incorporate self-catering accommodation, both because it broadened the potential range 
of respondents, and because it quickly became apparent that many non-serviced firms (i.e. 
caravan parks) offer a range of self-catering units in addition to their caravan pitches (to 
name one example). Thirdly, the need to offer more information about the study than could 
be included in invitation and (brief) follow-up communications, thus the development of the 
support website, which is detailed in Section 2.4.4. Finally, given the response rate of the 
pilot, it appeared necessary to take all available steps to enhance the response rate of the 
main study, thus a prize draw was also incorporated, which is detailed in Section 2.4.5. 
In addition, a number of direct changes to the survey were also made. Firstly, the number of 
questions were reduced, with a target of 12 A4 pages (which is half the length of the pilot 
survey). This was in part possible following a rationalisation of the purpose of the study (for 
example, the pilot treated minimum wage regulation as a distinct area, rather than 
incorporating it as part of employment legislation); and in part because several questions had 
been included specifically to allow for wider tests of the validity of certain measures. Given 
the response rate, such tests comparing the results of different questions were not possible, 
although a number of further tests were employed to ensure the validity of the final dataset. 
These are discussed in each of the papers herein. Secondly, the structure was re-arranged, 
such that the survey could begin with organisational information, then each area of 
regulation, then finally, performance and personal information. Some wording was altered 
to make it clearer that non-relevant sections could be skipped. Also, that questions relating 
to other firms should be based on perception, rather than definitive knowledge; i.e. “I 
understand it is common in my industry…” rather than “my competitors operate in 
accordance with…”. This was necessary following feedback that respondents held opinions, 
not proof, about the workings of other firms, thus they declined to answer the original 
wording. 
It is clear that the pilot study provided a wealth of information, which proved essential to the 
success of the main survey and the study overall. The survey was streamlined, with several 
questions refined based on respondent feedback. Furthermore, the sampling frame was 
broadened to better represent the industry and an enhanced communication plan was devised, 
along with a more flexible database management system. Although it was not possible to 
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run the originally intended statistical tests, refinements were made and alternative tests were 
later utilised (which found the final dataset to be valid). 
2.4.2 Trade-association support 
Prior literature has established (detailed in Section 1.3) that trade-associations have the 
potential to play a vital role, fulfilling many of the shortcomings which plague micro-firms. 
Furthermore, in a regulatory context, there is evidence that trade-associations already “offer 
some guidance that is more concise and reader-friendly than official government advice” 
(BRE, 2010, p.14), which is likely because they are better positioned (than government 
agencies) to tailor advice towards their members. Indeed, two of the trade-associations in the 
accommodation sector (The BBA and BedPosts) were formed as a direct result of changing 
fire regulations, which left many firms unsure how to maintain compliance, while lacking 
the collective voice to shape or respond to legislative demands (BBA, 2014; BedPosts, 
2014). In addition, trade-associations act as gatekeepers to their membership. Indeed, Fan 
and Yan (2010) note that sponsorship and endorsement are generally found to improve 
survey response rates, thus it is clear that trade-association endorsement (and access to 
membership) is critical to ensure the success of a study such as this. 
Trade-association support was solicited with two specific purposes. Firstly, helping to 
develop (thus, tailor) the survey towards member firms. As with tailoring guidance, this 
leverages the unique knowledge that trade-associations possess regarding the make-up of 
their membership. Secondly, through an endorsement and promotion of the survey to the 
various memberships. Support was sought from all of the leading trade-associations and 
marketing groups in the accommodation industry, with letters, emails, and telephone calls 
being placed to initiate dialogues from around the time of the pilot study. In addition, many 
of the associations publish their membership, often through guidebooks or directory 
websites, thus allowing for a sampling frame to be devised. This is discussed in Section 
2.4.3. 
Early communication with the BH&HPA appeared promising, which was expected due to 
their widespread use of research, strong lobbying position, and the prominence given to 
regulation in the bi-monthly BH&HPA Journal, which is distributed to all members. Indeed, 
the earliest communications were particularly positive and the raw results of a prior 
BH&HPA survey were shared. Additionally, during this time several suggestions were 
made, such as a preference for the term ‘anti-discrimination’, rather than ‘consumer equality’ 
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(the former term is found in the survey and the papers herein, the latter term was used during 
the pilot study). Further refinement was also made to the ‘knowledge tests’, which led to a 
revision of several test items and a revised question stem which made it clear that an absolute 
response was required, rather than a detailed set of conditions in which a statement may be 
true or false. Unfortunately, despite the early positive communication and a continued 
commitment to addressing concerns, no formal endorsement was ultimately provided. 
In a similar vein, the BBA became involved at an early juncture (January 2014), and while 
they did not possess prior research to share, they made several suggestions for the survey. 
Many of these revolved around the wording of the fire regulation questions. The BBA were 
in fact the first trade-association to offer an official endorsement. They were provided with 
an article regarding the study and survey to include in their monthly Bed & Breakfast News 
magazine. They were also given a unique link for members to use to access the survey, which 
was sent to their 8000+ membership via email. 
While dialogue with other trade-associations began around the same time, other 
endorsements were made after the survey launched, thereby demonstrating the strength of 
the finalised survey, as it directly led to further endorsement of the study itself. 
Endorsements were made by the British Hospitality Association, Farm Stay UK, and 
VisitEngland (the English tourist board). As before, each was provided with a bespoke article 
for their respective magazines and newsletters, as well as unique links to the survey. In 
addition, it is worth noting that both the University of Bath School of Management and 
Centre for Governance and Regulation were widely promoted throughout the study. With 
each new endorsement, the communications and support website were updated to reflect the 
wider acceptance of the study. Three further groups chose to inform their members about the 
survey without offering a formal endorsement. These were BedPosts, the National Caravan 
Council, and the Tourism Society. Several other groups were approached, including both the 
English Association of Self Catering Operators, and the Federation of Small Businesses. 
However, where responses were received, no support was forthcoming. 
Following the development of each of the papers herein (along with any future papers 
utilising this study’s dataset, see Section 6.5.1), it is intended that the findings will be 
circulated to all relevant trade-associations (whether they endorsed the study or not). 
Thereby positively impacting future activities through the insights and implementation of 
the recommendations herein (Section 6.3). Additionally, bespoke articles based on the 
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research will be offered to each trade-association for inclusion in their respective 
publications. It is hoped that this successful study and the close integration of trade-
associations, will help to foster relationships for future research projects, both with the 
associations that supported this study and, by example of this study, those that did not. 
2.4.3 Participant database and sampling frame 
A bespoke database was developed for the purposes of the study, specifically designed to 
store participant data including both contact information and tracking of all communications. 
The database was created in Microsoft Access (as it was the most suitable package), 
consisting of a number of linked tables developed to Third Normal Form (3NF); meaning 
that table records are connected via unique codes, with no duplication. The database 
relationship diagram is presented in Appendix 1. The need for such a database was 
highlighted through the pilot study, which used a similar approach via a simple spreadsheet. 
The upgrade to a database allowed for easier and more detailed querying (to use the technical 
term) of firm and communication data, for example ‘a report of firms who have been 
contacted in the last X days’ and what messages they were sent. 
Data was sourced from a number of publicly available websites, including UKParks.com 
(the BH&HPA membership directory), BedAndBreakfast.com, the Motorcaravanners’ Club 
Handbook, the Little Green Book, Farm Stay UK’s website, BedPosts, the AA 
accommodation website, and The Caravan Club’s directory of certified location sites13. 
Across the various tables a number of data points are included, beginning with contact details 
for each firm (such as business name and address), along with optional contact details for 
specific individuals. This was necessary because, particularly in the tourism context, there 
is widespread use of generic email addresses, such as enquiries@ (336 cases in the database) 
and info@ (770 cases in the database), which may not necessarily be directed to the owner-
manager. Where possible, personalisation was used to address communications to a named 
person and individual email addresses were used when available. Additional fields included 
whether or not a firm has completed the survey, their eligibility for the prize draw, and 
whether they have requested to be excluded (from future communications). A total of 293 
                                                 
13 Certified Locations are small parks, operated by Caravan Club members, and authorised to accept up to five 
Caravan Club members at a time. They do not require licencing by the local council and many can be found as 
ancillary extensions to other businesses, utilising land that would otherwise have little purpose. Caravan Club 
owned parks were excluded as they form part of the Club, which does not meet any criteria of the micro-firm 
definition. 
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firms were marked as excluded, with reasons such as retirement, no time or inclination to 
take part, and business closure. Details about each firm’s facilities, such as the type of 
accommodation available, the number of rooms or pitches, revenue, and profit were also 
included where available. This was sourced from firms’ own website, trade publications and 
financial data submitted to Companies House. In 14% of cases (the maximum possible), this 
information was later compared with survey responses to validate the authenticity of the 
results which had been provided. No evidence of bias or misreporting was found. Finally, 
the content of each message (be-it an invitation or follow-up), along with the date and 
method of each communication was also included. Such additional detail, while not strictly 
required for the study, allows for a future review to ascertain the most successful methods 
of communication to each sub-sector over time, along with other aspects, such as the effect 
of additional trade-association support on response rates. Such future possibilities are 
explored further in Section 6.5.1. 
2.4.4 Support website 
Through the pilot study, it became clear that there would be a constant struggle between 
brevity, which increases the chances of a communication (letter or email) being read, and 
detailed information, which enhances understanding and alleviates concerns. To address 
this, a single-webpage support website was developed. Written in a conversational tone, it 
includes information about the study, thereby allowing communications to be shorter while 
offering a link to more information for those who seek it. This information is tailored both 
to prospective survey respondents and to other organisations, such as trade-associations, who 
may wish to participate in some way. Appropriate links to the University website are also 
included. The website has been maintained throughout the study, starting before the launch 
of the survey, through to the present day. For example, new trade-association endorsements 
were added as they became available and news updates on the study are also detailed. In 
addition, the use of a website allowed bespoke web links (URLs) to be created (all within 
the same branding pattern) thereby giving each supporting trade-association their own 
(accountable) unique link to promote the survey (for example, bizsurvey.org/bba for the Bed 
and Breakfast Association). The support website received a high level of traffic throughout 
the duration of the survey, with several respondents and potential respondents using it to 
both get in contact (via email and telephone) and undertake the survey.  
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The live website can be viewed at bizsurvey.org. Archived versions of the site are also 
available at bizsurvey.org/archive. Copies of three key versions of the website (before, 
during, and after the survey) are presented in Appendix 2.  
2.4.5 Survey approach 
A survey method was chosen for the study because it allows standardised responses to be 
collected for a wide selection of variables, in an efficient manner, from a large sample. 
Whereas in-depth interviews or case-studies, while useful in their own right, may not result 
in the wider applicability of findings, and may also be unduly influenced by the specific 
circumstances of individual firms (Edwards et al., 2002; Edwards et al., 2003). Additionally, 
given the difficulties regarding access with micro-firm owner-managers (Johnson, 2002), a 
survey has the advantage that it requires minimal time investment, which can be undertaken 
at the convenience of the owner-manager. Interviews, in contrast, require more time and 
greater planning. 
At the time the survey was being developed, there was considerable prior literature regarding 
the relative differences between online and postal surveys, although the rapid pace of 
technological development had already outdated many of the research findings. For example, 
several studies note the potential bias towards younger and more affluent respondents of 
online surveys (Fan and Yan, 2010), although the proliferation of online devices has vastly 
reduced such disparities (Schley, 2013). Similarly, there was a preponderance for treating 
online surveys as inherently inferior, rather than simply an alternate medium. In contrast 
Manfreda et al. (2008) found online surveys to be comparable to postal surveys, although 
suffering from an average 11% lower response rate. Furthermore, online surveys present a 
number of advantages, such as dynamic layouts and instantaneous feedback (with no need 
for respondents to actually ‘return’ the survey), not to mention the lower administrative costs 
(Fan and Yan, 2010). Given the ceaseless expansion of digital devices and the benefits (cost 
and otherwise), this study used a mixed-mode approach, offering both online and postal 
surveys. More recent literature suggests this approach was valid, while confirming the 
ongoing suitability of online surveys (Dillman, 2016; Wolf et al., 2016). 
Questions for the survey (both versions) were developed with careful consideration to avoid 
the introduction of subtle bias. Following the guidance of Dillman et al. (2008) and later, 
Dillman et al. (2014), efforts were made to devise questions tied to the underlying concepts, 
in an appropriate and easy to follow format. Further to this, specific efforts were made to 
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follow the balanced (rather than burden-led) approach laid out in Section 1.4. Such as 
avoiding leading questions, presenting both the positive and negative in questions stems (i.e. 
“how much do you agree or disagree with…”), and avoiding the term ‘burden’ in all but one 
part of the scale items (which are also offset by other scale items). Scales, and the underlying 
questions, were developed in line with Spector’s (1992) guidelines and tested for convergent 
validity, which was found to be above the accepted minimum in all cases (DeVellis, 2012). 
Each of the papers herein expand further on the additional validation methods employed and, 
in line with the requirements of the target journal, the appendix table in Paper Three provides 
more detail, including the Cronbach’s alpha value, for each scale variable. 
While it is necessary for these two versions of the survey (online and postal) to be as similar 
as possible (even the formatting matches as closely as is practical), to prevent introducing 
bias, a small number of differences were unavoidable, which are detailed here. The 
introduction and closing text differs to reflect how the postal version must be posted back 
with the included freepost return envelope, while the online version simply requires a push 
of the ‘submit’ button. The postal version is paginated to fit 12 A4 pages, whereas the online 
version (which allows for an infinite number of questions per page) presents each block of 
questions (i.e. organisation questions, then each set of regulation questions, and so on) as a 
separate page. As all postal entries were tracked, there was no need to collect region 
information, yet the online surveys could have been completely anonymous, so they included 
a map for respondents to note their broad location14. A comparison of the results of postal 
and online responses showed no evidence of systematic bias caused by the method used. 
Given the experience of the pilot study, ensuring a suitable response rate became a primary 
concern. While several new steps were taken in the survey and communications, such as 
personalisation, highlighting the salience towards owner-managers, and industry 
endorsement, incentives were also provided through the use of a prize draw. There is 
considerable research into the use of incentives15, although no consensus has been reached. 
For example, while Gendall and Healey (2008) recommend the inclusion of money (or 
similarly valued items) with postal surveys, Dennis Jr (2003) found no incentives had a 
meaningful impact on response rates. Furthermore, the move towards online surveys negates 
the opportunity to provide many incentives, instead relying on codes to redeem money or 
                                                 
14 Online surveys can in fact estimate a respondent’s location automatically, but the process suffers from poor 
accuracy and it can be easily deceived, so a location question was preferred. 
15 Note that the survey was devised-by and launched-in 2014, meaning that the state of research has likely 
changed since, but had no bearing on this study. 
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vouchers, which lacks the immediacy of simply putting money in an envelope with a survey 
(Cobanoglu and Cobanoglu, 2003; Snyder and Elliard, 2012). Charitable donations were also 
considered, however, the majority of extant research found this to be of limited benefit and 
may actually perhaps reduce the response rate (Gendall and Healey, 2010), so they were 
discounted as well. 
The study instead opted for a prize draw, in which prizes consisted of four Amazon vouchers 
with values ranging from £25 to £100. In order to qualify, respondents had to complete the 
entire survey (and return it in the case of postal entries), including entering their name and 
email address. As surveys were recorded, their eligibility was noted in the participant 
database. Shortly after closing the survey, all qualifying entries were listed out in a table and 
four row numbers were randomly selected using Microsoft Excel’s RANDBETWEEN() 
function, in which the first and last row numbers were set as the lower and upper bounds 
between which a random number was generated four times. Each winner was contacted by 
telephone before an email containing the voucher code was dispatched. The winners also 
agreed to allow their names to be presented on the support website. 
The survey was distributed over the course of six months from October 2014. The prolonged 
period presented the opportunity for firms that close in the ‘off-season’ to take part, while 
avoiding the busiest holiday periods. Through practical necessity, firms were contacted in 
groups, thus spreading the distribution throughout the survey period. This also allowed the 
communication messages to be updated, such as with the addition of new endorsements, 
over time. Paper surveys were numbered and posted to randomly selected firms and firms 
for whom there was no obvious email address. 2,000 copies were produced and only a small 
number were retained for firms who specifically requested the postal version. The surveys 
were dispatched with a freepost return envelope and a covering letter which detailed the 
purpose of the study, the approximate length of the survey, the prize draw, and referred to 
the support website for further information. Additionally, logos for each endorsing trade-
association were included on the covering letter and were updated throughout the 
distribution period. Firms who received a postal survey were sent several follow-up 
messages via email and one via post. Following the pilot study, all firms who were contacted 
via email were sent a pre-invitation notice a short time before the invitation with survey link. 
Both referenced the support website to allow for brevity. These firms were also sent email 
follow-up messages on a number of occasions. All communications were developed using 
the guidelines laid out by Dillman et al. (2008) and Dillman et al. (2014). A total of 706 
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responses were collected, a highly respectable response rate of 19% (Saunders et al., 2015), 
of which 44% were postal entries, with the remaining 56% completed online. 
Copies of both the postal and online versions of the survey are included in Appendices 3 and 
4 respectively. 
2.5 Constant-comparison thematic analysis of survey comments 
Due to various resource and time restrictions, it was not possible to undertake widescale 
interviews with survey respondents. In lieu of this, the comments provided in the survey’s 
open comments box were formally analysed using a constant-comparison thematic method 
as defined by Krueger and Casey (2009). Via this technique, the comments were labelled 
with codes related to their content. Throughout the process, these codes are compared with 
each other (the ‘constant-comparison’) to limit duplication. Later, the codes were again 
compared and grouped together into overarching themes. The themes (and indeed individual 
codes) can then be used for interpretive analysis, with direct quotes included to provided 
illustrative examples, thereby ensuring that such an analysis is thoroughly rooted in the data. 
In this study, and in particular throughout the papers, the thematic analysis is used to inform 
the interpretation of the quantitative results, especially in relation to causation within 
identified variable relationships. Due to the length limitations of the papers, little detail is 
provided regarding this analysis, with only the relevant themes, sub-themes and quotes 
discussed in each case. However, this section of the thesis provides greater detail on the 
analysis and all of the themes.  
It is important to note that this analysis is of an unsolicited comments box at the end of a 12-
page survey. Indeed, the precise wording of the prompt was: “is there anything else you 
would like to tell us about any of the issues raised in this survey?”, which explains why the 
second largest theme is classified as ‘miscellaneous’. A strong level of triangulation is 
possible, given that the themes independently generated by the comments, match the 
statistical analyses so closely (such as an emphasis on value and burden, and noting the non-
financial business goals). Furthermore, many of the comments and specific terms used by 
respondents, can be found in other studies (such as Peck et al., 2012, Figure 2.2 in particular). 
This points towards interviews as a rich data source for future research, which is explored in 
Section 6.4. 
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The remainder of this section lists each theme, along with the number of remarks and a brief 
description, before offering illustrative quotes. Many of these quotes can also be found in 
Paper’s One and Three, where they are used to explore the quantitative results. There are 
197 responses with entries in the open comments box, leading to a total of 205 codes, with 
473 remarks, combined to form 10 themes. Where quotes are listed, the respondent ID is 
given in parentheses. The absence of a theme, or a thread within a theme (such as trade-
association support for non-regulatory issues) should not be taken as evidence that such an 
absence exists, only that its presence was not noted, which is not surprising given the context 
and the prompt provided. This is where real interview data would provide a fuller account. 
Details about the firm and the respondent: 159 remarks. This was the largest overall 
theme, in which respondents provided extraneous information about either themselves or 
their business. Of these, 72 comments specified that the respondent firm was small, while a 
further 26 noted that their revenue was considerably less than the £75,000 (i.e. the lowest) 
revenue tier presented in the survey. Some background relating to firm diversification was 
also included, along with the age of the business and succession planning. Illustrative quotes 
include: 
Our business is not only micro, it’s miniscule! (1910). 
Running a small business is a nightmare, particularly where it concerns public 
health/safety/employment law! (2287). 
I am a very small Bed & Breakfast and although sensible regulation is very 
important I sometimes feel that we are in danger of losing our individuality and 
for the experience for my guests I want them to feel at home (3463). 
Trade-association support: 14 remarks. These comments related directly to the support 
sought and provided by various trade-associations; including improving knowledge, 
checking compliance, and reliance on regulatory matters, along with demonstrating 
knowledge which has clearly been given by trade-associations. Illustrative quotes include: 
Being part of a membership organisation probably makes me more aware of 
legislation and other issues, than independent operators (2016). 
Visit Britain have to reissue their Pink Book guide every year just to keep up 
with the continuous changes and additional restrictions (4031). 
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I rely on the Caravan Club to guide me in matter regarding regulation of the 
Caravan Club site aspects of the business (5379). 
Sharing economy: 13 remarks. These comments specifically refer to the sharing economy, 
and indeed, frequently name Airbnb in particular. They demonstrate the growing concern 
surrounding firms which respondents believe represent unfair competition as they currently 
fall under different regulatory scrutiny. Although not included in this analysis, several trade-
associations additionally remarked on this notion as well. Illustrative quotes include: 
Businesses that choose not to be inspected [by the tourist board] are often under 
the radar and don’t get visits from Environmental Health, fire officers, etc. 
(1937). 
The most important issue for small hospitality businesses is, in my opinion, 
unfair competition from ‘businesses’ that are potentially unregulated as they 
trade using non-standard methods such as Airbnb (2176). 
Lack of information, support and knowledge: 28 remarks. This theme represents specific 
complaints relating to the lack of information and support (and thus the resulting knowledge 
deficit) provided by the government, local councils, and regulators. Indeed, the tourist board 
and their inspectors are frequently singled out. Illustrative quotes include: 
Local councils should issue booklets on fire and health and safety – not seen 
anyone or had contact in 18 years! (1855). 
Setting up and building a new campsite has been far more difficult than it should 
have been. Very little support from council and licencing authorities (3106). 
Burden: 87 remarks. While not the category with the most remarks, this theme does consist 
of the highest number of individual codes (i.e. the widest variety of statements). Comments 
include various complaints relating to the ‘burden’ of regulation, consisting of both cost and 
time. There were many specific comments relating to individual regulations, including some 
not featured in the survey. Additionally, many respondents referred to regulation as a form 
of ‘assault’ on businesses and demonstrated somewhat cynical beliefs regarding the ‘true’ 
purpose of regulation and a widespread lack of common sense. Illustrative quotes include: 
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Good practice in my Bed & Breakfast is followed as a matter of routine but a 
diary RE: hygiene is a waste of my time which I deeply resent, cooking only 4 
breakfasts max a day! (1878). 
Regulations have a disproportionate impact on small businesses. Compliance 
sometimes has a very disruptive impact if you do the right thing e.g. maternity 
leave. We have no specialist resources to cover such things and nobody seems 
to appreciate that running a small business is like living in a turret with different 
types of regulator attacking from all sides (53). 
Feel many regulations designed across the board and do not always 'fit' to small 
business without incurring costs. Reduced my staff due to PAYE rules and 
regulations which meant more time on computer and away from hands on work 
(1963). 
Value: 18 remarks. This theme demonstrates the acceptance of the need for regulation and 
regulatory compliance amongst firms. Many comments refer to respondents ‘trying their 
best’ to comply and ‘do the right thing’, even in the face of the apparent ‘burden’. Illustrative 
quotes include: 
I don’t think there are many businesses that don’t accept the need for certain 
regulations. Compliance of regulations is important but they do need to be made 
far more appropriate to micro-businesses (2980). 
I believe that regulations are essential for the safety of the public (3804). 
Goals: 8 remarks. These comments relate to the reason owner-managers operate their firms 
and highlight their enjoyment in doing so, often specifically in spite of regulatory 
‘roadblocks’. Regulation was also mentioned here, but only as the cost of doing business. 
Illustrative quotes include: 
I have enjoyed running my Bed & Breakfast business in the last 20 years (1820). 
My husband who is 84 and myself run it and do not employ any staff. It enables 
us to stay in our lovely home, otherwise we would have to downsize (2078). 
There is a lot of satisfaction to be had providing holiday makers with lovely 
accommodation, which I guess is why I am still doing it (4048). 
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Poor understanding of micro-firms by regulators: 7 remarks. While the theme with the 
fewest remarks, these comments highlight the differences between one and two-person firms 
against larger SMEs. They also demonstrate a belief that little thought is given to micro-
firms when designing regulation, with requirements written for larger firms before being 
applied to everyone. Several comments call for ‘sensible’ exemptions for micro-firms. 
Illustrative quotes include: 
Too many regs are designed for large business then applied to small/micro-
businesses i.e. turnover less than 100k. Phrase sledgehammer and nut come to 
mind. I with only 6 letting rooms have to comply to same rules as Holiday Inn 
and Hilton types of hotels (4653). 
Another [regulatory overreach] is the gas regulation where any premises selling 
items requires a gas certificate including a ventilation system. Fine except it 
even includes a church hall occasionally having a bring and buy sale. They need 
to spend thousands on a ventilation system not used 95% of the time. A little 
thought and a genuine intention to improve things surely would include an 
exemption for small users (6612112016). 
Non-regulatory burdens: 27 remarks. Perhaps confirming prior literature that owner-
managers ‘tend towards the negative’ (Edwards et al., 2003; IpsosMORI, 2007), these 
comments highlight further burdens on firms, in addition to the regulatory burdens already 
detailed. These include difficult trading conditions, changing guest attitudes, finding quality 
staff, a pervasive litigious public attitude, rising costs (such as business rates and bank 
charges), and third-party review sites/online travel agents. Amongst these comments, some 
respondents were further disheartened by a lack of support and their perceived treatment by 
the government. Illustrative quotes include: 
The regulations, compliance and the change in attitude of guests (more 
demanding, less understanding of what a B&B is and should provide) has meant 
that I have decided to close the B&B and reopen as self-catering only (1697). 
As a society we desperately need a significant cultural shift to make people take 
much more responsibility for the consequences of their own actions and to 
                                                 
16 This respondent, along with several others, undertook the survey online, completely anonymously and 
without entering the prize draw, hence the different naming convention. 
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ignore the compulsion felt to increase regulation every time the red top press 
select another issue to publicise in an effort to maintain their own sales (4031). 
Health and safety has served its purpose but common sense needs to be 
readdressed and instilled in young people (2156). 
It is the continual rising costs of business rates, electricity, waste disposal, 
insurances, bank charges, customer relations that have a bigger impact on 
running a business (5592). 
Miscellaneous survey (non-regulatory) comments: 112 remarks. While this appears to 
be one of the largest themes, it merely reflects the source as an open comments box about 
anything included in the survey. Indeed, these comments are mostly unrelated to the study, 
and instead query aspects of the survey, or include apologies for delayed completion. 
Furthermore, there are several somewhat vitriolic comments related to the survey itself, 
mostly surrounding the lowest revenue tier on offer (in addition to those who simply 
highlighted that their revenue was particularly lower than the tier amount), and querying the 
inclusion of questions aimed at exploring social desirability. In particular, many respondents 
felt these questions were too personal and appeared out of place in a ‘business related’ 
survey; moreover, many commented on how they boycotted the questions. It is surprising 
that these aspects drew such ire and Section 6.4 details how future studies may integrate this 
insight. Additionally, 10 of the remarks were somewhat related to knowledge of competitor 
compliance. Illustrative quotes include: 
The (earnings) revenue for this survey are much higher than mine last year my 
income was less than £5,000 (1728). 
For many of our 21 years we were members of the English Tourist Board (or 
whatever it chooses to call itself these days) and also Quality in Tourism. We 
feel that these expensive quangos have done very little to protect [their] members 
from threats such as those outlined above and seem to be concerned only with 
their latest fad promotions many of which have provided us with no tangible 
benefits whatsoever. We are however pleased that at long last someone has taken 
the trouble to ask us our opinions (2175). 
I don't see the relevance of the last section! Not answering! (3528). 
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2.6 Ethical and data considerations 
Ethical approval was sought through the standard University process and was granted before 
data collection commenced. 
Participant consent was provided by the voluntary completion of the survey. All 
communications and the survey itself were written to clearly identify the voluntary nature of 
the survey. Where trade-association support is highlighted, it was done-so as endorsement, 
without suggestion that member firms should be induced to participate. Throughout 
communications and the survey, the nature of the study was made clear, as were the 
requirements of participants, potential or otherwise. 
A prize draw was offered to entice completion of the survey (as detailed in Section 2.4.5). 
Entry was voluntary (in addition to the voluntary nature of the survey), with participants 
freely choosing to enter by including their name and email address. This information is 
stored separately from the response data. 
This study is relatively low risk with minimal sensitive information required, much of which 
is self-identified into category form at the point of collection, rather than seeking exact detail. 
Potentially sensitive questions are generally of a business, rather than personal nature. There 
is a small risk that participants admit to regulatory ignorance or non-compliance, however 
this is negated as all recorded data is treated confidentially, with participants identified only 
through participant coding throughout the sample database and response data. All data is 
stored securely, in protected environments and in accordance with the Data Protection Act 
(1998). Any reports (of any nature) on the study will only use aggregated data. Where quotes 
are used as part of the thematic comment analysis, any potentially identifying information is 
anonymised to ensure that no particular firm or individual can be identified. 
2.7 Participant characteristics 
While each paper herein details the variables used in their respective analyses, it was not 
always suitable to include wider descriptive characteristics about respondents and their 
firms. In addition to the information provided in the papers, these details are gathered here 
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Number of Workers 
 
 02.79 01.94 
Revenue    
 Up to £75,000 
Up to £500,000 






Years in Business 
 
 15.67 11.30 
Respondent Age 
 
 58.93 10.05 








2.8 Chapter summary 
This chapter has elaborated upon the background and methodological detail provided in each 
of the papers herein. In doing so, it has explored the context of each of the four areas of 
regulation included in the study. It has also provided greater insight into the wider research 
approach, such as the successful pilot study (which informed so much of the main study), 
the need-for and use-of trade-association support, the use of a website to display information 
about the study (thus allowing brevity in some communications with potential respondents), 
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and a more detailed account of the survey methods that were chosen and employed, from 
question development to distribution. In addition, a far more comprehensive description of 
the thematic analysis of unsolicited survey comments is given than can be found in the 
papers. Indeed, it explains the analytic process and includes all of the themes, with 
illustrative comments. 
Over the next three sections, each of the papers is presented in turn, starting with declarations 
of authorship. Following the papers, Section 6 provides an overall discussion, bringing the 




3. Paper One: Knowledge 
This declaration concerns the article entitled: 
Managerial Hubris, Trade-Associations and Regulatory Knowledge in Micro-Firms 
Publication status (tick one) 




This is the first revised and resubmitted version for the British Journal of Management, 
originally submitted February 2017 and resubmitted August 2017 in revised form. The 
version contained herein has since been altered in light of the viva voce examination. Note 
that this paper is referred to as “Chapter 3 in this thesis” in citations throughout the later 
papers. If accepted, the reference would read: 
Betton, M.E., Branston, J.R. & Tomlinson, P.R., 2017. Managerial Hubris, Trade-
Associations and Regulatory Knowledge in Micro-Firms. British Journal of Management. 
Candidate’s 
contribution 
to the paper 
(detailed, 
and also 
given as a 
percentage) 
The candidate considerably contributed to the… 
Formulation of ideas: 60%. I devised the basis of the paper, including the exploration of 
Perceived- and Actual Knowledge, and studied further literature as necessary. I created the 
initial draft of the paper, containing most of the ideas in raw form. From this, the second 
and third authors and I, made revisions throughout the paper, before we each approved of 
the initial version of the paper for submission. The same process was used to revise the 
version of the paper included herein in light of reviewer comments. 
Design of methodology: 60%. I devised and refined the survey, based on the outcomes of 
the pilot study. I also developed each of the variables from the constituent survey questions 
and ran all of the statistical analyses, with methodological support from the other authors. 
Experimental work: 90%. I alone conducted the survey, communicated with respondents 
(potential and otherwise), and liaised with trade-associations, although financial support for 
postal survey and the prize draw was provided by the second author. 
Presentation of data in journal format: 90%. I followed the Author Guidelines for the 
British Journal of Management and read a number of articles from the journal, thus ensuring 
the presentation would be acceptable and in keeping with the expected level of work. Special 
consideration was given to the word count, wherein the paper uses the higher limit available, 
which was justified through the number of hypotheses and the need to fully explore the 
range of issues involved, along with addressing reviewer comments. Tables are embedded 
in the text as the paper is presented herein, but were provided in a separate file for journal 
submission. Tables 5 and 6 include extra statistical detail and are presented differently than 
similar tables elsewhere in the thesis to address a specific reviewer comment. 
Permission Permission was granted by the journal Associate Editor to include the revised draft of this 
paper in the thesis, provided that public access to the thesis remained embargoed for a set 
period after publication. 
Candidate 
Statement 
This paper reports on original research I conducted during the period of my Higher Degree 





Managerial Hubris, Trade-Associations, and 
Regulatory Knowledge in Micro-Firms 
 
Abstract 
In micro-firms the manager must be both the chief decision-maker and a specialist in many, 
if not all, areas of the business. This wide range of responsibilities can reduce the 
opportunities to maintain knowledge of regulatory matters, thereby risking misguided 
attempts at regulatory compliance, and hence potentially ruinous unnecessary costs and/or 
prosecution for breaking the law. It is therefore essential that managers are aware of 
deficiencies in their knowledge, so they can seek improvement, and avoid over-confidence 
– hubris – in their knowledge levels. Using newly collected survey data from micro-firms in 
the English accommodation sector, we present an analysis of the level of regulatory 
knowledge that micro-firm managers think they possess, and what they actually possess, 
over four core areas of regulation. Using multivariate techniques both Perceived-Knowledge 
(from self-assessment) and Actual-Knowledge (from a simple test) of regulation are found 
to be different and generally poor. Additionally, attitude is found to influence both forms of 
knowledge, while trade-association memberships are also found to enhance Perceived-, but 
not Actual-Knowledge. We suggest several methods to improve both knowledge and self-
assessment skills through a co-ordinated cross trade-association campaign, as the lack of 
alternatives means they remain best suited to deal with micro-firm managers. 
 






Managers of all businesses must make decisions based on their knowledge and 
understanding of an ever-evolving set of regulations1. However, in small firms and 
particularly micro-firms, the wide range of responsibilities and potential lack of skills or 
specialist knowledge may impact managers’ knowledge and understanding of the 
applicability of particular regulations, and/or the detail of how they should be implemented 
(O'Dwyer and Ryan, 2000). For a business to succeed it needs to comply with all applicable 
regulations, whilst expending the least amount of resources in doing so. A poor level of 
understanding of regulations can result in misguided attempts at regulatory compliance, 
which risks incurring unnecessary costs and/or prosecution for breaking the law. For smaller 
firms, the resulting fines, reputational damage, and/or loss of business due to temporary 
closure can quickly exceed their limited resources (Boustras et al., 2015; Shalini, 2009). It 
is therefore important to understand what managers know and how much they think they 
know about the regulations applying to their business, and the sources of this Perceived- and 
Actual-Knowledge.  
A potential danger is managers are liable to exhibit hubris (overconfidence in their imperfect 
knowledge) leading to (poor) ill-informed decision-making. There is a rich literature 
exploring managerial hubris in a variety of contexts, including entrepreneurship, unethical 
governance, and the decisions taken by corporate executives (Cassar, 2010; Haynes et al., 
2015; Hayward and Hambrick, 1997; Hayward et al., 2006; Hiller and Hambrick, 2005; 
Judge et al., 2009; McManus, 2016)2. This literature suggests that hubris is a real concern 
for businesses and it is likely to be especially serious for micro-firms who lack the resources 
to withstand poor decision-making for a prolonged period. Typically, studies on regulation, 
particularly those involving micro-firms, assess the ‘burden’ of regulation but crucially fail 
to explore the level of knowledge and understanding that sits behind the assumed burden 
(Kitching, 2006; Kitching et al., 2015). Furthermore, micro-firms are frequently overlooked 
in favour of larger ‘small firms’, while firms with no employees are often excluded, both in 
general terms, and in academic studies of regulation in particular (Arrowsmith et al., 2003; 
Greenbank, 2000; Russo and Tencati, 2009). Yet knowledge-of, and compliance-with, 
                                                 
1 Regulation is the “imposition of rules by government, backed by the use of penalties that are intended 
specifically to modify the economic behaviour of individuals and firms in the private sector” OECD (1993, 
p.73). 
2 See Table 1 in Bodolica and Spraggon (2011) for an overview of hubris and its manifestations in managers 
and firms. 
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regulation is especially significant for micro-firms as managers often find themselves spread 
thinly, focusing on the day-to-day operations of their businesses (and hence ‘firefighting’) 
rather than finding time for business development (Falta and Gallery, 2011). They are also 
likely to suffer from a lack of managerial skill and experience, and wider business support 
(Carson, 1985; Johnson, 2002; O'Dwyer and Ryan, 2000) making them particularly 
vulnerable to hubris. For instance, Blackburn et al. (2015) find micro-firm managers often 
'sort out problems on their own' and only 20% seek legal professionals when dealing with 
legal issues, despite lacking the expertise themselves. This makes micro-firms an ideal 
setting in which to explore regulatory knowledge, especially since they are also the most 
numerous type of businesses in the UK economy, accounting for 96% of all businesses, 32% 
of private sector employment, and 19% of private sector turnover (BEIS, 2016a).  
The contribution of this paper is three-fold: it first makes a broad theoretical contribution by 
exploring the specific challenges micro-firms face with regulation, and in doing so it 
identifies the need to consider these firms separately from the ‘small firm’ segment they 
have tended to be grouped with thus far. It then makes a second, more specific, theoretical 
contribution by identifying the potential impact that both trade-associations and an 
individual’s perception of a regulation may have on the Perceived- and Actual-Knowledge 
of a micro-firm’s manager. The third contribution is an empirical one via the exploration of 
these theoretical positions through the use of original survey data and multivariate 
techniques. The level of regulatory knowledge micro-firm managers’ actually possess, what 
they think they possess, and the determinants of these is explored over four core areas of 
regulation. Employment, Anti-discrimination, Fire, and Health and Safety were chosen as 
they are areas where the relevant trade-associations are active, are widely applicable to all 
businesses which either have employees or are open to the public, and hence they broaden 
the potential impact of the results beyond the immediate case. Throughout we explore the 
possibility of hubristic behaviour. 
The tourism industry is a fitting case for such a study as it predominantly comprises micro-
firms (Tourism Alliance, 2016) and is highly regulated, with over 21,000 regulations 
estimated to be in effect (Tourism Regulation Taskforce, 2012). It is a significant sector in 
the UK economy, accounting for 9.5% of UK employment and contributing 7.1% of UK 
GDP (in 2014) (Tourism Alliance, 2016). Furthermore, Shaw and Williams (2009) argue 
there is little research into knowledge in a tourism context, and there are a substantial number 
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of trade-associations in the industry (with high levels of membership) making it an ideal 
context in which to explore the issue of regulatory knowledge within micro-firms. 
The remainder of this paper is set out as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature 
and in doing so it develops a number of hypotheses to be tested. Section 3 presents 
background on the chosen case, details of the survey that acted as the data source, and the 
methodological approach. Sections 4 and 5 then present, analyse, and discuss the results, 
before Section 6 briefly concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical Background 
2.1 Micro-Firms and Regulation  
Micro-firms, defined herein as firms with 0-9 employees (BIS, 2016c; DTI, 1995), are 
distinguished by the role of the owner, who is likely to be both the manager and also highly 
active in all parts of the business (Edwards et al., 2002; Kelliher and Reinl, 2009). Unlike in 
larger (small) firms where there may be specialist support within the business, micro-firm 
owner-managers must not only be the chief decision-maker, but also a specialist in many 
(perhaps all) aspects of the business including regulation (Lovatt and Pratten, 2003; Matlay, 
1999; Tilley, 2000). With the owner-manager’s time stretched across all aspects of the 
business, there may be scarce opportunity to research and implement applicable regulations, 
potentially leading owner-managers to view regulation as a distraction from core business 
activities or to perhaps even ignore them (Akinboade and Kinfack, 2012; Atherton et al., 
2008; Edwards et al., 2004). Micro-firms are generally found to be informal in their 
operations, with business practices which do not strictly follow regulatory procedures 
(Arrowsmith et al., 2003; Ram et al., 2001; Saridakis et al., 2013). It might therefore be 
supposed that knowledge of applicable regulations, and the associated challenges of ensuring 
compliance, are particularly problematic for micro-firms. However, the actual impact of 
regulation on micro-firms is unclear since most studies in this area have either tended to 
consider them to be part of a broad small or SME (Small and Medium Enterprise) segment 
(e.g. Crain and Crain, 2010) or exclude (at least some of) them from analysis (BEIS, 2016b; 
Blackburn and Hart, 2002).  
Even when studies are relevant, they have been somewhat split in their conclusions making 
it difficult to establish a clear picture. Some studies have suggested small firms are indeed 
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disproportionately affected by regulation (e.g. Collard and Godwin, 1999; OECD, 2001). 
Indeed, Carter et al. (2009) identify a stream of work with such conclusions and suggest the 
basis of such regressive costs are because some compliance costs are (partially) fixed and 
hence do not increase in proportion to size. Other studies reach contrary conclusions (e.g. 
Edwards et al., 2003; Hart et al., 2008; Vickers et al., 2005). A review by Kitching (2006) 
found issues with identifying the direct impact of regulatory changes, although did suggest 
issues surrounding “lack of awareness of regulation [and] deliberate noncompliance” 
(p.803) might be responsible for such findings.  
Irrespective of the impact of regulation, owner-managers must continually maintain 
awareness of regulatory developments and then take appropriate action when necessary in 
order to preserve regulatory compliance. This fundamentally requires a suitable 
understanding of the regulations so they can be interpreted correctly. However, there is much 
evidence that small firm owners lack the solid knowledge and understanding of regulations 
required (Atkinson and Curtis, 2004; Harris et al., 2012; Lovatt and Pratten, 2003; Marlow, 
2003; Sjögrén and Syrjä, 2015; Westrip, 1986). These knowledge deficits might also impact 
upon the employees of the business, as many employees in small firms may lack awareness 
of relevant regulations or their own legal rights, instead relying upon the interpretations 
(correct or otherwise) of the owner-manager (Atkinson et al., 2016). For instance, Hart et al. 
(2008) found 67% of small business owners took personal responsibility when dealing with 
new regulation and 58% personally trained existing employees, further emphasising the need 
for owner-managers to have their own clear understanding. 
In light of these discussions it is clear knowledge of regulation is crucial for the success of 
micro-firms, but work on small firms suggest it is likely to be lacking. We therefore posit 
that in relation to routine knowledge, owner-managers would ideally be expected to have 
close to 100% knowledge and certainly above 80% knowledge (Kane, 2013). Consequently, 
any score significantly below 100% should be considered poor as it implies owner-managers 
were lacking a substantial amount of functional knowledge. Thus, we specify: 




2.2 Knowledge, Self-Assessment, and Attitude 
Without a required qualification or formalised training programme for owner-managers of 
micro-firms, such individuals must assess their knowledge and then take action where it is 
thought to be lacking. Yet, most research (mainly in non-business contexts) reports that 
individuals are usually poor at assessing their own level of knowledge (Eva and Regehr, 
2007; Eva and Regehr, 2011; Gordon, 1991; Kruger and Dunning, 1999, 2002; Meeran et 
al., 2016) suggesting that owner-manager hubris is a real possibility. Indeed, the review by 
Sitzmann et al. (2010) found 56% of studies reported self-assessment to be inaccurate, rising 
to 80% for the few studies on businesses. 
Businesses provide few opportunities for structured testing given (owner-)managers’ lack 
time (Johnson, 2002; Sauermann and Roach, 2013) and hence many studies simply accept 
self-assessment to be an accurate proxy for Actual-Knowledge (Akinboade and Kinfack, 
2012; Atkinson and Curtis, 2004; Nag and Gioia, 2012; Weerasiri and Zhengang, 2012). 
However, Stokols et al. (2001) developed techniques with SMEs using Likert-scale type 
questions to ascertain the perceived level of managerial knowledge, before testing this with 
a series of questions. Similarly, Alaaeddine et al. (2013) tests SME knowledge with a bank 
of questions regarding different aspects of a new law.  
Given the paucity of research into the accuracy of self-assessment in a business context, 
most especially in a micro-firm and regulation context, along with the propensity for 
accepting self-assessment despite apparent inaccuracies, we can specify: 
H2: There will be no meaningful correlation between Perceived- and 
Actual-Knowledge of regulation, 
where we would expect either no statistically significant correlation, or one with a r-value 
below 0.10, which Cohen (1988) and Pallant (2011) define as the lower limit for a ‘small 
correlation’. 
Knowledge of one’s shortcomings is not necessarily sufficient to prompt learning. Prior 
literature already denotes the hubris present in owner-managers, which suggests that they 
already know there is a limit to their knowledge (that being the basis of H2). Therefore, there 
must exist other factors which influence the drive to learn and thus, the knowledge level. 
IpsosMORI (2007) demonstrate the importance of owner perceptions or misperceptions 
through interviews, finding particularly negative perceptions of newer regulations, or 
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regulatory changes, which diminished with time. Edwards et al. (2003) and Hart et al. (2008) 
both demonstrate a link between these perceptions of regulation (i.e. if it is seen as good or 
bad for business, or as burden on the business) and their reactions, including efforts relating 
to compliance. This is particularly evident when a regulation is viewed as an unwelcome 
intrusion or an erosion of perceived common sense. This implies that a positive perception 
towards regulation, i.e. owner-managers’ attitude, will affect their reactions to regulation. 
Furthermore, Edwards et al. (2003) and Hart et al. (2008) find that ultimately, owner-
managers view regulation as a singular whole, rather than considering each regulation 
individually (i.e. as an aggregate, whose average is raised with every ‘good’ regulation and 
lowered by any ‘bad’ regulation). 
It follows that this ‘reaction’ to regulation includes spending time on researching, 
understanding, and eventually complying with regulation. We therefore posit that a generally 
positive attitude towards regulation (such as viewing it as a benefit to the firm or society) 
will promote engagement with learning, thereby resulting in greater effort expended to learn 
about it (as well as implement measures to comply with it), while a negative attitude will 
result in less effort to learn and therefore, poorer knowledge. Thus, we specify: 
H3a: Perceived-Knowledge of regulation will positively correlate with 
attitude towards regulation. 
H3b: Actual-Knowledge of regulation will positively correlate with 
attitude towards regulation. 
 
2.3 Source of Knowledge 
To understand the knowledge of regulation owner-managers possess, it is important to 
understand the sources of their knowledge. Existing research has identified a number of 
information sources used by micro/SME firms, such as the internet, personal networks, the 
media, external professionals (including consultants and accountants), and trade-
associations (Bennett and Ramsden, 2007; Bennett and Robson, 1999b; King et al., 2014; 
Peck et al., 2012). Although ‘the internet’ is frequently listed as a source, it is in fact a 
conduit to sources of knowledge including: definitive official sources such as Government 
websites; and potentially unreliable sources such as blogs or news websites. Furthermore, 
the owner-manager needs to correctly interpret any information gathered, which is far from 
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certain. For instance, Peck et al. (2012) highlight that relevant information can be lost amid 
the ‘media noise’ and general negative opinion surrounding the reporting of regulatory 
matters. Moreover, they also note the media often discusses regulation during periods of pre-
implementation policy consultation, further confusing readers about what is eventually 
introduced and hence what is required for compliance. Thus, the internet and personal 
networks might be perceived as being of variable quality and hence potentially unreliable 
sources due to their inherently limited accountability and subjective interpretation. There is 
also evidence that official sources of information, such as government agencies, have 
demonstrated poor success in reaching small firms or doing so in a timely matter (Blackburn, 
2012; Blackburn and Hart, 2002; BRE, 2010). 
Several studies note the extensive use of external professionals, mostly accountants, by small 
firms for business support and information seeking (BEIS, 2016b; King et al., 2014; 
Pleasance and Balmer, 2013). However, the use of accountants may be over-reported as a 
source of wider support since the inherent complexities of financial matters, including 
payroll and taxation, make it difficult for owner-managers to ‘muddle through’ hence 
support is often needed in this area. Indeed, there is limited research into what information 
and assistance owner-managers actually seek from their accountants beyond direct 
accounting matters, and it is unlikely accountants can provide robust support for wider 
regulatory matters (e.g. fire-safety requirements). Pleasance and Balmer (2013) found that 
while accountants were far and away the most frequently used independent source of support 
in general, for regulatory matters, it is actually trade-associations that small firms turn 
towards. 
Trade-associations can not only provide accurate and tailored information on relevant 
regulations given their inherent expertise (BEIS, 2016b), but may also generate further 
benefits as they offer an extensive range of services to member firms. Crucially such 
associations provide member firms exclusive access to a set of collective services typically 
including: legal, financial, and marketing advice; paid for services/consultancy in the 
aforementioned areas; research and development facilities; bulk purchasing schemes; and all 
typically at a lower cost than alternative market providers due to staff expertise, economies 
of scale, and lower transaction costs (Bennett, 2011; Bennett and Ramsden, 2007; 
Tomlinson, 2011). As such trade-associations may contribute significantly towards the 
apparent shortfall of resources and capabilities which micro-firms often suffer due to their 
inherent size.  
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While much of the research into trade-associations investigates their external role of 
lobbying (Bennett, 1998, 2000; Rajwani et al., 2015), there is comparatively less into their 
role as a conduit for disseminating information among their members. When investigating 
the benefits of a variety of trade-associations to SMEs, Bennett and Ramsden (2007) found 
information and advice were both identified as a specific reason for sustaining membership. 
Battisti and Perry (2015) found that unlike larger firms, SMEs favoured access to individual 
advice over other factors available. They also found improved awareness of industry issues 
and ability to cope with problems were among the strongest benefits that SMEs achieved 
through membership. It therefore seems likely trade-associations have a role in enhancing 
the regulatory knowledge of micro-firms and hence we specify: 
H4a: Membership of trade-associations will enhance Perceived-
Knowledge of regulation. 
H4b: Membership of trade-associations will enhance Actual-Knowledge 
of regulation. 
 
However, sources of information on topics such as regulation are not in themselves enough, 
as Bennett and Robson (1999a) note SMEs have a greater need for assistance, but are less 
likely to seek it. As noted, owner-managers must appreciate the level of their knowledge in 
order to identify areas where they may be lacking. One mechanism which is often cited as 
improving knowledge self-assessment, is feedback (Krajc and Ortmann, 2008; Sitzmann et 
al., 2010). Trade-associations may disseminate knowledge to their member firms through 
internal publications or email (for example, in the context of the case considered herein, the 
BH&HPA Journal or the Bed and Breakfast News magazine). This unidirectional knowledge 
transfer, an example of what Salge and Vera (2013) termed ‘radical learning’, lacks any form 
of feedback, thereby relying upon member firms (and owner-managers in particular) to both 
read and correctly interpret the information available. That is far from certain. As such, trade-
association membership may well increase Actual-Knowledge but might also engender 
hubris via an over-inflated sense of Perceived-Knowledge relative to the benefit actually 
provided. We therefore specify: 
H5: Membership of trade-associations has a greater positive impact on 
Perceived-, rather than Actual-Knowledge. 
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3. Methodology 
3.1 Contextual Background 
To explore these issues, this study draws upon an original survey exploring regulation and 
micro-firms in the English holiday accommodation industry. The focus is on England rather 
than the UK due to differences in regulations that exist in the UK’s devolved regions. As 
mentioned in Section 1, the tourism industry is a suitable case to explore these themes as it 
not only accounts for a significant share of the economy, but is also predominantly made up 
of micro-firms with a large number of regulations (Blackburn and Hart, 2002), the majority 
of which are noted to be “ill-fitted to the world of small businesses that characterise” the 
industry (House of Commons, 2015, p.3). Additionally, BEIS (2016b) found firms in the 
industry were most likely to claim regulation is an obstacle to success. Indeed, two of the 
trade-associations in the sector (The BBA and BedPosts) formed as a direct response to 
changing fire regulations (BBA, 2014; BedPosts, 2014). 
Within the English accommodation industry, the focus is on two main sub-sectors where 
micro-firms are most likely to proliferate: serviced accommodation, such as Bed and 
Breakfasts (B&Bs) and hotels, of which there are an estimated 33,499 firms; and non-
serviced accommodation, such as caravan parks and self-catering accommodation, of which 
there are an estimated 34,167 firms (VisitEngland, 2016). The sub-sectors not only define 
the services on offer, but also the regulations in place. For example, serviced firms are more 
likely to provide food and fall under food preparation regulation, while non-serviced firms 
are more likely to provide electricity and water to pitches, and hence are subject to related 
regulation.  
The industry is home to many trade-associations and marketing groups, such as the Bed and 
Breakfast Association (BBA), the British Hospitality Association (BHA), BedPosts, British 
Holiday & Home Parks Association (BH&HPA), and Farm Stay UK. Each of which provide 
their members with support regarding business operations and crucially, dealing with 
regulation. For example: the BBA regularly email and distribute a monthly magazine to their 
8000 members (BBA, 2014); and the BH&HPA send a bi-monthly BH&HPA Journal to 
their 2900+ membership which dedicates a significant proportion of its 100+ pages to 
regulatory matters (BH&HPA, 2017).  
In addition to these industry associations, there are many associations which operate across 
the wider tourism industry, such as VisitEngland, the national tourist board; and the Tourism 
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Alliance, which operates as a ‘trade-association of trade-associations’ representing a 
combined 200,000+ tourism firms (Tourism Alliance, 2017). Furthermore, in the context of 
micro-firms, there is also significant overlap with associations such as the Federation of 
Small Businesses, who perform many of the same actions we have listed, but specialise in 
small business matters. 
 
3.2 Sampling Frame and Survey Design 
A database of 3805 potential respondents was developed using several publicly available 
sources. These include the AA, bedandbreakfast.com, BedPosts, the Caravan Club, the 
‘Little Green Book’, Farm Stay UK, the Motorcaravanners Club Handbook, and 
UKParks.com. The sampling frame was limited to firms operating in England and to those 
with fewer than 10 employees. The owners were contacted via post and/or email, addressed 
by name where known or ‘the owner’ where unknown, with several follow-ups over a six-
month period from October 2014. There were 706 valid responses, which represents a highly 
respectable 19% response rate, given the sampling frame (Saunders et al., 2015). 
The questions were first pilot tested by a subset of relevant potential respondents and the 
main industry associations (as outlined below) were approached with a draft of the survey 
to check the wording of the questions and to secure endorsements in the hope of enhancing 
response rates. A small number of minor changes were made in response to the feedback 
received from both sources, and the finalised survey was endorsed by the BBA, the BHA, 
and Farm Stay UK; all of whom sent details of the study to their members. VisitEngland, the 
national tourist board, endorsed the study and included details in email and print 
publications. A further three groups (BedPosts, the National Caravan Council, and the 
Tourism Society) sent information about the study to their members without a formal 
endorsement. 
The survey explored owner-manager knowledge in four areas of regulation: employment; 
anti-discrimination; fire; and health and safety. These areas were chosen because of their 
applicability not only within the tourism industry, but due to their wide reach and overall 
importance given they impact on almost all firms that either have employees or allow access 
to members of the public. Due to the restricted nature of the questions and the different 
micro-firms being surveyed, respondents were only asked about regulatory areas relevant to 
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their business. The survey is part of a wider research project exploring regulation and micro-
firms, and included additional questions which are not relevant to this study3. 
In addition, an unsolicited general comments box was included at the end of the survey. 
Present in 197 cases, these comments were analysed using constant-comparison thematic 
analysis (Krueger and Casey, 2009). The emergent themes, presented in the discussion of 
our results (Section 5, Table 8), offer further insight and support to our primary quantitative 
analyses.  
 
3.3 Analytical Approaches, Model Specification, and Variable Construction 
In light of the hypotheses developed in Section 2, we deploy two techniques to explore the 
relevant issues. The first group (H1 to H3) require the exploration of the revealed levels of 
Perceived- and Actual-knowledge (including the respondents’ view of the value of 
regulation) which are most appropriately examined using summary statistics and bivariate 
correlations (Ward et al., 2002). The second group of hypotheses (H3 to H5) explore the 
overall determinants of Perceived- and Actual-Knowledge of regulation, using a formal 
model as specified below: 
(𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃 𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴) 𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑜𝑜𝐾𝐾𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾𝑃𝑃 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝐾𝐾
= 𝐵𝐵0 +  𝐵𝐵1 𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒 +  𝐵𝐵2 𝑌𝑌𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒 𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾 𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
+  𝐵𝐵3 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝐾𝐾
+  𝐵𝐵4 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝐾𝐾𝑒𝑒 𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
+  𝐵𝐵5 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜𝐾𝐾𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝐾𝐾
+  𝐵𝐵6 𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃-𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝐾𝐾 𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 
 
The model is applied to both Perceived- and Actual-Knowledge as the dependent variable 
and incorporates a number of control variables (discussed below). Since both dependent 
variables are continuous and scalar, with the higher values clearly indicating owner-
managers have more (actual or perceived) knowledge of regulation, an OLS regression 
model is adopted. This is possible because, as Carifio and Perla (2008), Gaito (1980), and 
Dougherty (2011) identify, although the dependent variables incorporate several ordinal data 
                                                 
3 This paper is part of the PhD project of the leading author, which explores further themes, including the 
Perceived-Burden and Value of regulation, perceived industry compliance, and business performance. 
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sources (i.e. individual Likert-scale responses) they become interval results at the scale level 
due to their nature as combinations of responses to multiple questions. Furthermore, the 
central limit theorem suggests the resulting data will tend to be normally distributed and 
hence it is widely acknowledged that parametric techniques, such as OLS regression, are 
appropriate (Carifio and Perla, 2008; Dougherty, 2011; Norman, 2010)4. Indeed, not only 
do Blackburn and Hart (2002) utilise this method for combined test scores, but Norman 
(2010, p.7) notes that “parametric statistics can be used with Likert data … with no fear of 
‘coming to the wrong conclusion’”. 
The models (indeed all of our analyses) are estimated in Stata v13, first by including the 
control variables and then sequentially, the independent variables. The primary variables 
utilised (in both types of analysis) are as follows. 
 
3.3.1 Dependent Variables 
Actual-Knowledge was based upon a set of five true/false questions for each of the four 
specific areas of the regulation (20 in total). As it is impossible to assess every single aspect 
of regulation in a manageable survey, the questions, detailed in Table 1, were developed 
using a number of sources, most notably The Pink Book (VisitEngland, 2012, 2014), with 
varying levels of complexity based on routine knowledge of regulations. Recognising the 
inherent potential for bias in basing this construct on a relatively small number of questions, 
they were written such that the correct responses were both true and false (across the survey), 
and some questions were framed to test up-to-date knowledge by presenting out-of-date 
information which was no longer true. To minimise the subjectivity of the questions and to 
ensure they gave equal treatment to the four areas of regulation, the questions were 
developed-with and approved-by the supporting trade-associations, and tested using the pilot 
study. A similar method for testing knowledge was successfully employed by Alaaeddine et 
                                                 
4 Given the dependent variables are the mean values derived from up to four areas of regulation (see Section 
3.3.1) the values are non-integer, meaning that alternative methods, such as ordered-probit are problematic due 
to issues with data loss because of the required rounding and/or the resulting large number of cut-off points. 
Such alternatives have however, been explored in a variety of ways (including utilising rounded values, and 
categorised groupings) and the results are consistent with the ones presented herein. Simple aggregation of the 
results from the different areas of regulation was also explored (e.g. using the total number of correct responses) 
but this was found to be inherently biased since it treated individuals the same whether they had answered 20 
or fewer questions. Thus, we report these OLS models because they are not only statistically valid but also 
because they utilise all our data variation and are the easiest to interpret. 
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al. (2013) and Blackburn and Hart (2002). The latter covered more areas of regulation, but 
did so using fewer questions per area (1-5) resulting with a similar total of questions (21).  
The ability of respondents to correctly answer these questions generates a 0-5 variable for 
each area of regulation. However, as the survey was structured to allow respondents to skip 
areas not relevant to them, the overall Actual-Knowledge of regulation was calculated as the 
percentage of questions correctly answered relative to the number attempted (i.e. X out of 
20 for those attempting all four areas, and X out of 15 for those doing 3 areas). A dummy 
variable (see Section 3.2.2) was included to control for any differences caused by not 
completing questions on all areas of regulation. 
Table 1 lists the mean percentage of correct responses, and associated standard deviations, 
for each question. Figure 1 demonstrates the distribution of responses, revealing there is a 
good range with an approximately normal distribution. Table 2 presents the correlation 
between Actual-Knowledge of each individual area of regulation against the overall Actual-
Knowledge indicator. The strong and consistent correlations (Row 5) demonstrate the 
overall indicator for Actual-Knowledge is not driven by one area alone, which suggests the 
measure is valid. 
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Table 1: Actual-Knowledge questions with mean percentage correct 
 
Employment Mean % Correct SD  Anti-Discrimination 
Mean % 
Correct SD 
From October 2014, the 
minimum hourly wage for 
someone over 21 is £6.50 
88 32.2  Firms are required to make 
reasonable changes for disabled 
customers 
94 24.2 
       
Full time staff can have 
payment in lieu of holidays 
46 49.9  Large single-sex groups may be 
refused service 
61 48.9 
       
Family members who work for 
the firm can be paid below 
minimum wage 
19 39.3  Customers may be refused 
service based on their age 
40 49.1 
       
If an employee is 'on call', they 
are only entitled to be paid for 
time when they are actually 
doing something for the 
business 
64 48.1  The onus is on disabled 
customers to highlight, rather 
than businesses to check for any 
special requirements 
70 45.7 
       
It is a civil offence to pay an 
entitled employee below 
minimum wage 
11 31.8  Properties with more than one 
storey should install an elevator 
for wheelchair users 
82 38.1 
       
Fire Mean % Correct SD  Health and Safety 
Mean % 
Correct SD 
A fire risk assessment is only 
required for medium and large 
organisations 
92 27.6  All businesses must appoint a 
health & safety officer 
54 49.9 
       
If no more than six people can 
be accommodated on the 
premises and all 
accommodation is not above 
the first floor (the six bed-space 
rule), then the business is 
exempt from fire regulations 
79 40.5  Employers are always liable 
when employees fail to follow 
safety instructions in the 
workplace 
44 49.6 
       
A fire risk assessment can only 
be written by a qualified 
assessor 
84 36.6  A health & safety inspector may 
enter any part of the premises at 
any time 
80 39.7 
       
An automatic fire-detection and 
alarm system must be installed 
in the premises 
71 45.6  Firms with five or more 
employees must have a written 
health & safety policy 
93 25.1 
       
All local fire service apply the 
same interpretation of the 
regulations and your potential 
risks 
 
43 49.5  Family businesses which are 
incorporated as limited 
companies do not need 
employers liability insurance 
97 18.3 
Note. The question stem before these statements read “from your knowledge of [each] regulation, is it strictly 




Perceived-Knowledge was self-reported by respondents using a five-point Likert-scale for 
each area of regulation, based upon the work of Stokols et al. (2001) and Eva et al. (2004). 
As with Actual-Knowledge, respondents could skip areas of regulation not relevant to them. 
Hence Perceived-Knowledge of regulation was calculated as the mean response over all of 
 





2 3 4 5 
1. Actual knowledge of  
health and safety 
 
-     
2. Actual knowledge of  
employment 
 
0.160* -    
3. Actual knowledge of  
anti-discrimination 
 
0.132* -0.075 -   
4. Actual knowledge of  
fire 
 
0.069 0.025 0.034 -  
5. Actual-Knowledge of  
regulation (overall) 
 
0.621* 0.563* 0.582* 0.589* - 
* p<.05      
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the individual areas answered (e.g. someone answered 3/5, 3/5 and 4/5 for three areas of 
regulation would have a mean of 3.333/5). This was then converted into an overall 
percentage (3.333/5 equates to 66.66%) to facilitate comparability with Actual-Knowledge. 
A dummy variable (see below) was again included to control for any differences caused by 
not answering for all areas of regulation. The distribution of responses is presented in Figure 
1. As with Actual-Knowledge, Table 3 presents the correlation between Perceived-
Knowledge of each area of regulation against the overall indicator. Again, the strong and 
consistent correlations (row five) demonstrate the overall indicator is not driven by one area 
alone, and demonstrates the validity of the measure. 
 
3.3.2 Independent Variables 
Further questions were asked regarding respondent’s perceptions of regulation and control 
data regarding the respondents’ business, leading to the following variables to be used:  
Number of employees: a categorical variable (0/1) distinguishing between the number of 
people working in the firm, including the owner-manager. The base category (0) is 1 worker, 
indicating the owner-manager works alone, while category (1) designates 2-9 workers, 
which may indicate a family based firm or one with employees. This distinguishes the 
 





2 3 4 5 
1. Perceived knowledge of  
health and safety 
 
-     
2. Perceived knowledge of  
employment 
 
0.397* -    
3. Perceived knowledge of  
anti-discrimination 
 
0.488* 0.576* -   
4. Perceived knowledge of  
fire 
 
0.541* 0.404* 0.544* -  
5. Perceived-Knowledge of  
regulation (overall) 
 
0.777* 0.802* 0.855* 0.802* - 
* p<.05      
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smallest and least complex firms, from those who are larger and may fall under wider 
regulation. 
Years in business: a categorical variable (0/1) which indicates the number of years that the 
current owner-manager has operated the business, with 1-10 years (the base category, 0), 
and 11+ years (cat 1). Fewer years in business may indicate the firm is new or expanding, 
while category 1 designates an established business and an owner-manager who is more 
experienced with regulatory issues and change (Carter et al., 2009). 
Serviced accommodation: a categorical (0/1) variable where 1 indicates serviced 
accommodation, while 0 indicates non-serviced accommodation. This designates the level 
of service provided and may impact the type of regulation and enforcement placed on each 
firm, along with inferring to which trade-associations each firm may be a member.  
Attitude toward regulation: the level of agreement (0-7) to the statement “it is important 
to me that my business is compliant with regulation”. This attitude informs the importance 
that owner-managers’ place on regulatory issues and on maintaining their level of knowledge 
to ensure compliance (Edwards et al., 2003; Hart et al., 2008; IpsosMORI, 2007). 
All areas of regulation included: as the values of Perceived- and Actual-Knowledge are 
determined by the mean score of up to four areas of regulation, this categorical variable 
distinguishes between those who answered for all four areas (cat 1) and those who did not 
answer at least one area (cat 0). Forcing respondents to answer all areas creates bias as, for 
example, knowledge of employment regulations would be understandably lower for firms 
with no employees. This variable tests for any bias created by the different number of 
questions used to form the dependent variables.  
Number of trade-association memberships: there is a high-level of trade-association 
membership within the sample, and this variable is a count of the number of trade-association 
memberships, thereby serving to distinguish the level of engagement with trade-associations. 
More trade-association memberships offer more potential information sources and may also 




3.4 Data Validation 
For the construct variable Perceived-Knowledge, which is based on Likert-scale questions, 
Cronbach's alpha was calculated to test for convergent validity and was found to exceed the 
accepted minimum of 0.7 (DeVellis, 2012). Since Actual-Knowledge is not based on Likert-
scale questions (and given the variation in individual test scores, see Table 1), Cronbach's 
alpha is not suitable. Face validity for Actual-Knowledge was satisfied by using a previously 
successful method of testing knowledge, though the specific content is obviously different 
(Hair, 1998; Hair et al., 2010). 
By collecting both dependent and independent variables from the same source, there is a risk 
of common method bias (Guide and Ketokivi, 2015; Podsakoff et al., 2011). However, the 
very nature of the study, exploring the perceptions and knowledge of micro-firm owner-
managers means there is only one owner-manager per organisation, thus it is impossible to 
investigate multiple individuals per firm. To mitigate this as far as is possible, we gathered 
independently sourced data on several variables, such as revenue, profit, number of 
employees, and number of rooms/pitches. These details were collected from sources 
including firm websites, trade publications, and financial data submitted to Companies 
House. This verification was done for 14% of the survey responses (the maximum possible) 
and no evidence of bias or misreporting was found. Furthermore, through a pilot study we 
were able to assess the understanding of questions matched our expectations. Thus, the 
validity of subjective assessments is accepted (Rong and Wilkinson, 2011). In addition, the 
survey was structured to separate key areas and reduce the risk of respondents linking 
different concepts. Finally, all respondents were assured of confidentiality and anonymity 
throughout the survey process to elicit truthful responses. 
With any econometric method there is an inherent risk of omitted variable bias (Hosman et 
al., 2010), yet there is also considerable evidence that simply adding confounders will 
equally bias the model (Clarke, 2009; Hosman et al., 2010). We therefore followed the 
approach laid out by Clarke (2005) and Mitra and Washington (2012), whereby a review of 
the literature is used to suggest what variables may demonstrate a relationship with the 
dependent construct. In addition to the control variables included, we also tested other 
commonly used confounders, such as gender and region, which were found to be non-
significant and have little effect, thus they were not included in the study as Breiman (1992) 
and Clarke (2005) suggest fewer variables lead to more accurate models. Furthermore, our 
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models are similar to those used by Blackburn and Hart (2002), whom include many of the 
same variables (albeit operationalised differently), culminating in similar R-squared results. 
Finally, in order to verify our models’ robustness, we examined the residuals and found them 
to be randomly distributed with no major deviation from normality (Pallant, 2011; 
Tabachnick and Fidell, 2013).  
 
4. Results  
Table 4 presents the mean, standard deviation, and correlations for Perceived- and Actual-
Knowledge, along with attitude towards regulation. As noted in Section 2.1, considering that 
the range of questions used to develop Actual-Knowledge covered routine knowledge, we 
would expect informed owner-managers to achieve close to 100% (Kane, 2013). In our 
results, a mean score of 65.92% (median of 67%) with standard deviation of 12.13, and with 
just 4.07% scoring 90% or more (see Figure 1), suggests respondents generally held a poor 
level of knowledge and hence H1 is supported (see Table 7 for a hypotheses summary). 
Moreover, the mean score for Perceived-Knowledge is 62.25% (median of 65%) with a 
standard deviation of 16.54, demonstrating owner-managers know they possess incomplete 
knowledge. 
 
Table 4 also provides support for H2, as there is only a very small correlation (with r<0.10) 
between Perceived- and Actual-Knowledge. This suggests owner-managers are generally 
quite inaccurate in assessing their level of knowledge (which can be further seen from the 
differences in the distribution of Perceived- and Actual-Knowledge as illustrated in Figure 
1). Finally, Table 4 demonstrates small but statistically significant correlations between 
 





SD 1 2 3 
1. Perceived-Knowledge of regulation 
 
62.25 16.54 -   
2. Actual-Knowledge of regulation 
 
65.92 12.13 0.096* -  
3. Attitude toward regulation 
 
5.97 1.09 0.260* 0.112* - 
* p<.05      
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attitude towards regulation and both Perceived-Knowledge and Actual-Knowledge, 
providing support for H3a and H3b. However, the effect on Perceived-Knowledge (0.260) 
is more than twice that on Actual-Knowledge (0.112).  
Table 5 presents the OLS regression models for Perceived-Knowledge, first with just the 
control variables, then (model 2) with all independent variables in place. Table 6 presents 
models for Actual-Knowledge. In both cases the models improve with the inclusion of the 
exploratory variables. These offer further support for H3a and H3b given the highly 
statistically significant, positive links between attitude and both Perceived- and Actual-
Knowledge, although as before, the effect on Perceived-Knowledge (3.82%) is greater than 
that on Actual-Knowledge (1.15%).  
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4.51** 1.61 2.80 3.76** 1.73 2.17 












   1.39** 0.71 1.97 
       
R2 
 
 0.0442   0.1145  
Adjusted R2 
 
 0.0363   0.1016  
F (4, 484) 
 
 5.60***     
F (6, 412) 
 
    8.88***  




In the model for Perceived-Knowledge, there is a strong positive relationship with greater 
numbers of trade-association memberships. Every trade-association membership was 
associated with a 1.39% increase in Perceived-Knowledge. However, in the model for 
Actual-Knowledge the relationship is statistically insignificant. These findings do not verify 
the causality in such a relationship but suggest some support for H4a and H5, but not for 
H4b. 
 













β SE t 
 
















3.32** 1.18 2.81 4.32*** 1.30 3.32 












   -0.57 0.53 -1.08 
       
R2 
 
 0.0669   0.0732  
Adjusted R2 
 
 0.0591   0.0597  
F (4, 484) 
 
 8.67***     
F (6, 412) 
 
    5.42***  
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001 
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The models also demonstrate a negative relationship for both Perceived- and Actual-
Knowledge with the number of employees, suggesting owner-managers with 2+ workers 
have (respectively) 4.94%/3.21% less regulatory knowledge. Furthermore, serviced 
accommodation firms appear to have higher Perceived- and Actual-Knowledge 
(3.76%/4.32%). Additionally, while the number of years in business has no statistically 
significant relationship with Perceived-Knowledge, there is a strong negative relationship 
with Actual-Knowledge (-2.81%). Finally, the variable to test whether all areas of regulation 
were answered by each respondent, is shown to be statistically insignificant for both models, 
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Perceived-Knowledge of regulation will positively correlate  





Actual-Knowledge of regulation will positively correlate with 





Membership of trade-associations will enhance  
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Membership of trade-associations has a greater positive impact 
















14 Being part of a membership organisation probably makes me more aware of 
legislation and other issues, than independent operators (2016). 
 
Visit Britain have to reissue their Pink Book guide every year just to keep up 
with the continuous changes and additional restrictions (4031). 
 
I rely on the Caravan Club to guide me in matters regarding regulation of the 








28 Local councils should issue booklets on fire and health and safety – not seen 
anyone or had contact in 18 years! (1855). 
 
Setting up and building a new campsite has been far more difficult than it 





7 Too many regs are designed for large business then applied to small/micro 
businesses i.e. turnover less than 100k. Phrase sledgehammer & nut come to 
mind. I with only 6 letting rooms have to comply to same rules as Holiday Inn 





87 Good practice in my bed & breakfast is followed as a matter of routine but a 
diary RE: hygiene is a waste of my time which I deeply resent, cooking only 4 
breakfasts max a day! (323). 
 
Regulations have a disproportionate impact on small businesses. Compliance 
sometimes has a very disruptive impact if you do the right thing e.g. maternity 
leave. We have no specialist resources to cover such things and nobody seems 
to appreciate that running a small business is like living in a turret with 
different types of regulator attacking from all sides (53). 
 
Feel many regulations designed across the board and do not always 'fit' to 
small business without incurring costs. Reduced my staff due to PAYE rules & 
regulations which meant more time on computer & away from hands on work 
(1963). 
 
I cannot pretend to spend my time trying to keep up with legislation. I 
understand that I should comply with the law and take reasonable effort to do 
so, however I rely more on treating customers as I would like to be treated 
(2142). 
 
The current situation is that there is so much legislation it is impossible to know 
& comply with all the regulations. Even specialist lawyers do not profess to 






18 I don’t think there are many businesses that don’t accept the need for certain 
regulations. Compliance of regulations is important but they do need to be 
made far more appropriate to micro businesses. (2980). 
 
I believe that regulations are essential for the safety of the public (3804). 
 
Note: respondent ID in parentheses. Only themes relevant to this study are included here. The question stem 
read “is there anything else you would like to tell us about any of the issues raised in this survey?” 
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5. Discussion 
5.1 Perceived- and Actual-Knowledge 
We found in micro-firms that Actual-Knowledge was poor in core areas of regulation, 
thereby extending the findings of previous literature which found similar results in (larger) 
small firms. Such a deficit of knowledge could, for example, be the difference between 
someone using safety equipment and someone else not even knowing it is available, and 
hence there is clear potential for negative impacts for firms, employees, and customers. 
Furthermore, the majority of respondents also identified Perceived-Knowledge as being 
considerably less than 100%, which is suggestive of largescale hubris in that owner-
managers, by continuing to operate their firms, are knowingly acting with imperfect 
knowledge. As respondent 1570 put it: “The current situation is that there is so much 
legislation it is impossible to know and comply with all the regulations” (Table 8, 
‘knowledge and burden’). 
Since Perceived- and Actual-Knowledge only weakly correlate, our results suggest self-
assessment of regulatory knowledge to be a poor indicator of actual regulatory knowledge. 
This is not only in line with the majority of studies covered by Sitzmann et al’s (2010) review 
of self-assessment in general, but also casts doubt on micro-firm and/or regulation studies 
which rely on self-assessment. For the firm, poor self-assessment is likely to have a direct 
impact on the ways in which owner-managers approach learning. If they believe their 
knowledge is ‘good enough’, they are unlikely to prioritise improving it, which suggests 
attempts at regulatory compliance will be based on a faulty understanding and knowledge 
deficits (and associated issues) will likely endure into the future.  
In keeping with Edwards et al. (2003), Hart et al. (2008) and IpsosMORI (2007), we found 
attitude towards regulation has a positive association with knowledge. Moreover, since we 
unusually explored two measures of knowledge, our results show this association is 
markedly larger on Perceived- than Actual-Knowledge. The causality of this finding is 
unclear though, as knowledge might engender a positive view, or a positive disposition might 
encourage knowledge acquisition. In this regard, the unsolicited comments on the survey 
offer some insights (Table 8, ‘knowledge and burden’) as none supported the idea that 
knowledge engendered a positive view, and a number actively contradicted it. For instance, 
respondent 1878 noted: “Good practice in my Bed & Breakfast is followed as a matter of 
routine but a diary RE: hygiene is a waste of my time which I deeply resent, cooking only 4 
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breakfasts max a day”. Such comments are not explicit support for a positive attitude 
encouraging knowledge, but imply such causality by undermining the alternative.  
The number of years in business was found to have no statistically significant impact on 
Perceived-Knowledge, while having a negative link with Actual-Knowledge. Since our 
survey is not longitudinal, the effect of time on the knowledge levels of individual owner-
managers is impossible to draw-out in detail. Carter et al. (2009) and Edwards et al. (2003) 
suggest the impact of time is due to a resistance to change. However, the unsolicited survey 
comments (Table 8, ‘knowledge and burden’) hint at an alternative explanation: “I cannot 
pretend to spend my time trying to keep up with legislation. I understand that I should comply 
with the law and take reasonable effort to do, however I rely more on treating customers as 
I would like to be treated” (respondent:2142). It is possible Perceived-Knowledge remains 
broadly constant over time as past knowledge is assumed to be retained, but in the absence 
of significant continued learning, Actual-Knowledge declines as new regulations are 
developed/past knowledge is forgotten.  
The negative relationship between both Perceived- and Actual-Knowledge with larger 
employee numbers is perhaps due to larger firms being busier, with the owner-manager 
spending more time supporting employees, leaving less time to allocate to maintaining 
regulatory knowledge (as implied by comments relating to ‘firm size’, ‘knowledge and 
burden’, and ‘poor regulator understanding’, see Table 8).  
Serviced firms were associated with higher Perceived- and Actual-Knowledge relative to 
non-serviced firms. A possible explanation is the serviced sector was subjected to a 
regulatory shock following the “worst UK hotel fire in 40 years” (BBC, 2011). This not 
only led to greater enforcement action but also the creation of at least two trade-associations, 
and hence likely engendered a more proactive regulatory mindset leading to a general 
increase in knowledge. Such a shock might also have exacerbated underlying differences 
due to non-serviced firms being subject to greater numbers of regulations because of the 
nature of their activities. 
 
5.2 Trade-Associations  
Given prior literature (and the lack of alternatives available) we expected trade-associations 
to be a key source of regulatory knowledge, yet despite high levels of membership within 
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the sample, Actual-Knowledge remained poor. Furthermore, while our results show that 
additional memberships have a small but positive association with Perceived-Knowledge (a 
1.39% increase per additional trade-association membership), there is no statistically 
significant link with Actual-Knowledge. Yet, the survey comments suggest at least some 
owner-managers do rely on trade-associations support. Respondent 5379 for instance, 
offered: “I rely on the Caravan Club to guide me in matters regarding regulation of the 
Caravan Club site aspects of the business” (Table 8, ‘trade-association support’). 
We posit this may be due to: information overload, with time constrained owner-managers 
struggling to keep up with the influx of regulatory information from multiple sources; 
contradictory information, with different trade-associations interpreting and presenting 
information in different ways; or from a false sense of security as access to information from 
multiple sources creates over-confidence, meaning it is not consumed/interpreted by the 
owner-manager. All of these possible explanations highlight the inherent lack of feedback 
because while trade-associations may provide detailed and accurate information on 
regulation (e.g. such as in the BH&HPA Journal), there is no recourse to ensure information 
is read, understood, and implemented. It also highlights there is limited opportunity to 
demonstrate to owner-managers that their knowledge is lacking and hence they must seek to 
improve it.  
It could be argued both Perceived-Knowledge and the number of trade-association 
memberships are in fact being influenced by a hitherto unexplored variable, such as the 
management style of the owner-manager; with more professional managers demonstrating 
greater Perceived-Knowledge and also choosing wider membership. However, this seems 
unlikely for two reasons. Firstly, we would expect such a professional management style to 
influence Actual- as well as Perceived-Knowledge, but our results found no such influence. 
Secondly, the ‘fire-fighting mentality’ (and the resource limitations) seen within micro-firms 
(Falta and Gallery, 2011), imply owner-managers are by necessity focused on day-to-day 
operations, so have little time for professional development. Such constraints were 
highlighted by many unsolicited comments received in the survey (see Table 8, ‘regulatory 




5.3 Improving Knowledge 
Given micro-firm owner-managers are reluctant to seek support and shun outside 
‘interference’ (Blackburn et al., 2015) improving regulatory knowledge is a real challenge. 
The survey comments suggest ‘official sources’, including government and regulators, could 
certainly better connect with firms (Table 8, ‘lack of support’). Unfortunately, there is 
considerable evidence that such measures (e.g. including ‘regulatory update’ guidance with 
tax returns) would fail as prior attempts have proven unsuccessful (Blackburn, 2012; 
Blackburn and Hart, 2002). There would still also be no guarantee owner-managers would 
read, correctly interpret, and implement such guidance. Indeed, they are likely to perceive it 
as ‘further burden’ and thus, ignore it (Edwards et al., 2004).  
Micro-firms have previously been found to access support through accountants (e.g. BEIS, 
2016b), though as financial experts, they are not well placed to provide wider regulatory 
support. Therefore, in the absence of credible alternatives and given the high levels of 
membership in the industry, along with what appears to be partial success in improving 
Perceived-Knowledge, trade-associations may nevertheless present the best solution to 
improve knowledge of regulation among micro-firms, though much work must be done. 
Indeed, there is already evidence that trade-associations provide “more concise and reader-
friendly” guidance than the government (BRE, 2010, p.14). 
Our findings suggest three areas of focus for trade-associations. Firstly, improving owner-
managers’ attitude towards regulation, as this will improve the likelihood of enhanced 
learning. Secondly, calibrating owner-managers’ self-assessment of their existing 
knowledge, thereby demonstrating the need for further training and advice. However, while 
seminars and training sessions are an obvious start, micro-firms are reluctant to attend for a 
variety of reasons (Bennett and Robson, 1999a, b). A new model is required which allows 
for remote learning and feedback. This could perhaps be achieved with tools such as case 
studies, quick quizzes (e.g. in magazines), and incentives to participate (like prize draws). 
Additionally, given a preference for direct contact (BIS, 2016a, b; Peck et al., 2012), follow-
up phone calls could feature. Finally, trade-associations should specially target micro-firms 
that are longer established and/or which have employees as these generally have the weakest 
knowledge levels. 
Given the variation we have observed in the sub-sectors and the need for a consistent 
message (Chittenden et al., 2002), such reform would be best instigated by an association 
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like the Tourism Alliance, which can co-ordinate efforts with its trade-association members. 
Furthermore, by involving non-industry associations, there can be wider input with ‘small 
business’ associations ensuring guidance is tailored to smaller firms, while tourism 
associations ensure it is tailored to the industry. Networking is known to shape owner-
manager understanding (Kitching, 2016), thus networking with support firms, such as 
accountants, would also help to spread awareness of the tailored guidance, either acting as 
an intermediary or by promoting trade-association membership (and the benefits therein). 
Doing so would facilitate a co-ordinated campaign across trade-associations, sub-sectors, 
and beyond, thereby ensuring correct information and a consistent message. Moreover, by 
focusing on guidance, attitude, and self-assessment calibration, such a campaign may 
improve owner-managers’ willingness and understanding of their need to learn, which would 
improve future efforts as well. This would also address all three of Peck et al’s (2012) aspects 
of information failure, namely by improving the information available and the 




Using newly collected primary data of under-studied micro-firms, we have found evidence 
that micro-firm owner-managers in the English tourism industry have an overall poor level 
of knowledge of four key area of regulations. Additionally, owner-managers’ Perceived-
Knowledge of regulation was found to be poorly aligned with their level of Actual-
Knowledge. Such results suggest hubris is endemic within micro-firms, since owner-
managers knowingly act with a knowledge deficit.  
Despite past evidence that micro-firms strongly rely on trade-associations for support (for 
regulatory and other matters), trade-association membership was found to only positively 
impact Perceived-Knowledge but have no impact on Actual-Knowledge. Nevertheless, in 
the absence of viable alternatives, we believe trade-associations remain a likely candidate to 
address the knowledge and self-assessment shortfall.  
In drawing these conclusions, it should be recognised this study is perhaps somewhat limited 
by the scope of the tests utilised to explore Perceived- and Actual-Knowledge. While these 
explored core areas of knowledge and the wording was agreed with the relevant trade-
associations, the results are dependent on their particular wording and choice of regulation. 
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Future studies using Actual-Knowledge might benefit from the creation of a standardised 
testing procedure, which would then help minimise use of inaccurate self-assessment. Such 
studies would also benefit from interviews with owner-managers, to better understand 
exactly how they receive and process information. This would help explain the causality in 
the relationships we have identified, explore the existing use of accountants, and examine 
how trade-association support improves Perceived-Knowledge but goes no further. Finally, 
the possibility that the disparity between Perceived- and Actual-Knowledge grows over time 
should be tested with a longitudinal study over a prolonged period. 
In addition, this study implies wider areas for further exploration. Given the disparity 
between Perceived- and Actual-Knowledge, future research could explore regulatory 
compliance, which may demonstrate a similar pattern of disparity between what is perceived 
and actually the case. Furthermore, this might also be explored by investigating the impact 
on owner-manager decision-making and how this impacts business performance, including 
the traditional regulatory focus on the burden of regulation.  
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The Impact of Regulation on Micro-Firm Performance 
 
Abstract 
Regulations constrain the operations of firms, thereby impacting performance. Traditionally 
this has resulted in a focus on regulatory burden and its impacts on financial performance 
measures. This paper suggests a true assessment should consider both the burden and value 
of regulation in relation to entrepreneur defined success. This is explored in the frequently 
overlooked context of micro-firms using original survey data from the English Tourism 
industry, and utilising multivariate regression techniques. Burden is found to have a negative 
impact upon financial performance measures, while value has a positive impact on the 
broader goal based performance measures favoured by micro-firm owner-managers.  
 
Keywords: Micro-Firms, Regulation, Performance, Goals, Cost-Benefit. 
 
JEL Codes: L51, L21, L25, L83. 
 
Highlights: 
• Consideration of regulation needs to encompass both its burden and its value. 
• Assessment of micro-firm performance requires financial and non-financial 
measures. 
• We use data from an original survey of micro-firms in the English tourism industry. 
• Regulatory burden is found to negatively impact financial performance measures. 





Owners and managers of all businesses take many decisions which contribute to the 
perceived success or failure of the enterprise. What counts as success or failure is subjective 
and depends upon the idiosyncratic business goals of owners and managers, and hence how 
they evaluate performance. While larger firms traditionally focus upon financial measures 
of performance, such as profits, share price, and market share, smaller firms (and most 
especially micro-firms) have been found to favour more personal goal-oriented measures of 
success such as self-sufficiency, autonomy, and sociability (Dewhurst and Horobin, 1998; 
Greenbank, 2001; O'Dwyer and Ryan, 2000). The owners and managers of smaller firms 
will therefore often make different business decisions when compared to their larger 
counterparts (Dunkelberg et al., 2013). For example, an owner or manager who aims to 
spend (more) time with family may prefer to keep their business small to avoid taking up 
too much time, rather than relentlessly pursue expansion in the quest for larger profits. 
A key determinant of the performance of an enterprise is the extent to which it is impacted 
by government regulation (Federation of Small Businesses, 2004; Gov.uk, 2013). The 
inherent purpose of regulation is to ensure that businesses are not completely free to make 
choices purely determined by their chosen path to success, but are constrained by a set of 
minimal standards judged to be in the wider public interest (Atherton et al., 2008; Better 
Regulation Task Force, 2007). Thus regulation, often pejoratively referred to as ‘red tape’, 
is generally perceived as being financially costly to firms and hence a general impediment 
to entrepreneurial success. How much of an impediment will depend on both the extent of 
regulation and how success for the enterprise is measured1. However, what is often forgotten 
is that regulation is invariably designed and implemented with good intentions, and hence 
might also be perceived as having some redeeming value or benefit, especially in situations 
where success is not judged monetarily. As such, a true assessment of the impact of 
regulation needs to consider both its cost and its value in relation to appropriate measures of 
entrepreneurial success. 
Owners and managers of micro-firms are often one and the same, which means these owner-
managers are uniquely positioned for an exploration of such issues as they are situated at the 
heart of their firms, controlling and overseeing virtually all aspects of the business (Edwards 
                                                 
1 Open Europe (2015) for instance, found the 100 ‘most burdensome’ EU regulations cost the UK economy 
£33.3 billion per year (which is over £6 billion more than is raised annually from Council Tax – a property tax 
paid to local government). 
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et al., 2002; Kelliher and Reinl, 2009). As such, they not only set the goals of the business 
but are also likely to personally deal with regulatory matters, including shaping their 
response to regulatory changes (Edwards et al., 2003; Hart et al., 2008; Kelliher and Reinl, 
2009)2. Much of the existing literature explores this by investigating the ‘burden’ of 
regulation, which is often found to disproportionately affect micro-firms (for example 
Edwards et al., 2003; OECD, 2001; and Gov.uk, 2013). However, such studies generally 
focus on the financial impact of regulation, despite evidence that small and micro-firms 
favour other measures of success. It is therefore not surprising to find there is some 
inconsistency in the evidence that the burden of regulation hampers micro-firm performance 
(Edwards et al., 2003; Kitching, 2006; Vickers et al., 2005). Such mixed findings therefore 
hint at a more complex relationship between regulation and micro-firm performance which 
requires further exploration.  
This study investigates such a relationship in depth by making a three-fold contribution. The 
first is a theoretical contribution by adopting an holistic view of regulation to explore the 
perception of regulation from both the positive (value) and negative (burden) sides. A further 
theoretical contribution is made by exploring how this holistic view of regulations impacts 
upon business performance, where this is measured both in financial terms and in broader 
goal orientated terms. The second contribution is an empirical one via the exploration of 
these theoretical positions through the use of original survey data on micro-firms in the 
English tourism sector using both OLS and ordered probit techniques. The English tourism 
industry presents a fitting case because it is highly regulated (Tourism Regulation Taskforce, 
2012) and features a large number of micro-firms. Finally, in making these specific 
theoretical and empirical contributions, the paper also advances the relatively neglected field 
of micro-firm study in general. Such firms have frequently been excluded in prior research 
(even in favour of larger small firms) and yet cover a variety of enterprise types including 
family businesses and new entrepreneurial ventures. 
The remainder of this paper is set out as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on measures 
of performance, then micro-firms, regulation, and regulatory perception. In doing so, it 
develops a number of hypotheses to be tested. Section 3 presents the chosen case, details the 
newly collected primary survey data, and the methodological approaches used. Section 4 
reports the results and analysis, including both ordered probit models to test the financial 
                                                 
2 Micro-firms are also an important sector of most economies. In the UK, for instance, they account for 32% 
of private sector employment and 20% of private sector turnover (BIS, 2012). 
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performance measures and an OLS regression model to test wider goal satisfaction, in line 
with the hypotheses. Finally, Section 5 explores these findings, before Section 6 offers a 
brief conclusion. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Measures of Performance 
Studies covering all firm sizes generally favour traditional financial measures of 
performance, (such as revenue, profit, stock price), which are easily understood and 
compared between firms (Fajnzylber et al., 2011; Muñoz-Bullón and Sánchez-Bueno, 2011). 
Such measures (implicitly) presume a profit-making motive for the business with a general 
assumption that “more is better” (for example: Murphy et al., 1996; Strielkowski, 2012; 
Wiklund and Shepherd, 2003). However, there are two issues with this general approach: 
firstly, some of these measures are not available to all firms (e.g. share price is only a suitable 
measure for firms listed on the stock market); and secondly, not all firms have such a 
simplistic profit-making motive (Chrisman et al., 2012; Wiklund and Shepherd, 2003; 
Zellweger et al., 2013).  
Despite the already considerable literature which describes how micro-firms3 and other 
smaller firms eschew these profit-motive measures (Greenbank, 2001; O'Dwyer and Ryan, 
2000; Watson and Robinson, 2003), studies into such firms still typically rely on financial 
performance measures (Strielkowski, 2012; Watson and Robinson, 2003). Indeed, it is 
widely accepted that entrepreneurs start businesses for a number of reasons, but less well 
understood how those goals are used to measure performance (Andersson et al., 2002; 
Greenbank, 2001). Dewhurst and Horobin (1998), note the growing evidence of small firms 
“who are not motivated by a desire to maximise economic gain” (p.25), and hence are likely 
to hold broader, non-economic goals. In line with this, O'Dwyer and Ryan (2000) suggest 
that micro-firms prefer the subjective performance measure of “meeting and satisfying the 
objectives of the owner” (p.347), which in turn requires an understanding of those objectives. 
The study of entrepreneurial goals is of particular importance in the small business literature 
as the divergence from financial business objectives directly impacts decision making within 
the firm (Shinkle, 2012). As Williams et al. (1989) put it, “decision making may rest on 
                                                 
3 Herein defined as firms with 0-9 employees in line with BIS (2016) and DTI (2001). 
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highly personalised criteria” (p.1643) which may not be immediately obvious. For example, 
an owner-manager who desires to meet new people may deliberately keep the business small 
so that they can focus their efforts on spending time in direct contact with customers, whereas 
one who seeks the challenge of operating a business or providing employment opportunities 
may prefer to concentrate on expansion and/or administration.  
Goals therefore, are not only important as a measure of success for small firms, but they also 
inform the intention and direction of the business itself. Indeed, Dunkelberg et al. (2013) 
found firms with ‘monetary-goals’ used alternate resources and deployed them in 
significantly different ways to firms with ‘nonmonetary-goals’. Thus, regulation is likely to 
impact goals and therefore, business decisions. For example, an owner-manager wishing to 
provide employment may focus on expanding the business, but then find employment 
regulation too onerous and hence scale back/limit the goal.  
Financial goals appear to be a lower priority to small business owners, even when the 
business is not a passion-project or secondary to another enterprise (Clark, 2009; Evans and 
Ilbery, 1992; Sharpley and Vass, 2006). However, Pearce (1990) found 90% of interviewees 
demonstrated a detailed awareness of costs and revenue, despite claims that “money was not 
the major goal” (p.343) of their business. It therefore seems that financial aspects of the 
enterprise remain important, even when it is claimed otherwise. This may be due to related 
goals, such as “survival” and “breaking even”, which Greenbank (2001) found small firms 
to hold and which necessitates an in-depth understanding of the costs and revenue involved 
in the business.  
There are several studies (e.g. Greenbank, 2001; and Strielkowski, 2012), which also 
highlight the dichotomy of perceived success between financial and non-financial measures. 
For example, measured purely on profitability and growth, many micro-firms would be 
judged to be performing poorly but those same firms may score highly for owner-manager 
satisfaction levels (Greenbank, 2001). This further demonstrates the need to include non-
financial measures of performance alongside more traditional financial measures when 
evaluating micro-firms (Jennings and Beaver, 1995; Keasey and Watson, 1993).  
An explanation as to why this approach has not yet been widely adopted is proffered by 
Greenbank (2001) (drawing upon March, 1972) who highlights the difficulty of getting 
owner-managers of small firms to articulate their goals. There is evidence that the informal 
nature (among other aspects) of small firms can lead to goals being discovered, rather than 
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planned outright, with respondents to surveys often claiming to have no ‘objectives’ or 
‘targets’, but immediately going on to describe such things4. A practical implication of this 
difficulty is that no universally accepted collection of business goals that can be readily 
adopted to measure performance against. Andersson et al. (2002), found multiple goals 
which they classified as being either personal or business related, and also discovered that 
where financial goals were identified, the majority were not directly money-making in 
nature. Greenbank’s (2001) review categorised a range of objectives as being personal non-
economic, personal-economic, or business related. Further studies, such as Birley and 
Westhead (1994) or Carter et al. (2003) also demonstrate a similar pattern of goals and 
categories. What is common between all these contributions is that besides industry specific 
items, there is a relatively small set of goals generally perceived to be held by owner-
managers of micro-firms. These include work-life balance, leisure time, the desire to meet 
new people (particularly in customer facing industries, such as tourism), the desire to ‘be 
one’s own boss’, and running a business. 
Despite this clear understanding that owner-managers of micro-firms generally hold a broad 
set of goals, there is a paucity of research looking at performance measured against these 
goals (i.e. goal satisfaction). Strielkowski (2012) reviews studies of SME performance, 
concluding that most use financial measures of performance. In the few cases where 
subjective methods featured, they tended to do so only as a back-up to traditional measures. 
Aside from the relative ease of adopting objective measures of performance, Besser (1999) 
hints at another possible reason behind this; she identified a weak correlation between a 
single self-reported measure of perceived business success with objective performance 
measures such as total number of employees. The implication is that objective financial 
measures of micro-firm performance might act as a proxy for goal based subject measures. 
In light of these discussions we therefore specify our first hypotheses: 
H1: There will be a positive correlation between financial and non-
financial performance measures. 
H2: There will be weak correlation between financial and non-financial 
performance measures.  
 
                                                 
4 Such behaviour highlights the need to offer suggestions for potential goals in structured research hence the 
methodology adopted herein – see Section 3. 
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2.2 Micro-Firms and Regulation 
Micro-firms are, by definition, very small firms, yet they are generally still required to 
conform with the vast majority, if not all, of the regulations that apply to larger firms. A 
wealth of prior research has identified the financial burden of regulation on firms, and also 
that this falls disproportionally on micro-firms (see for example Carter et al., 2009; and UK 
Government, Gov.uk, 2013). Much of this burden can be attributed to what Edwards et al. 
(2003) termed ‘direct costs’ which are the directly attributable increases in required financial 
expenditures. An example might be higher wage costs following an increase in a statutory 
minimum wage for which the cost of compliance is at least partially fixed. This means that 
the overall costs are a disproportionately greater percentage of revenue for small firms than 
for larger firms. The OECD (2001) found that firms with 1-19 employees incurred regulatory 
costs up to five times higher than firms with 50-500 employees. Furthermore, Collard and 
Godwin (1999) found that while firms with 5000+ employees spent only £5 per-employee 
per-year on regulatory administration, firms with 1-4 employees spent up to £288 per-
employee per-year.  
In addition to direct costs, Edwards et al. (2003) also note that there are ‘indirect effects’ 
from regulation, such as the formalisation of business practices or simply having less time 
to develop the business as more time is spent on regulatory administration and record 
keeping5. Indeed, the Federation of Small Businesses (2004) found firms with 1-2 employees 
spend up to five times as many hours per employee dealing with regulatory issues as firms 
with 50+ employees. Furthermore, harsh penalties for non-compliance are often not scaled 
for business size (Tourism Regulation Taskforce, 2012). Micro-firms are further hampered 
by their limited resources, both in monetary and time costs, along with poor understanding 
of the relevant regulations (or changes therein) and a lack of managerial skill (Chapter 3 of 
this thesis; Carson, 1985; Johnson, 2002; O'Dwyer and Ryan, 2000). 
However, another strand of literature reaches the somewhat contrary conclusion that 
regulation has no negative impact on micro-firm performance despite the broad findings of 
increased financial costs. Hart et al. (2008, p.9) suggests that for small firms, “there is no 
necessary correlation between regulation and performance”. Indeed, Edwards et al. (2003) 
found that not only were general complaints of regulation anecdotal in nature, but so were 
complaints of additional administrative costs. Further examples include IpsosMORI (2007), 
                                                 
5 This can be particularly troubling in the informal recording keeping environment of a micro-firm. 
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Vickers et al. (2005) and Kitching (2006), whom all failed to identify direct impacts from 
regulatory changes.  
These two strands of the literature might be reconciled by the simple idea that any increase 
in costs faced by firms is entirely passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices. 
However, such a scenario seems rather unlikely given that virtually all products have a price 
elasticity of demand greater than zero. A more realistic explanation is that micro-firms often 
lack the detailed record keeping of larger firms thereby making the situation opaque and 
hence more difficult to quantify a link between the burden of regulation and performance. 
Furthermore, the aforementioned debate on appropriate performance measures for micro-
firms suggest micro-firms hold a broad set of goals that go significantly beyond financial 
measures, and hence financial costs might not be detrimental to these broad measures of 
performance. In light of these discussions we therefore specify:  
H3: The Perceived-Burden of regulation will have a negative impact upon 
financial performance measures. 
H4: The Perceived-Burden of regulation will have a negative impact upon 
goal related performance measures. 
 
The focus in most studies to date has been on the ‘burden’ of regulation, particularly when 
considering smaller firms. However, it should not be forgotten that regulation is usually 
created with good intentions, and hence there is inherently some value in regulation. The 
focus on burden might originate because, as IpsosMORI (2007, p.3) found, owner-managers 
tend “towards the negative when spontaneously describing regulations”. It is perhaps easier 
for owner-managers to identify potential negative aspects of regulation rather than the 
positive value. Aspects such as additional administrative burdens, higher labour costs, the 
erosion of common sense, and loss of control over the ‘destiny’ of the business, the fear of 
accidental non-compliance (and associated penalties) are often identified, perhaps because 
they may have disproportionate impacts on micro-firms (Edwards et al., 2003; IpsosMORI, 
2007).  
Conversely, there are a number of potential benefits to regulation, although both IpsosMORI 
(2007) and Edwards et al. (2003) found that micro-firm owner-managers struggled to 
identify them without prompting. Relevant aspects include improved procedures, a level 
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playing field across the industry, a stimulus to encourage modernisation and innovation 
(even if only to mitigate the cost of compliance), improved inter-business and industry 
networking (while seeking support from fellow firms and trade-associations), and even 
finding legitimacy in existing practices (for example the use of flexible working, which the 
informality of micro-firms may already provide) (Edwards et al., 2003; IpsosMORI, 2007; 
Ram et al., 2001). Additionally, the close personal relationships between owner-managers 
and workers can engender a sense of duty and allow owner-managers to see benefits from 
an employee’s perspective, for example offsetting the ‘burden’ of maternity leave by 
granting it to a close friend (IpsosMORI, 2007). In light of these discussions we therefore 
specify our next hypotheses relating to the impact of Perceived-Value of regulation: 
H5: The Perceived-Value of regulation will positively impact goal related 
performance measures. 




3.1 Context, Sampling Frame, and Survey Design 
The English holiday accommodation industry is a fitting case to explore these issues because 
it is highly regulated6 (Tourism Regulation Taskforce, 2012), largely consists of micro-
firms, and is an important contributor to both the economy (Tourism Alliance, 2016) and 
employment (Tourism Alliance, 2015). The tourism industry accounts for 9.5% of UK 
employment, contributes 7.1% of GDP, and almost 70% of businesses in the industry are 
micro-firms (Tourism Alliance, 2015, 2016). The focus is on England, rather than the entire 
United Kingdom, due to regulatory differences between devolved regions. Firms within the 
industry may be categorised into two sub-sectors: serviced (i.e. bed and breakfasts, B&Bs) 
and non-serviced (i.e. caravan parks), which indicates the type of accommodation 
provided/the services on offer, and hence the regulations which may be in place thereby 
                                                 
6 For instance, it could be argued that caravan parks are subject to almost all of the same regulations that affect 
a small town, such as cabling, roadways, water and waste management. 
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potentially engendering different perceptions of regulatory burden and value7. There are a 
number of trade-associations and marketing groups within the industry, which provide 
support and marketing opportunities for members’, including on regulatory matters. Indeed, 
trade-associations are an important source of such knowledge for micro-firms8.  
A database of 3,805 potential respondents was developed using several publicly available 
sources including the AA, bedandbreakfast.com, BedPosts, the Caravan Club, the ‘Little 
Green Book’, Farm Stay UK, the Motorcaravanners Club Handbook, and UKParks.com. 
Given the focus of the study, the sampling frame was limited to firms with up to 9 employees 
operating in England. Owners were contacted via post and/or email, addressed by name 
where known and to ‘the owner’ where unknown, with several follow-ups over a six-month 
period from October 2014. There were 706 valid responses, representing a highly respectable 
19% response rate, given the sampling frame (Saunders et al., 2015). 
The survey was pilot tested by a subset of relevant potential respondents and the main 
industry associations were approached with a draft of the survey to check the wording of the 
questions and to secure endorsements in the hope of enhancing response rates. Following 
the feedback provided by both sources, a small number of changes were made and the 
finalised survey was endorsed by the Bed and Breakfast Association, the British Hospitality 
Association, and Farm Stay UK; all of whom sent details of the study to their members. The 
national tourist board, VisitEngland, endorsed the study, providing details in their email and 
print publications. A further three groups: BedPosts, the National Caravan Council, and the 
Tourism Society; sent information about the study to their members without a formal 
endorsement. 
Four areas of regulation, namely employment, anti-discrimination, fire, and health and 
safety, were chosen to be explored in the survey due to their applicability both within the 
tourism industry and their wider reach, given that they impact on almost all firms that either 
employ people or allow access to the public. Due to the different sub-sectors being surveyed, 
respondents were only asked about regulatory areas relevant to their business. For example, 
only those who claimed to have two or more workers were presented/asked to complete 
questions on employment regulation. The survey is part of a wider research study exploring 
                                                 
7 For example, in relation to fire regulations, a B&B must consider escape routes from each room and building, 
while a caravan park may consider this only for facilities buildings but must also contemplate the space between 
units (to reduce the risk of fire spreading). 
8 See Chapter 3 of this thesis for a more detailed view of the holiday accommodation sector, the services 
provided by each sub-sector and the role of trade-associations. 
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regulation and micro-firms, and so it included additional questions which are not relevant to 
this study. 
 
3.2 Analytical Approaches, Model Specification and Variable Construction 
We deploy several techniques to test the hypotheses developed in Section 2. The first group 
(H1 and H2), investigating the relationship between financial and non-financial measures, 
are examined using summary statistics and bivariate correlations as presented in Table 4 
below (Ward et al., 2002). Next, we use two versions of an ordered-probit model to explore 
the impact of the independent variables on two ordinal financial measures of success (H3 
and H6). The model is described below and includes three control variables: number of 
employees, years in business, and serviced accommodation. The results are reported in 
Tables 5 and 6 below, with the marginal effects for both versions of the model presented in 
Appendix A for completeness.  
𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃 [𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃 𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃 𝐾𝐾𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴] 𝑃𝑃ℎ𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑃𝑃
= 𝐵𝐵0 +  𝐵𝐵1 𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒 +  𝐵𝐵2 𝑌𝑌𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒 𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾 𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
+  𝐵𝐵3 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝐾𝐾 + 𝐵𝐵4 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃-𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝐾𝐾
+  𝐵𝐵5 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃-𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝐾𝐾 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 
 
To explore H4 and H5, that consider the impact of Perceived-Value and burden on goal 
satisfaction, a further variation of the model is employed. However, with the goal satisfaction 
dependent variable being both continuous and scalar, with higher values clearly indicating 
higher levels of goal satisfaction, the OLS estimation technique is utilised. The results are 
presented in Table 7 below. 
𝐺𝐺𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝐾𝐾
= 𝐵𝐵0 +  𝐵𝐵1 𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒 +  𝐵𝐵2 𝑌𝑌𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒 𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾 𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
+  𝐵𝐵3 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝐾𝐾 + 𝐵𝐵4 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃-𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝐾𝐾
+  𝐵𝐵5 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃-𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝐾𝐾 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 
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All of our analyses are estimated in Stata v13, first by including the control variables then 
the independent variables. The primary variables utilised in all of our analyses are briefly 
described below.  
 
3.2.1 Dependent Variables 
Financial Performance: is measured by two metrics: revenue and net profit change over 
the past three years (at the time of the survey), with responses provided in three categories: 
decreasing (coded 1), stable (2), and increasing (3). These simplified measures heighten the 
likelihood of gaining responses given our micro-firm targets, who are generally less trusting 
about providing financial information in surveys or participating at all (Curran, 2000; 
Johnson, 2002; Pearce, 1990; Thomas et al., 1998). This form of self-reported measure is 
commonly used in similar studies of small firms and Cruz et al. (2012) notes the accepted 
reliability and correlation with objectively collected data. Furthermore, both Che-Ha et al. 
(2012) and McElroy et al. (2001) recommend investigating economic change over time 
(even when collected as a snapshot), as we have done here. 
Table 1 presents the percentage of respondents who reported their three-year revenue and 
net profit change in each category: decreasing, stable, and increasing. This highlights that 
while almost half of all respondents reported stable revenue and net profit, of the remainder 
a greater percentage reported that while revenue was increasing, net profit was not. Although 
there may be any number of causes, increased costs of regulatory compliance would likely 
be one of the contributors. 
 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for financial performance measures 
 
  
Percentage of respondents reporting to be in each category 




18.87% 47.34% 33.79% 
Net profit change 
 




Goal Satisfaction: the level of satisfaction (1-7 Likert scale, very dissatisfied to very 
satisfied) with each of a set of ten potential goals for a business, averaged into a single 
construct variable. Given the wide range of goals that have been identified, we developed 
our own list of goals, starting with a number of existing lists from the literature, primarily 
from Andersson et al. (2002), Birley and Westhead (1994), Carter et al. (2003), Greenbank 
(2001), and Shane et al. (1991). We removed direct thematic duplicates, along with items 
which were irrelevant to our micro-firm and tourism context. Given considerable evidence 
that non-financial goals are favoured by micro-firms (e.g. Dewhurst and Horobin, 1998), 
only one directly financial goal was included, which itself is tailored towards profit 
satisficing rather than “making money for money’s sake”.  
The resulting list was pilot tested (in addition to the survey pilot test) with informal 
interviews of several potential respondents, beginning with an inquiry into goals, before 
asking specifically about our compiled list of goals. Additionally, we collaborated with the 
Bed and Breakfast Association to further ensure the validity of the list, which they then 
approved (as did all subsequent trade-associations when they endorsed the study). This 
resulted in our final list of ten goals, presented in Table 2, which shows the mean satisfaction 
scores, along with the percentage of respondents who reported holding each of the individual 




3.2.2 Independent Variables 
Perceived-Value: based on the level of agreement (1-7 Likert scale, strongly disagree to 
strongly agree) with a number of items regarding the positive aspects of the four areas of 
regulation (see Table 3). The items are partly based on Edwards et al. (2003) and IpsosMORI 
(2007), and were developed using Spector’s (1992) guidelines. The construct was aggregated 
using the mean score of agreement across each area of regulation. 
 





they hold the goal 
Mean 
Satisfaction SD 
Having free time for non-
business activities 
 
25% 4.73 1.50 
Being your own boss 
 
55% 6.14 0.87 
To pursue a desired lifestyle or 
hobby 
 
24% 5.10 1.47 
To have greater flexibility for 
your personal and family life 
 
38% 5.15 1.44 
To be challenged by the 
problems and opportunities of 
operating a business 
 
14% 5.22 1.16 
To have work satisfaction 
 
44% 5.78 1.00 
Achieving financial security 
 
58% 5.14 1.27 
Desire to meet new people 
 
29% 5.68 1.05 
Giving employment 
opportunities to your family 
 
13% 4.81 1.14 
Giving employment 
opportunities to those who 
need them 
 
7% 4.71 1.12 




Perceived-Burden: based on the level of agreement (1-7 Likert scale, strongly disagree to 
strongly agree) with a number of items for each regulation, related to the perceived ‘burden’ 
that firms may face (see Table 3). The items were developed using Spector’s (1992) 
guidelines, partly based on Edwards et al. (2003) and IpsosMORI (2007). The construct was 
again aggregated using the mean score of agreement across the items.  
We use these two variables, Perceived-Value and Burden, to explore the mixed feelings 
respondents may feel towards regulation, namely that they can simultaneously view both the 
positive and negative aspects, from the perspectives of both business owners and customers. 
The items used to capture the value and burden of regulation consider regulation in generic 
terms rather than in regard to the impact of specific regulations. This approach was chosen 
in order to allow for the inherent variation between firms and to offset both the negative 
preponderance observed in previous studies regarding the burden of regulation and the 
apparent difficulty that firms face when independently identifying the potential positive 
impacts of regulation (Edwards et al., 2003; IpsosMORI, 2007). 
Control variables regarding the respondents’ business were also collected leading to the 
following variables to be used:  
Years in business: a categorical variable (0/1) indicating the number of years that the 
current owner-manager has operated the business. It distinguishes between 1-10 years (the 
 








I understand why [each] regulations exist 
 
Small businesses, such as my own, should 
be exempt from the full force of [each] 
regulation 
 
The protections afforded by [each] 
regulations are an unreasonable burden on 
my firm 
[Each] regulations should apply to all 
businesses 
 
I believe [each] regulations are good for 
business 
 
[Each] regulations are a sensible control 
on firms 
 
Scale (1-7) where 1 indicates strongly disagree and 7 strongly agree. Each statement was 
presented for the four areas of regulation (employment, anti-discrimination, fire, and 
health and safety), with the name of the regulation in place of [each]. 
 
110 
base category, 0), and 11-60 years (category 1). Note that no respondent reported running 
their firm for more than 60 years. Fewer years in business may indicate that the firm is at a 
different stage of its lifecycle, i.e. new and expanding (Andersson et al., 2002).  
Number of employees: a categorical variable (0/1) which distinguishes between the number 
of people working in the firm, including the owner-manager. The base category (0) is one 
worker, indicating the owner-manager works alone, while category 1 designates 2-9 
workers, which indicates either a family based firm or one with employees. It distinguishes 
the smallest and least complex firms, from those who are larger and may fall under wider 
regulation. 
Serviced accommodation: also a categorical (0/1) variable where category 1 indicates 
serviced accommodation, while the base category (0) indicates non-serviced 
accommodation. This designates the level of service provided and allows for differences 
relating to the extent, type, and enforcement of regulation placed on each type of firm. 
 
3.3 Data Validation 
For each construct variable, Cronbach’s alpha was calculated to test for convergent validity 
and in each case was found to exceed the accepted minimum of 0.7 (DeVellis, 2012). 
Additionally, the items for Perceived-Value and Perceived-Burden were included within a 
larger set of questions in the survey and were tested using Principle Component Analysis, 
which highlighted our selected constructs as viable (Hair et al., 2010; Spector, 1992). Face 
validity for goal satisfaction is satisfied through the process of pilot testing the goal items 
with both potential respondents and the supporting trade-associations (Hair, 1998; Hair et 
al., 2010). 
In collecting all variables from a singular survey source there is a risk of common method 
bias (Podsakoff et al., 2011), which was mitigated by independently sourcing data on a 
number of variables, including from Companies House, firms’ own websites and trade 
publications, and then comparing these to the survey responses. We found no evidence of 
bias or misreporting. Furthermore, we were able to test the validity of subjective assessment 
(Rong and Wilkinson, 2011) through the pilot study, ensuring the understanding of questions 
matched our expectations. Additionally, the survey was structured to separate key areas and 
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thus reduce the risk of respondents linking different concepts. Finally, respondents were 
assured of both anonymity and confidentiality to elicit truthful responses. 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Perceived-Value and Burden of Regulation 
Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics for each of the core variables. It is interesting to 
note the mean of the Perceived-Value of regulation (5.34) is considerably higher than that 
of the Perceived-Burden (3.81), corresponding with “somewhat agree” to “agree”, and 
“somewhat disagree” to “neither agree nor disagree” respectively. This suggests that despite 
common rhetoric highlighting only the burden of regulation, respondents in fact seem to 
value regulation more than they identify it as an actual burden. Furthermore, there is a strong 
negative correlation between Perceived-Value and Perceived-Burden, indicating that as 
Perceived-Value increases, Perceived-Burden decreases, implying value can actually offset 
burden. These initial results demonstrate the importance of exploring both value and burden 
when considering regulation. 
 
 



















1. All goal 
satisfaction 
 








3.81 1.15 -0.19* -0.48* -   
4. 3-year revenue 
change 
 
2.15 0.71 0.21* 0.09* -0.17* -  
5. 3-year net profit 
change 
 
2.00 0.72 0.25* 0.14* -0.19* 0.77* - 
*p<.05        
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4.2 Financial Measures of Success 
Table 4 also demonstrates the small positive correlations between each of the two financial 
measures and goal satisfaction, indicating a (small) link between the objective and subjective 
measures of success. This supports H2, that there will be a weak correlation between the 
two, and by extension, H1, that the correlation will be positive (see Table 8 below for a 
summary of hypotheses and which are supported). Additionally, there are small positive 
correlations between each financial measure with Perceived-Value, thus suggesting some 
initial support for H6, which posits such an impact. Similarly, there are also stronger negative 
correlations between each financial measure and Perceived-Burden, suggesting some initial 
support for H3, which explores such an impact. These initial conclusions regarding H3 and 
H6 will be further explored econometrically.  
Table 5 presents the ordered probit model for three-year revenue change, while Table 6 
presents the same for three-year net profit change. In both cases, the initial estimation 
includes only control variables, with the independent variables being added in the second 
estimation.  
In both versions of the model, we can see that Perceived-Value has no statistically significant 
impact upon on either measure of performance. This implies the benefits of regulation (i.e. 
the level playing field and higher standards) are not having a direct impact upon financial 
performance, providing no support for H6, which posits a positive impact. Meanwhile 
Perceived-Burden demonstrates a negative effect on financial performance, supporting H3 
and indicating burden has a negative impact. This is not entirely unexpected, as the burdens 
of regulation (such as monetary and time costs) are likely to have direct impacts, particularly 
on net profit as monetary costs increase. These models also potentially suggest that burden 
may have a stronger impact on financial rather than goal based performance. Similarly, the 
lack of support for value impacting performance suggests that value may have a stronger 




Table 5: Ordered Probit.  










































Log likelihood -456.86 
 
-451.96 
Chi-square 62.32 (3 df) 72.11 (5 df) 
 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001. Note: Standard Error in parentheses. 




Additionally, the models demonstrate a negative impact from the number of years in 
business. This variable differentiates between owner-managers who have been in place for 
up to 10 years, and those who have been in place for up to 60 years, implying that the firms’ 
point in the business lifecycle matters. It might be that a younger firm may still be growing, 




Table 6: Ordered Probit.  










































Log likelihood -478.11 
 
-472.34 
Chi-square 41.71 (3 df) 53.26 (5 df) 
 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001. Note: Standard Error in parentheses. 
Note: dependent variable coded (1) decreasing, (2) stable, (3) increasing. 
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4.3 Goal Satisfaction 
In addition to what has already been discussed, the mean score for goal satisfaction is 5.38 
(see Table 4) suggesting that overall, respondents - in broad terms - are generally fairly 
satisfied with their performance using this broader measure. Furthermore, Table 4 also 
presents a small positive correlation between goal satisfaction and Perceived-Value, along 
with the small negative correlation with Perceived-Burden, again demonstrating both the 
imbalance between value and burden, and suggesting that for goals, value has a greater role 
than burden. To explore this further, Table 7 presents the OLS regression models for goal 
satisfaction, first with just the control variables (model 1), then with Perceived-Value and 
Perceived-Burden (model 2).  
Unlike the ordered probit models for the two financial performance measures, Perceived-
Burden has no statistically significant impact upon goal satisfaction; thus H4, is not 
supported. This suggests regulations are not detrimental to goal satisfaction measures of 
performance despite anecdotal evidence about the damaging effects of red tape (e.g. 
Edwards et al., 2003; and IpsosMORI, 2007). Furthermore, in light of the previous results 
concerning financial performance measures in Section 4.2, this finding also supports the 
suggestion that regulatory burden may have a greater impact on financial measures of 
performance than on goal satisfaction. 
The results also show that Perceived-Value has a statistically significant and positive impact 
on goal measured performance, thereby supporting H5. This is again a noteworthy result as 
it suggests the benefits of regulation can actually enhance some measures of performance. 
This plus our earlier findings on financial measures of performance, suggests that Perceived-
Value has a stronger impact on goals (than Perceived-Burden). Indeed, these results, 
combined with the different means for the value and burden of regulation (Table 4), imply 




Additionally, while the number of years in business shows no statistically significant impact 
in this version of the model, the number of employees demonstrates a negative impact, with 
the smallest firms (having no employees) more satisfied than larger firms. This may be a 
result of the inherent complexity which comes from running a larger firm, along with an 
increased degree of separation between the owner-manager and some aspects of the business. 
For instance, by hiring a receptionist, the owner-manager of a B&B may spend less time 
face-to-face with customers, which would hamper satisfaction towards the goal “desire to 
meet new people”. 
 




































   
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.07 
 
F (3, 480) 3.10** 
 
 
F (5, 478)  8.58*** 
 




5. Wider Discussion 
Our finding that the Perceived-Burden of regulation has a negative impact on financial 
measures of performance identifies in micro-firms what has been found elsewhere in the 
literature in regards to larger small firms. In particular the results suggests the existence of 
what Edwards et al. (2003) termed the ‘direct’ costs of regulation: a cost increase, such as 
an increase to a minimum wage, which directly impairs net profitability. There will also 
likely be indirect time costs associated with the opportunity costs of researching, 
understanding, and implementing regulatory changes. In micro-firms, such time costs are 
doubly deleterious as they are not carried out by specialised teams, but most likely the owner-
manager themselves, at the detriment of other business and profit making activities for which 
they are also responsible. This likely contributes to what Falta and Gallery (2011) term a 
'firefighting' mentality, in which owner-managers feel they are so time constrained that 
business development takes a back seat to dealing with one immediate issue after another. 
As such the burden of regulation might explain why some micro-firms remain small even 
when expansion might form part of the owner-manager’s set of goals. 
That Perceived-Burden was found not to impact goal satisfaction might help explain and 
reconcile previous literature in this area where different streams have found there to not only 
 
Table 8: Summary of hypotheses 
 
H1 There will be a positive correlation between financial and non-
financial performance measures. 
 
Supported 




H3 The Perceived-Burden of regulation will have a negative impact 
upon financial performance measures. 
 
Supported 
H4 The Perceived-Burden of regulation will have a negative impact 
upon goal related performance measures. 
 
Not supported 
H5 The Perceived-Value of regulation will positively impact goal  
related performance measures. 
 
Supported 
H6 The Perceived-Value of regulation will positively impact on 





be a disproportionate financial burden on small firms (e.g. OECD, 2001; and Collard and 
Godwin, 1999) but also no direct link between regulation and firm performance (Edwards et 
al., 2003; and Kitching, 2006). Previously these streams have been hard to reconcile given 
that firm performance has been measured mainly in financial terms and hence the findings 
of the two streams were fundamentally at odds concerning the burden of regulation. 
However, our findings suggest that while financial performance does seem to be negatively 
impacted by regulation, this does not translate into a meaningful constraint on a broader 
notion of performance as measured against the goals held by the owner-manager. Such 
findings are not only useful in their own right but also illustrate clearly the importance of 
selecting suitable measures of performance. 
Financial and goal based measures of performance are very different in many ways. 
However, by building on the work of Besser (1999) we also found that goal based 
performance measures positively but weakly correlate with more traditional financial 
performance measures. This might reflect the fact that no matter what non-financial goals 
an owner-manager may hold for their firm, if it cannot at least break-even, then the business 
is ultimately doomed to failure. It might therefore be that financial success facilitates to some 
extent the attainment of the wider set of goals held by owner-managers. Revenue and profits 
are not necessarily desired for their own sake but for how they help to facilitate the realisation 
of other goals.  
The unique central role played by owner-managers in micro-firms is important as it likely 
contributes to a mentality that regulation is especially onerous and burdensome, and thus 
why there is so much anecdotal evidence of this. Owner-managers are exposed to all relevant 
regulations, along with the potential impacts and perceived burdens, and must also devise 
ways to comply. In contrast, in larger firms (including SMEs), there is likely to be insulation 
between regulation and the ultimate owner. Therefore the owner-manager of a micro-firm 
likely develops an instinct for burden based upon the aggregation of all possible negative 
impacts, thereby heightening the perceived overall impact. For example, a micro-firm with 
no employees of child-bearing age, may still consider the potential burden of maternity and 
paternity leave, even though it is unlikely to affect them. Similarly, legally compliant owner-
managers may still worry about the potential costs of an employment tribunal simply because 
they have been exposed to 'horror stories' featured in trade-association publications. We 
would therefore suggest that while it is not possible to say the concerns over the Perceived-
Burden of regulation are invalid, it would seem that such concerns are over-stated, 
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particularly in relation to micro-firms and their wider preferred goal based measures of 
performance.  
By moving beyond a focus purely on the burden of regulation that has been the 
preoccupation of prior studies, we have found Perceived-Value of regulation is a more 
important determinant of the performance of micro-firms. This is likely due, at least in part, 
to both the use of subjective measure of goals for performance which are more suitable for 
micro-firms, and a more independent approach of measuring the value of regulation which 
did not require owner-managers to list specific positive impacts.  
Thus having identified that burden of regulation is overstated within other studies, we would 
therefore also suggest that value of it is understated. This might be because, as Edwards et 
al. (2003) and IpsosMORI (2007) found, owners and managers are much faster to point out 
the burdens of regulation than identify the benefits, and without prompting it can even be 
difficult for them to identify any positive impacts at all. This is perhaps unsurprising when 
any benefits associated with regulation are less likely to have a ‘direct positive impact’ to 
offset the ‘direct cost’, i.e. while an increase in the legal minimum wage increases wage 
costs, it does not increase revenue or directly lead to an increase in productivity.  
What is probably not explicitly considered by owner-managers is there are a host of indirect 
benefits that can be associated with regulation. For instance, while many owner-managers 
will prize the informality within their firms, we know in some cases regulation actually 
legitimises their actions, such as the case of offering flexible working to employees 
(Arrowsmith et al., 2003). Furthermore, the close personal relationships within micro-firms 
likely allows owner-managers to view first-hand the potential benefits to their friends and 
family (i.e. their employees) of implementing a variety of employment regulations such as 
flexible hours, pension entitlements, or maternity/paternity leave. Such benefits may not 
factor into improved financial performance (unless a regulatory change improved 
productivity for example) but would be much more likely to factor into goal satisfaction 
levels. This dual perspective as both employer and as a friend/family member may even go 
so far as to mitigate the Perceived-Burden. A further consequence of regulation may be a 
move to improve procedures, and hence a stimulus toward modernisation and innovation. In 
the accommodation context, particularly for micro-firms, this could manifest as a move 
towards a computerised booking system, reducing the risk of human error and allowing for 
the potential of online booking, for example. Furthermore, fear of non-compliance penalties 
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contributes to Perceived-Burden, but this can be alleviated by (following the regulations) to 
develop specific procedural practices, which not only reduce the exposure to (for example) 
employment tribunals, but also improve confidence and consistency when dealing with 
employees.  
In many ways one of the most obvious benefits of regulation is it creates a level playing field 
for all firms within the sector as all are subject to the same minimum standards. As long as 
all adhere to the regulations, this ensures businesses are not undercut by one adopting lower 
and cheaper standards. However, in the accommodation sector, developments associated 
with the sharing economy, including the success of businesses such as Airbnb, pose 
challenges in this regard as such new businesses are competing in the same market space as 
traditional businesses likes B&Bs, but are subject to different and currently less onerous 
forms of regulation (at least in the UK). In such settings, regulations, even when previously 
adopted and accepted, can become an increasing financial burden to traditional businesses.  
In addition to Perceived-Value and Burden, our results highlight two further factors which 
impact performance. Firstly, the number of years in business was found to have a negative 
impact but only on financial performance. This may be due to older firms being in a later 
part of their business lifecycle, thus no longer new and expanding. It is also possible that a 
more experienced owner-manager who may have been exposed to more regulation and 
regulatory change, is actively attempting to reduce the size of the business to reduce the 
perceived regulatory burden (as many regulations do not apply, or fully apply, to smaller 
firms). That the number of years in business has no impact on goal satisfaction again 
highlights the importance of investigating how micro-firm owner-managers measure 
performance, as older owner-managers remain as satisfied as their younger counterparts, 
even in the face of stable or decreasing revenue and profit.  
Secondly the number of employees was found to have a negative impact on goal satisfaction, 
but no impact on financial performance. This is not entirely unsurprising, as a firm looking 
to enhance profits would only employ workers when it made financial sense to do so, but a 
firm with more employees will be larger and hence more complex. This complexity may be 
the issue for goal satisfaction as there is likely to be increasing separation between the owner-
manager and some aspects of the business as it grows. A B&B owner-manager hiring a 
receptionist may find they spend less time dealing directly with customers, thereby 
hampering their “desire to meet new people” goal. Furthermore, employment regulations 
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may become increasingly complicated over a relatively small threshold of workers (as in the 
UK), increasing the organisational complexity in a nonlinear fashion, thereby creating a 
dynamic shift between operating as a ‘one-man band’ and employing workers.  
 
6. Conclusions 
Using newly collected primary data focussed on traditionally overlooked micro-firms, we 
identified owner-manager goals to be an appropriate measure of business performance, and 
indeed, one which positively but weakly correlates with more traditional financial 
performance measures. Furthermore, unlike previous studies, we investigated both the 
Perceived-Value and Burden of regulation. Despite the negative rhetoric commonly 
associated with the damaging impact of red tape on firms, we found the burden of regulation 
has been overstated in studies of small firms to date. Our results show that whilst regulation 
does negatively impact financial performance, it has no impact on goal satisfaction which is 
a more relevant measure of success for owner-manager run micro-firms. This dichotomy 
between different performance measures goes a long way to explaining the inconsistent 
results of previous studies on the impact of regulation which have usually concentrated on 
financial measures of performance and burden. Meanwhile the Perceived-Value of 
regulation, which has not been explored before, is in fact a more important and positive 
determinant of the type of performance that matters most to micro-firms. In this sense we 
have found regulation to be both good and bad for firm performance in contrast to other 
studies, and would therefore suggest that this holistic approach is a better way to examine 
the impact of regulation going forward. 
Given past studies have illustrated that owner-managers cannot identify easily the benefits 
of regulation (but can readily do so with the burdens), our findings suggests it is crucial that 
any future regulatory changes are accompanied by appropriate information. The rationale 
behind the regulation and the positive impacts it might bring need to be communicated to 
owner-managers, whether it be directly from policy-makers/government or via other sources 
such as trade-associations. To do so will enhance the benefits associated with the regulation 
and hence perceived performance, whilst also helping to move away from viewing regulation 
merely as an unwelcome burden. 
In drawing these conclusions, we recognise that our study might be somewhat limited by our 
choice of measures of financial success (though such measures aid response rates for micro-
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firms). Furthermore, our survey captured firm goals at a single point in time, and future 
studies may wish to examine how they may have changed over the course of the business 
lifecycle or as a result of regulatory (or other) impacts. It could be argued that Perceived-
Burden’s lack of impact on goal satisfaction is due to goals being ‘rewritten’ around 
regulation, as suggested by Greenbank (2001), thereby negating any negative impact. Since 
we examined a pre-defined list of goals (i.e. we have not allowed respondents to consider 
alternative goals) we would suggest that such an impact is limited but it would be difficult 
to quantify this without a longitudinal study of goals over a prolonged period.  
Our use of both the Perceived-Value and Burden of regulation has identified a significant 
new stream of work for future exploration, as it offers a more nuanced approach than the 
traditional use of just burden. Areas which warrant further study include the use of more 
detailed measures of business success, and using individual regulations to explore specific 
burdens, costs, benefits, and notions of value. Furthermore, investigating the relationship 
between Perceived-Value, Burden, and regulatory compliance also has merit, as does an 
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burden. Note: dependent variables coded (1) decreasing, (2) stable, (3) increasing. 
 
124 
Besser, T.L., 1999. Community Involvement and the Perception of Success among Small 
Business Operators in Small Towns. Journal of Small Business Management, 37(4), pp. 16-
29. 
Better Regulation Task Force, 2007. Principles of Good Regulation. 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20070222000000/http://www.brc.gov.uk/downl
oads/pdf/principlesleaflet.pdf. 
Birley, S. & Westhead, P., 1994. A taxonomy of business start-up reasons and their impact 
on firm growth and size. Journal of Business Venturing, 9(1), pp. 7-31. 
BIS, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, 2012. Business Population Estimates 
for the UK and Regions 2012. 
BIS, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, 2016. Protections for small and micro 
businesses in non-regulated sectors. 
Carson, D.J., 1985. The Evolution of Marketing in Small Firms. European Journal of 
Marketing, 19(5), pp. 7-16. 
Carter, N.M., Gartner, W.B., Shaver, K.G. & Gatewood, E.J., 2003. The career reasons of 
nascent entrepreneurs. Journal of Business Venturing, 18(1), pp. 13-39. 
Carter, S., Mason, C. & Tagg, S., 2009. Perceptions and experience of employment 
regulation in UK small firms. Environment and Planning. C, Government & Policy, 27(2), 
p. 263. 
Chapter 3 of this thesis. Betton, M.E., Branston, J.R. & Tomlinson, P.R., 2017. Managerial 
Hubris, Trade-Associations, and Regulatory Knowledge in Micro-Firms. 
Che-Ha, N., Mavondo, F.T. & Mohd-Said, S., 2012. Performance or learning goal 
orientation: Implications for business performance. Journal of Business Research. 
Chrisman, J.J., Chua, J.H., Pearson, A.W. & Barnett, T., 2012. Family Involvement, Family 
Influence, and Family-Centered Non-Economic Goals in Small Firms. Entrepreneurship: 
Theory & Practice, 36(2), pp. 267-293. 
Clark, J., 2009. Entrepreneurship and diversification on English farms: Identifying business 
enterprise characteristics and change processes. Entrepreneurship & Regional Development, 
21(2), pp. 213-236. 
125 
Collard, D. & Godwin, M., 1999. Compliance Costs for Employers: UK PAYE and National 
Insurance, 1995–96. Fiscal Studies, 20(4), pp. 423-449. 
Cruz, C., Justo, R. & De Castro, J.O., 2012. Does family employment enhance MSEs 
performance?: Integrating socioemotional wealth and family embeddedness perspectives. 
Journal of Business Venturing, 27(1), pp. 62-76. 
Curran, J., 2000. What is Small Business Policy in the UK for? Evaluation and Assessing 
Small Business Policies. International Small Business Journal, 18(3), pp. 36-50. 
DeVellis, R.F., 2012. Scale Development: Theory and Applications. SAGE Publications. 
Dewhurst, P. & Horobin, H., 1998. Small Business Owners. In: R. Thomas, ed. The 
Management of Small Tourism and Hospitality Firms. Cassell, pp. 19-38. 
DTI, Department of Trade and Industry, 2001. Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) - 
Definitions [Online]. Available from: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+ 
/http://www.dti.gov.uk/sme4/define.htm [Accessed 2013]. 
Dunkelberg, W., Moore, C., Scott, J. & Stull, W., 2013. Do entrepreneurial goals matter? 
Resource allocation in new owner-managed firms. Journal of Business Venturing, 28(2), pp. 
225-240. 
Edwards, P., Gilman, M., Ram, M. & Arrowsmith, J., 2002. Public Policy, the Performance 
of Firms, and the 'Missing Middle': The Case of the Employment Regulations, and a Role 
for Local Business Networks. Policy Studies, 23(1), pp. 5-20. 
Edwards, P., Ram, M. & Black, J., 2003. The impact of employment legislation on small 
firms: a case study analysis. 
Edwards, P., Ram, M. & Black, J., 2004. Why Does Employment Legislation Not Damage 
Small Firms? Journal of Law and Society, 31(2), pp. 245-265. 
Evans, N.J. & Ilbery, B.W., 1992. Advertising and farm-based accommodation: a British 
case study. Tourism Management, 13(4), pp. 415-422. 
Fajnzylber, P., Maloney, W.F. & Montes-Rojas, G.V., 2011. Does formality improve micro-
firm performance? Evidence from the Brazilian SIMPLES program. Journal of Development 
Economics, 94(2), pp. 262-276. 
126 
Falta, M. & Gallery, N., 2011. Unintended consequences of regulatory reporting 
requirements for small and medium size construction entities: Australian evidence. 
Construction Management & Economics, 29(11), pp. 1121-1135. 
Federation of Small Businesses, 2004. Better Regulation: Is It Better for Business? 
Gov.uk, 2013. Reducing the impact of regulation on business [Online]. Available from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/policies/reducing-the-impact-of-regulation-on-business/ 
supporting-pages/reducing-regulation-for-small-businesses [Accessed August 2013]. 
Greenbank, P., 2001. Objective setting in the micro-business. International Journal of 
Entrepreneurial Behaviour & Research, 7(3), pp. 108-127. 
Hair, J.F., 1998. Multivariate Data Analysis. Prentice Hall. 
Hair, J.F., Black, W.C. & Babin, B.J., 2010. Multivariate Data Analysis: A Global 
Perspective. Pearson Education, Limited. 
Hart, M., Athayde, R., Blackburn, R., Kitching, J., Smallbone, D. & Wilson, N., 2008. The 
impact of regulation on small business performance. Small Business Service, Department of 
Trade and Industry. 
IpsosMORI, 2007. Businesses’ Perceptions of Regulation, report for the Better Regulation 
Executive. 
Jennings, P. & Beaver, G., 1995. The management dimension of small business failure. 
Journal of Strategic Change, 4(4), pp. 185-200. 
Johnson, S., 2002. Lifelong learning and SMEs: issues for research and policy. Journal of 
Small Business and Enterprise Development, 9(3), pp. 285-295. 
Keasey, K. & Watson, R., 1993. Small Firm Management: Ownership, Finance and 
Performance. Wiley. 
Kelliher, F. & Reinl, L., 2009. A resource-based view of micro-firm management practice. 
Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Development, 16(3), pp. 521-532. 
Kitching, J., 2006. A burden on business? Reviewing the evidence base on regulation and 
small-business performance. Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 24(6), 
pp. 799-814. 
127 
March, J.G., 1972. Model Bias in Social Action. Review of Educational Research, 42(4), pp. 
413-429. 
McElroy, J.C., Morrow, P.C. & Rude, S.N., 2001. Turnover and organizational performance: 
a comparative analysis of the effects of voluntary, involuntary, and reduction-in-force 
turnover. The Journal of applied psychology, 86(6), p. 1294. 
Muñoz-Bullón, F. & Sánchez-Bueno, M.J., 2011. Does downsizing improve organisational 
performance? An analysis of Spanish manufacturing firms. International Journal of Human 
Resource Management, 22(14), pp. 2924-2945. 
Murphy, G.B., Trailer, J.W. & Hill, R.C., 1996. Measuring performance in entrepreneurship 
research. Journal of Business Research, 36(1), pp. 15-23. 
O'Dwyer, M. & Ryan, E., 2000. Management development issues for owners/managers of 
micro-enterprises. Journal of European Industrial Training, 24(6), pp. 345-353. 
OECD, 2001. Businesses' Views on Red Tape. OECD Publishing. 
Open Europe, 2015. Top 100 EU rules cost Britain £33.3bn. 
Pearce, P.L., 1990. Farm tourism in New Zealand: A social situation analysis. Annals of 
Tourism Research, 17(3), pp. 337-352. 
Podsakoff, P.M., MacKenzie, S.B. & Podsakoff, N.P., 2011. Sources of Method Bias in 
Social Science Research and Recommendations on How to Control It. Annual Review of 
Psychology, 63(1), pp. 539-569. 
Ram, M., Edwards, P., Gilman, M. & Arrowsmith, J., 2001. The dynamics of informality: 
employment relations in small firms and the effects of regulatory change. Work, Employment 
& Society, 15(4), pp. 845-861. 
Rong, B. & Wilkinson, I.F., 2011. What do managers’ survey responses mean and what 
affects them? The case of market orientation and firm performance. Australasian Marketing 
Journal (AMJ), 19(3), pp. 137-147. 
Saunders, M., Lewis, P. & Thornhill, A., 2015. Research Methods for Business Students. 7th 
ed.: Pearson Education. 
128 
Shane, S., Kolvereid, L. & Westhead, P., 1991. An exploratory examination of the reasons 
leading to new firm formation across country and gender. Journal of Business Venturing, 
6(6), pp. 431-446. 
Sharpley, R. & Vass, A., 2006. Tourism, farming and diversification: An attitudinal study. 
Tourism Management, 27(5), pp. 1040-1052. 
Shinkle, G.A., 2012. Organizational Aspirations, Reference Points, and Goals: Building on 
the Past and Aiming for the Future. Journal of Management, 38(1), pp. 415-455. 
Spector, P.E., 1992. Summated Rating Scale Construction: An Introduction. SAGE 
Publications. 
Strielkowski, W., 2012. Factors That Determine Success Of Small And Medium Enteprises. 
The Role Of Internal And External Factors. Journal of Applied Economic Sciences, 3(21), 
pp. 334-350. 
Thomas, R., Church, I., Eaglen, A., Jameson, S., Lincoln, G. & Parsons, D., 1998. The 
national survey of small tourism and hospitality firms: annual report 1997-1998. Centre for 
the Study of Small Tourism and Hospitality Firms, Leeds Metropolitan University. 
Tourism Alliance, 2015. UK Tourism Statistics 2015. 
Tourism Alliance, 2016. UK Tourism Statistics 2016. 
Tourism Regulation Taskforce, 2012. Smart Regulation and Economic Growth: Seizing the 
Tourism Opportunity. 
Vickers, I., James, P., Smallbone, D. & Baldock, R., 2005. UNDERSTANDING SMALL 
FIRM RESPONSES TO REGULATION: The Case of Workplace Health and Safety. Policy 
Studies, 26(2), pp. 149-169. 
Ward, M., Gruppen, L. & Regehr, G., 2002. Measuring Self-assessment: Current State of 
the Art. Adv Health Sci Educ Theory Pract, 7(1), pp. 63-80. 
Watson, J. & Robinson, S., 2003. Adjusting for risk in comparing the performances of male- 
and female-controlled SMEs. Journal of Business Venturing, 18(6), pp. 773-788. 
Wiklund, J. & Shepherd, D., 2003. Aspiring for, and Achieving Growth: The Moderating 
Role of Resources and Opportunities. Journal of Management Studies, 40(8), pp. 1919-1941. 
129 
Williams, A.M., Shaw, G. & Greenwood, J., 1989. From tourist to tourism entrepreneur, 
from consumption to production: evidence from Cornwall, England. Environment and 
Planning A, 21(12), pp. 1639-1653. 
Zellweger, T.M., Nason, R.S., Nordqvist, M. & Brush, C.G., 2013. Why Do Family Firms 
Strive for Nonfinancial Goals? An Organizational Identity Perspective. Entrepreneurship: 








5. Paper Three: Compliance 
This declaration concerns the article entitled: 
Perceived Regulatory Compliance in Micro-Firms: The Case of English Accommodation Firms 
Publication status (tick one) 




Given that this paper builds on concepts developed in Paper Two, this is a draft, intended 
for submission to Tourism Management by the end of 2017, following the revised 
resubmission of Paper Two. If accepted, the reference would read: 
Betton, M.E., Branston, J.R. & Tomlinson, P.R., 2017. Perceived Regulatory Compliance 
in Micro-Firms: The Case of English Accommodation Firms. Tourism Management. 
Candidate’s 
contribution 
to the paper 
(detailed, 
and also 
given as a 
percentage) 
The candidate considerably contributed to the… 
Formulation of ideas: 70%. I devised the basis of the paper, including the exploration of 
both Perceived Own-Firm and Competitor Compliance, and studied further literature as 
necessary. I created the initial draft of the paper, containing most of the ideas in raw form. 
From this, the second and third authors and I, made revisions throughout the paper, before 
we each approved of the version included herein. 
Design of methodology: 70%. I devised and refined the survey, based on the outcomes of 
the pilot study. I also developed each of the variables from the constituent survey questions 
and ran all of the statistical analyses, with methodological support from the second and third 
authors. 
Experimental work: 90%. I alone conducted the survey, communicated with respondents 
(potential and otherwise), and liaised with trade-associations, although financial support for 
postal survey and the prize draw was provided by the second author. 
Presentation of data in journal format: 90%. I followed the Guide for Authors for the 
Tourism Management journal and read a number of articles from the journal, thus ensuring 
the presentation would be acceptable and in keeping with the expected level of work. Special 
consideration was given to the journal’s formatting requirements, such that greater detail is 
provided (e.g. Cronbach’s alpha, skew, and kurtosis values for each construct) in an 
appendix table, rather than presented in the text. Additionally, a table of descriptive statistics 
for all included variables is presented in the text and given its nature, is the most 
comprehensive presentation of the variables used in this thesis. The use of footnotes was 
also limited in accordance with the journal’s guidelines. 
Permission As this paper is in draft form, no permission is necessary at this stage. When it is submitted 
to Tourism Management, the covering letter will make it clear that the paper forms part of 
this thesis, which has been restricted for three years, thus guaranteeing journal exclusivity 
for a predetermined period. 
Candidate 
Statement 
This paper reports on original research I conducted during the period of my Higher Degree 





Perceived Regulatory Compliance in Micro-Firms: 
The Case of English Accommodation Firms 
 
Abstract 
Regulation is designed to limit the operation of firms, but is only successful when firms 
actually comply. This compliance is determined by several factors, including knowledge-of, 
and attitude-towards regulation, which consists of both its associated burden and value. 
Existing literature generally ignores value, focuses on ‘high-risk’ industries, and overlooks 
micro-firms, though they are the most numerous of firms and their limited resources mean 
they are less likely to comply. This paper explores Perceived Own-Firm and Competitor 
Compliance in micro-firms in the research-neglected tourism industry, using original survey 
data and multivariate regression. Perceived Own-Firm Compliance appears to exceed 
knowledge of regulation, which itself is found to be poor. Perceived Competitor Compliance 
is thought to be very low. Attempts to improve only Own-Firm Compliance will likely have 
a detrimental effect on Perceived Competitor Compliance, meaning that both must be 
approached in tandem to actually have a positive impact on efforts to comply. 
 
Keywords: Micro-Firms, Regulation, Compliance, Self-Assessment, Knowledge, 





Regulation is an omnipresent part of everyday life given it impacts everything from the way 
we are treated by employers to the cost and quality of the products we buy, yet it often goes 
unnoticed. By definition, regulation is a set of rules from government that limits what firms 
can do and how they can do it, thereby restricting the free choice that managers would 
otherwise enjoy (Atherton et al., 2008; BRTF, 2007), and hence is one of the most important 
determinants of firm behaviour (Lynch-Wood and Williamson, 2014). Firms must 
implement and/or adhere to all applicable regulations, and then maintain this compliance in 
a constantly evolving regulatory landscape which requires ongoing learning of new 
requirements that must be both understood and implemented. Poor or incomplete 
compliance, or indeed non-compliance, not only risks prosecution, but for smaller firms in 
particular, also jeopardises the very existence of the business. Large fines, lost business due 
to temporary closures or reputational damage, or in the case of an accident, the cost of 
compensation, along with recruitment and training of a replacement, may exceed the limited 
funds available (Boustras et al., 2015; Shalini, 2009).  
Many factors have been identified as possible determinants of the extent to which firms 
comply with regulations, including knowledge-of and attitude-towards regulation, levels of 
(government) enforcement, and perceptions of competitor compliance (Boustras et al., 2015; 
Fernández-Muñiz et al., 2009; Mendoza et al., 2016; Thomas et al., 2016). Yet 
understanding of the determinants of compliance is incomplete for a number of reasons, most 
especially in regard to micro-firms. Firstly, the regulatory environment is very wide ranging 
(and indeed constantly evolving according to Lynch-Wood and Williamson, 2014) but most 
of the extant compliance literature only considers perceived ‘high risk’ regulations and 
industries, such as health and safety law or the construction industry (where non-compliance 
could be fatal). This means that some industries (such as tourism studied herein) are 
chronically under-researched (Hasle and Limborg, 2006; Hasle et al., 2012) yet might 
provide distinctive results given the different nature of their activities. Secondly, a number 
of existing determinants are not thoroughly understood. For instance, attitude towards 
regulation is seen to be important but it has thus far only been considered in simple terms, 
without any consideration that regulation can have both benefits and burdens (Fooks and 
Mills, 2017). Finally, the limited compliance literature considering smaller firms either 
subsumes micro-firms into a broad ‘small firms’ category (Servon et al., 2010) or excludes 
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them altogether (Arrowsmith et al., 2003)1. Yet, the small size of micro-firms means that in 
most cases the owner also acts as the manager, and likely operates within all areas of the 
business. This makes owner-managers uniquely positioned to be both the main conduit-for, 
and decision-making agent behind, business regulatory compliance. Furthermore, micro-
firms exist in most industries, accounting for 96% of all firms, 32% of private sector 
turnover, and 19% of private sector turnover in the UK (BEIS, 2016a). They also encompass 
a variety of business types including entrepreneurial ventures and family businesses, along 
with sole traders and, simply, very small firms, so a thorough understanding of their unique 
compliance is a significant omission from the literature. 
This study addresses these deficits by investigating micro-firms in the English 
accommodation industry, thereby making a two-fold contribution. The first is a broad 
theoretical contribution by exploring the determinants of regulatory compliance, including 
consideration of both Own-Firm and Competitor Compliance. A key development is the 
identification that attitudes towards regulation can be better explored using the balanced 
evaluation of regulation suggested by Chapter 4 of this thesis, which considers both the value 
(benefits) and burden (costs) of regulation, in contrast to the ‘burden-centric’ method which 
typifies other studies of regulation to date. We then make an empirical contribution by 
exploring the identified potential determinants of perceived-compliance with original survey 
data in the English accommodation sector, thereby advancing regulatory compliance 
research in the neglected field of micro-firm study in general and the often-overlooked 
tourism industry in particular. The tourism industry represents a fitting case as with over 
21,000 regulations estimated to be in place, it is highly regulated and it features a high 
proportion of micro-firms (Tourism Regulation Taskforce, 2012). The focus is on perceived 
compliance rather than actual compliance since perceptions are what determine 
organisational decision-making (Fayolle and Liñán, 2014; Newell and Shanks, 2014; Sitkin 
and Weingart, 1995). 
The remainder of this paper is set out as follows: Section 2 presents a review of the literature 
on micro-firms, regulatory compliance, and (self) assessment skills, culminating in a set of 
hypotheses to be tested. Section 3 presents the chosen case, detailing the survey and the 
newly collected data, along with the methodological approaches used. Section 4 reports the 
                                                 
1 For example, the European Survey of Enterprises on New and Emerging Risks (ESENER) which excluded 
firms with less than 10 employees in 2010, and in 2014 excluded firms with less than 5 employees, despite the 
fact that 92% of registered EU firms have 0-9 employees (Boustras et al., 2015; EU-OSHA, 2010, 2014). 
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results of the analysis and in doing so, reveals the level of support for the hypotheses. Finally, 
Section 5 explores these findings in greater detail, along with a discussion of 
recommendations, while Section 6 offers a brief conclusion to the study. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Micro-Firms and Regulation 
Generally implemented by governments with the best of intentions, regulation is a set of 
rules/interventions that seek “to change the behaviour of individuals or groups” (BRTF, 
2007, p.1) for the collective benefit of society. For example, health and safety legislation 
ensures a safe environment for workers and consumers, while employment law ensures 
reasonable working conditions. However, regulatory measures are far from perfect, with 
numerous intended beneficial impacts to society often accompanied by increased costs and 
wider burdens, which generally apply to firms (Fooks and Mills, 2017). For example, the 
requirement to make premises accessible is clearly designed to ensure disabled individuals 
are not excluded and hence create a fully inclusive society, but potentially also results in 
massive costs to firms that have to undertake expensive adjustments, especially since the 
requirement to make ‘reasonable changes’ is ill-defined (Charlton, 2011; Gerrard, 2011). 
Similarly, Tan and Rae (2009) suggest more stringent safety requirements (e.g. strict fire 
door requirements) may reduce scope for innovation within the firm (e.g. stifling unusual 
accommodation options such as huts or buses).  
Micro-firms –herein defined as firms with 0-9 employees (BIS, 2016; DTI, 2001)– and other 
smaller firms are required to comply with the vast majority, if not all, of the regulations that 
apply to larger firms. There is a considerable literature on the financial burden of complying 
with regulation, which is generally found to disproportionally affect smaller-firms, as the 
cost of compliance remains partially fixed and so the cost as a proportion of revenue 
increases considerably for smaller firms (Carter et al., 2003; Edwards et al., 2003; Lewis et 
al., 2015a). For example, Collard and Godwin (1999) found firms with 1-4 employees spend 
up to £288 per-employee per-year on regulatory administration, compared to firms with 
5000+ employees who spend only £5 per-employee per-year. Similarly, the OECD (2001) 
found firms with 1-19 employees spend up to five times more on regulatory costs than firms 
with 50-500 employees.  
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For small firms Edwards et al. (2003) suggests this ‘burden’ consists of many facets, which 
they categorise as being either direct or indirect in nature. ‘Direct costs’, are identified as the 
increases in required expenditure (which do not all vary in relation to the size of the 
business), such as an increase in wage costs following an increase to the statutory minimum 
wage or the purchase of specialised equipment which regulation deems necessary. ‘Indirect 
effects’, are the wider non-pecuniary impacts, such as greater formalisation of business 
processes and increased time spent on regulatory administration. Lewis et al. (2015a) build 
on such a taxonomy by offering a categorisation based on the different stages involved in 
small-firm compliance, where each stage includes both direct and indirect elements: first, 
the cost of researching and understanding regulation; second, the cost of implementing and 
abiding by regulation (such as the purchase of specialised equipment or undertaking 
training); and finally, the cost of demonstrating compliance (most likely though reporting 
and paperwork).  
Such categorisations highlight the extent to which regulations require firms to make costly 
adjustments. Indeed, it has been suggested that regulation can be considered to govern the 
majority of processes and decisions within a smaller business (Lynch-Wood and 
Williamson, 2014). This is particularly important in the severely resource limited 
environment of micro-firms, where funds are limited and owner-managers are involved in 
all aspects of the business, including ensuring compliance. Since owner-managers usually 
confront limited time and many responsibilities, compliance can only happen to the 
detriment of other areas of the business, thereby exacerbating the previously reported 
‘firefighting mentality’ and general managerial approach of owner-managers (Falta and 
Gallery, 2011). It also likely contributes to the loss of the informal, family-feel of a small 
business, as formalisation of business practices is required to ensure and demonstrate 
regulatory compliance (Edwards et al., 2003).  
To date the main focus of research on regulation, particularly that considering smaller firms, 
has been to investigate this burden (BRE, 2010; Chittenden et al., 2002; Kuratko et al., 
1999). There are various reasons for this attention, one of which may simply be that owner-
managers, when surveyed or interviewed, tend “towards the negative when spontaneously 
describing regulations” (IpsosMORI, 2007, p.3) because they naturally find it easier to 
identify negative aspects and impacts of regulation. Furthermore, while regulatory changes 
often incur direct costs on the firm, they rarely convey direct and obvious benefits (financial 
or otherwise) to the firm as most benefits accrue to others, such as employees or customers. 
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Yet potential benefits to the firm do exist, and may include: a stimulus towards innovation 
and modernisation; improved networking (even if only to seek support to understand the 
regulation); and the legitimisation of existing practices (such as flexible working, which the 
informality of micro-firms frequently already provides); along with ensuring a level playing 
field in the market (Chapter 4 of this thesis; Edwards et al., 2003; IpsosMORI, 2007; Ram 
et al., 2001). Such benefits are difficult to quantify which is perhaps why they have generally 
been overlooked thus far. 
 
2.2 Attitude and Regulatory Compliance 
In addition to the extent of burden, a number of other factors have been identified which help 
determine the levels of regulatory compliance for firms in general, and to a lesser extent, for 
smaller firms in particular (Boustras et al., 2015; Nielsen and Parker, 2012; Thomas et al., 
2016). A key influence on small firm compliance levels is an owner-managers’ general 
attitude towards regulation, which has multiple potential means of influence. It has been 
found to impact the way regulation is treated within small firms, including the relative 
importance placed on maintaining regulatory compliance and the methods of 
implementation (Edwards et al., 2003; Edwards et al., 2004; Hart et al., 2008; IpsosMORI, 
2007). Whilst such conclusions have only been found in small firms to date, it seems likely 
that this also applies to micro-firms given that owner-managers are even more important in 
that context. Furthermore, Chapter 3 of this thesis found that attitude also impacts the 
willingness of micro-firm owner-managers to engage in on-going learning about regulation, 
which is likely to boost compliance levels for any given level of effort. 
Mendoza et al. (2016) explore the notion of ‘fairness’ in regards to compliance and 
regulatory knowledge levels in firms of all sizes, which clearly has close links to attitude. 
Fairness is found to be influenced by several factors, such as: whether the procedures 
required by the regulation lead to the desired outcomes; how easy the desired outcomes are 
to achieve; whether the reasoning for the regulation is adequately explained in a sufficient 
and timely manner; whether the regulation is seen as an intrusion on common sense; and 
perhaps most importantly, whether the cost of compliance is reasonable2. In this regard 
                                                 
2 This notion of fairness when combined with existing findings on the regressive nature of regulatory ‘burden’, 
could be taken to suggest regulation is inherently unfair on small and micro-firms, and might therefore explain 
the preponderance in the literature for negative rhetoric when dealing with regulation. 
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Lewis et al. (2015a) note that in SMEs (including micro-firms) a distinction often exists 
between the objectives of regulation which a business owner might perceive as being 
reasonable, and their associated perceptions regarding the unreasonable level of costs and 
complexities that are created by complying. Chapter 4 of this thesis expands on this when 
considering micro-firm performance by utilising a dual notion of attitude towards regulation, 
consisting of both its Perceived-Value (the potential benefits) and its Perceived-Burden (the 
costs and complexities). They note that by including separate measures for positive and 
negative attitudes, they achieve a better overall understanding of the complex issues around, 
and feelings towards, regulation.  
One area of the compliance literature that is relatively well developed for smaller firms 
concerns the impact of a sense of duty. Hasle et al. (2012) found the owner-managers of 
firms with up to 50 employees, actually wanted to comply with ‘reasonable standards’, 
noting they hold a ‘family feel’ towards their employees and hence, a sense of the value of 
regulation from their employees’ point of view. This is probably a direct result of the close 
personal relationships that are likely to exist between owner-managers and workers in 
smaller firms, as these would allow the owner-manager to see what is a burden to them is 
also a benefit to their employee, thereby engendering a sense of personal obligation. For 
example, the ‘burden’ of maternity leave might be somewhat mitigated by the act of granting 
it to an employee who is also a close friend (Chapter 4 of this thesis; IpsosMORI, 2007). 
BEIS (2016b) report similar results in SME firms with employees, with 91% of their 
respondents identifying “it’s simply important to do the right thing / comply with the law”, 
while only 76% claimed “avoiding sanctions due to non-compliance” (p.21). Furthermore, 
Boustras et al. (2015) investigated the motives for providing a safe work environment in 
micro-firm employers (thereby excluding firms with no employees) and found 56.2% 
reported “I feel ethically obliged”, emphasising the value of regulation, while only 37.6% 
emphasised the avoidance of burden, by identifying “to avoid a fine”.  
As such it seems micro-firm owner-managers not only consider the burden of regulation, but 
also its wider value/purpose, and both of these likely impact their levels of compliance. We 
therefore specify: 
H1: Perceived-Burden of regulation reduces Perceived Own-Firm 
Compliance with regulation. 
138 
H2: Perceived-Value of regulation improves Perceived Own-Firm 
Compliance with regulation. 
 
2.3 Knowledge and Compliance 
Knowledge of regulation is essential to regulatory compliance, since without it compliance 
would be based purely on luck (i.e. unintentional compliance) (Thomas et al., 2016). Indeed, 
Mendoza et al. (2016) suggest that knowledge deficits in SME employers are much more 
likely to cause non-compliance than any intentional behaviour. The issue is that regulation 
is complex so a basic level of understanding might not be sufficient to ensure compliance. 
For instance, a minimum wage instruction to pay no less than a certain amount per hour is 
easy to understand and implement, but the added complexity of benefits in kind and 
accommodation offsets (to name but a few) require extra effort to comprehend and 
implement (Lewis et al., 2015b). Such complexity not only increases the effort required to 
understand and implement such regulations, but likely leads to unintentional non-
compliance though partial ignorance (Mendoza et al., 2016). 
Knowledge is likely to be a particularly important issue for micro-firms as there is already 
considerable evidence that they generally have poor knowledge and understanding of 
regulation (Atkinson et al., 2016; Carter et al., 2009; Harris et al., 2012; Sjögrén and Syrjä, 
2015; Westrip, 1986). Of particular note given the industry considered herein is Chapter 3 
of this thesis, which found poor levels of knowledge in micro-firm owner-managers in the 
accommodation industry.  
Poor knowledge levels in micro-firms may be due, at least in part, to the fact that the 
acquisition of regulatory knowledge is not directly enforced, but is merely a voluntary act 
that can facilitate compliance (Mendoza et al., 2016). While larger firms may employ 
specialists and legal teams, within smaller, and especially micro-firms, it appears it is the 
owner-manager who is uniquely responsible for almost all regulatory issues (Edwards et al., 
2003; Hart et al., 2008; Kelliher and Reinl, 2009). Hart et al. (2008) find that 67% of small 
business owner-managers personally deal with new regulation, and 58% take personal 
responsibility for both training employees and making them aware of their own rights and 
responsibilities. Atkinson et al. (2016) and Nahrgang et al. (2011) conclude similar findings 
in small firms, and Boustras et al. (2015) does so for micro-firms. 
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Not only are micro-firm owner-managers required to spread their limited time across all 
areas of the business, but it seems they must also dedicate time to learning, understanding, 
and implementing a variety of different regulations. Acquiring and maintaining sufficient 
knowledge in all relevant areas is therefore going to be a particularly difficult challenge yet 
it is likely to be crucial for micro-firm regulatory compliance. As such we specify: 
H3: Perceived-Knowledge of regulation improves Perceived Own-Firm 
Compliance with regulation. 
 
2.4 Self-Assessment, and the Assessment of Others 
Smaller firm owner-managers are among the least likely to seek outside help or engage in 
wider networks (Lynch-Wood and Williamson, 2014). Instead, they operate in isolation, 
often not realising the limited extent of their regulatory knowledge, and hence their likely 
poor level of compliance (Champoux and Brun, 2003). Lacking time and preferring to focus 
on ‘running the business’, they often rely on passive information, such as updates or bulletins 
from trade-associations. However, prior studies covering a number of different disciplines 
demonstrate that individuals are generally poor at assessing their own level of knowledge 
(Eva and Regehr, 2005, 2007, 2011; Gordon, 1991; Meeran et al., 2016). Indeed, Sitzmann 
et al. (2010) found 56% of the studies they reviewed reported self-assessment to be 
inaccurate while a further 18% reported mixed results. In the context of micro-firm owner-
managers Chapter 3 of this thesis found self-assessment to be a poor indicator of Actual-
Knowledge, with trade-association engagement impacting only self-assessed (perceived) 
knowledge, rather than enhance what they actually know, thus engendering over-confidence 
in owner-managers. The suggestion was this might be due to a unidirectional form of radical 
learning (Salge and Vera, 2013), where knowledge flows in only one direction (from the 
source, such as a trade-association) and owner-managers have little opportunity for feedback 
or other methods of verifying their levels of understanding. 
The importance of assessing knowledge levels also extends to the subjective assessment of 
others. Thomas et al. (2016) examined the fishing industry and found that perceptions of 
competitor compliance influenced personal efforts at regulatory compliance. Boustras et al. 
(2015) develop this idea further when considering health and safety compliance in micro-
firms with employees, by suggesting that the perception of competitor regulatory compliance 
contributes to a ‘reference state’, which owner-managers draw upon when making their 
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compliance decisions. However, this concept is not explored empirically so it is unclear how 
important any such effect might be and hence we specify: 
H4: A positive reference state will improve Perceived Own-Firm 
Compliance with regulation. 
 
Furthermore, if individuals are inaccurate at gauging their own knowledge and ability, then 
they are even worse at gauging the same for others, and hence are likely to develop an 
inaccurate reference state. Generally referred to as the ‘better than average’ (BTA) effect, 
individuals are commonly found to believe themselves to be objectively ‘better’ than their 
peers across various settings (such as knowledge, capability, competency) despite lacking 
any evidence to suggest so (Brown, 2011; Krueger and Mueller, 2002; Meeran et al., 2016; 
Moore and Small, 2007). Research into the BTA effect considers explanations and 
moderating effects (Brown, 2011), such as overestimation (in terms of actual levels of own 
knowledge and an inflated sense of position relative others) and miss-calibration (between 
actual and perceived levels of knowledge) (Moore and Healy, 2008). The impact of the BTA 
effect on decision-making has also been explored theoretically in a class-room setting, most 
notably finding negative consequences associated with overconfidence (Merkle and Weber, 
2011).  
Therefore, in line with Boustras et al’s (2015) ‘reference state’, self-assessment and the BTA 
effect likely feed into each other, with over-estimated knowledge driving the impression that 
an individual is better than average. This in turn leads owner-managers to believe that they 
do not need to invest (so much) effort into their own compliance since they are already ahead 
of industry norms (Kruger, 1999). Indeed, irrespective of being ‘better than average’, 
Thomas et al. (2016) found that the perception of competitor compliance influences personal 
(i.e. own-firm) compliance, in line with the reference state, further demonstrating the need 
to understand both Own-Firm and Competitor perceived compliance. It seems likely that an 
understanding of this BTA effect will be important to improving regulatory compliance 
within micro-firms. We thus start by specifying that such a BTA effect likely exists in micro-
firm regulatory compliance comparisons: 
H5: Average Perceived Own-Firm Compliance will be higher than 
average Perceived Competitor Compliance. 
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Furthermore, inaccurate self-assessment and the BTA effect are likely to be mutually 
reinforcing, with over-estimated knowledge driving the impression that an individual is 
better than average, which in turn feeds an inflated sense of knowledge relative to other firms 
(Kruger, 1999). If competitors (i.e. all other firms in the same industry, operating in the same 
market) lack the same level of knowledge, they are unlikely to be able to comply as 
consistently and hence we specify: 
H6: Perceived-Knowledge of regulation reduces Perceived Competitor 
Compliance with regulation relative to one’s own firm. 
 
Finally, having explored a dual-notion of attitude in Section 2.2, we now posit that 
perceptions of both the value and burden of regulation will contribute to a firm’s perception 
of competitor compliance. Since it appears that owner-managers demonstrate a sense of duty 
and generally want to comply with ‘reasonable standards’ (BEIS, 2016b; Boustras et al., 
2015; Hasle et al., 2012; IpsosMORI, 2007), it follows that we can expect to see the same 
relationship between Perceived-Value and Perceived Competitor Compliance as we do with 
Perceived Own-Firm Compliance: namely that the positive effect of value will prove a 
benefit towards compliance efforts (even in the face of negative effects, such as those 
hypothesised in H6). For example, an owner-manager may value regulation and assume that 
competitors do so as well (even if they do so to a lesser extent due to the BTA effect). We 
therefore similarly expect to observe the inverse relationship with Perceived-Burden, 
although here the BTA effect is likely heightened. If an owner-manager sees the burden 
caused by a regulation and thus, reduces their compliance efforts (as hypothesised in H1), 
then the BTA effect will exaggerate the effect of burden on competitor compliance (Brown, 
2011; Kruger, 1999; Meeran et al., 2016), such that the burden will cause competitors to 
comply even less. 
As such we specify our final hypotheses: 
H7: Perceived-Value of regulation improves Perceived Competitor 
Compliance with regulation relative to the focal firm.  
H8: Perceived-Burden of regulation reduces Perceived Competitor 




3.1 Contextual Background 
To explore these issues this study draws upon original survey data from the English holiday 
accommodation industry. This is a fitting case because it is highly regulated, with an 
estimated 21,000+ regulations in effect (Tourism Regulation Taskforce, 2012)3; almost 70% 
of businesses in the industry are micro-firms; it accounts for 9.5% of the UK workforce 
(Tourism Alliance, 2015); and it contributes 7.1% of UK GDP (Tourism Alliance, 2016). 
Furthermore, not only has there been little research into knowledge in a tourism context 
(Czernek, 2017; Shaw and Williams, 2009), but as a non-high-risk industry, there is 
considerably less prior research into compliance than in other, higher risk industries, such as 
construction or fishing (Hasle and Limborg, 2006; Hasle et al., 2012; Thomas et al., 2016). 
The focus remains on England, rather than the entire United Kingdom, because of regulatory 
differences between the devolved regions. 
Within the industry, firms are categorised into two sub-sectors: serviced (i.e. bed and 
breakfasts, B&Bs); and non-serviced (i.e. caravan parks). This indicates both the level of 
service and the type of accommodation on offer. Furthermore, it impacts the regulations 
which are in place and thus, engenders different perceptions of regulation. We note that 
although the industry is not considered ‘high-risk’, there remain a number of relatively risky 
tasks within firms. For example, B&Bs likely serve food, so there are considerations over 
such things as using cooking equipment, while caravan parks likely involve more outdoor, 
physically laborious work with sharp (power) tools, such as landscaping and tree pruning4. 
Additionally, both sub-industries likely enact ‘do-it-yourself’ development of premises, and 
use potentially dangerous cleaning chemicals thereby illustrating that all industries include 
some risks.  
 
  
                                                 
3 For instance, with concerns over roadways, cabling, water and waste management (to name but a few), it 
could be argued that caravan parks are subject to almost all of the same regulations that affect a small town. 
4 Or indeed a recent fatal incident, when a transported caravan slipped off its jacks, crushing a park worker. 
This was ultimately found to be caused by poor health and safety training and therefore, poor compliance 
(BBC, 2015; BH&HPA, 2015). 
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3.2 Survey Design and Sampling Frame 
Using several publicly available sources, including the AA, bedandbreakfast.com, BedPosts, 
the Caravan Club, the ‘Little Green Book’, Farm Stay UK, the Motorcaravanners Club, and 
UKParks.com, an independent database of 3,805 potential respondents was developed. Due 
to the focus of the study, the sampling frame was limited to firms operating in England with 
0-9 employees. The owner-managers were contacted via post and/or email, addressed by 
name where known, otherwise ‘to the owner’, with several follow-up communications, also 
via post and/or email, over the six months from October 2014. This resulted in 706 valid 
responses and a highly respectable 19% response rate, given the subject of regulatory 
compliance (which many businesses might be unwilling to disclose) (Mendoza et al., 2016) 
and the sampling frame (Saunders et al., 2015). Furthermore, this represents a sufficient 
number of responses to undertake the statistical analyses herein (Green, 1991; Tabachnick 
and Fidell, 2007) 
The survey, which is part of a wider research study exploring regulation and micro-firms 
(and thus, included questions which are not relevant to this study), focused on four areas of 
regulation: employment, anti-discrimination, fire, and health and safety; these were chosen 
as they apply not only within the industry, but impact almost all firms that either employ 
people or allow access to the public. In light of the different sub-sectors, respondents were 
only asked about regulatory areas relevant to their business, so for example, only those who 
identified having employees were asked to complete questions regarding employment 
regulation. 
The survey was first pilot tested by a relevant subset of potential respondents. The main 
industry associations were also approached with a draft to check the questions and also to 
secure endorsements with the aim of enhancing the response rate. A small number of changes 
were made in the wake of feedback from both sources. The final survey was endorsed by the 
Bed and Breakfast Association, the British Hospitality Association, and Farm Stay UK, 
whom all also sent details of the survey to their members. Additionally, VisitEngland, the 
national tourist board, endorsed the study and published details in their email and print 
communications. Furthermore, three groups: BedPosts, the National Caravan Council, and 




3.3 Analytical Approaches 
We deploy several techniques to test the hypotheses developed in Section 2. First, H5 is 
examined using summary statistics. Then the remaining hypotheses (H1-H4 and H6-H8) are 
explored using an appropriate array of summary statistics, bivariate correlations, and two 
formal regression models, which are described below. Table 2 presents the results for 
Perceived Own-Firm Compliance, and Table 3 for Perceived Competitor Compliance. 
Through the construction of the dependent variables, the underlying ordinal data become 
interval results at the scale level, which tend towards normality due to the central limit 
theorem (Carifio and Perla, 2008; Dougherty, 2011; Gaito, 1980; Norman, 2010). Thus, they 
are continuous and scalar, with higher values clearing indicating higher levels of Perceived 
Compliance, and therefore the OLS estimation technique is both appropriate and utilised. 
All of our analyses are estimated in Stata v13, first by including the control variables: 
Perceived-Knowledge; Reference state; Perceived-Value; and Perceived-Burden of 
regulation. 
Firstly, the model for Perceived Own-Firm Compliance: 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑂𝑂𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾-𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒 𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
= 𝐵𝐵0 + 𝐵𝐵1 𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒 + 𝐵𝐵2 𝑌𝑌𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒 𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾 𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
+ 𝐵𝐵3 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝐾𝐾 + 𝐵𝐵4 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃-𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝐾𝐾 𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
+ 𝐵𝐵5 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝐾𝐾 𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
+ 𝐵𝐵6 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃-𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑜𝑜𝐾𝐾𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾𝑃𝑃 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝐾𝐾 + 𝐵𝐵7 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃
+ 𝐵𝐵8 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃-𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝐾𝐾
+ 𝐵𝐵9 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃-𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝐾𝐾 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 
 
Secondly, the model for Perceived Competitor Compliance, which is different only in that it 
does not include the reference state variable (because the reference state and Perceived 
Competitor Compliance are so closely linked): 
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𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒 𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
= 𝐵𝐵0 + 𝐵𝐵1 𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒 + 𝐵𝐵2 𝑌𝑌𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒 𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾 𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
+ 𝐵𝐵3 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝐾𝐾 + 𝐵𝐵4 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃-𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝐾𝐾 𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
+ 𝐵𝐵5 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝐾𝐾 𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
+ 𝐵𝐵6 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃-K𝐾𝐾𝑜𝑜𝐾𝐾𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾𝑃𝑃 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝐾𝐾
+ 𝐵𝐵7 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃-V𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝐾𝐾
+ 𝐵𝐵8 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃-𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝐾𝐾 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 
 
In addition, the survey included an unsolicited comments box, in which 197 comments were 
made. In lieu of interviews, which were not possible at the time, these comments have been 
analysed using a constant-comparison thematic analysis (Krueger and Casey, 2009). The 
comments and emergent themes are used to inform our primary quantitative analysis, 
particularly with regard to causation. The results are presented in Table 5 at the end of the 
results section, and then integrated into the discussion in Section 5. 
 
3.4 Variable Construction and Data Validation 
The variables used in the model are briefly described below, with full definitions and 
specification presented in Appendix A. Dependent variables Perceived Own-Firm 
Compliance and Perceived Competitor Compliance are both construct variables. These are 
based on a number of statements across each of the included regulations (employment, anti-
discrimination, fire, and health and safety) scored against 1-7 Likert scales, which are then 
aggregated to develop a construct from the mean value. Independent variables Perceived-
Value of regulation, Perceived-Burden of regulation, and Reference state are similarly 
constructed. Perceived-Knowledge of regulation is the self-reported level of knowledge 
measured as a construct variable which has been converted into an overall percentage. 
Further categorical control variables include: number of employees, containing four 
categories denoting the number of workers within the firm including the owner-manager; 
years in business, denoting newer firms (up to 10 years), along with older firms; and serviced 
accommodation, which denotes the sub-industry as either serviced or non-serviced, while 
also implying the regulations which are imposed on the firm and the trade-associations to 
which they may be a member. Trade-association memberships provides the raw number of 
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memberships, indicating the level of engagement with trade-associations and the potential 
level of support received. Finally, all areas of regulation included accounts for any bias 
caused by respondents not answering all four areas of regulation. As with any econometric 
method, there is always an inherent risk of omitted variable bias (Hosman et al., 2010). We 
therefore used the literature review to suggest the variables that may demonstrate a 
relationship with the dependent constructs, along with other commonly used confounders 
(such as region and gender) (Clarke, 2005; Mitra and Washington, 2012). We then followed 
the advice of Breiman (1992) and Clarke (2005), whom recommend using fewer variables 
for more accurate models, and so we included only the variables of particular interest. 
Items for each of the construct variables were presented as a larger set of questions in the 
survey and were tested using Principle Component Analysis, which highlighted our selected 
five constructs as viable (Hair et al., 2010; Spector, 1992). Cronbach’s alpha was then 
calculated to test for convergent validity and for each of the five constructs was found to 
exceed the accepted minimum of 0.7 (DeVellis, 2012). The risk of common method bias 
through the use of a singular survey (Podsakoff et al., 2011), was mitigated by comparing 
survey responses to independently sourced data on several variables (such as revenue, and 
number of pitches), including from firm’s own websites, Companies House, and trade 
publications. This validation was made for 14% of respondents (the maximum possible) and 
no evidence of bias or misreporting was found. Furthermore, the subject of the study, namely 
the perceptions of the owner-manager within a firm, combined with the fact that there is 
generally only one owner-manager (and on average just one employee) in each firm, makes 
it impossible to survey multiple respondents per firm. Face validity and subjective 
assessment validity (Hair, 1998; Hair et al., 2010) were satisfied through the use of existing 
methods of measurement where possible, such as Stokols et al. (2001) and Eva et al. (2004) 
for Perceived-Knowledge; and the pilot study (which ensured the understanding of questions 
and answers matched our expectations, Rong and Wilkinson, 2011). In addition, the survey 
was structured specifically to reduce the risk of respondents linking different concepts. 
Finally, all respondents were assured of both anonymity and confidentiality to elicit truthful 




4. Results and Discussion 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents the mean, standard deviation and correlations for all of the variables 
included in the study. It is clear from the first two rows that H5 is supported as the relatively 
high mean of Own-Firm Compliance (6.04) is markedly greater than the mean for Perceived 
Competitor Compliance (3.60) which is relatively low. It is however, interesting to note that 
there is only a small negative correlation between the two (-0.17) which is in contrast to the 
larger positive relationship found by Thomas et al. (2016). Furthermore, this disparity in 
means is likely an example of the BTA effect in action, which therefore also potentially 
questions the importance of Boustras et al’s (2015) notion of the ‘reference state’ in this 
context. Own-Firm compliance is seen to be high even though the general perception is that 
competitors do not comply to the same extent. 
The relatively low mean (63.30%) of Perceived-Knowledge indicates that self-assessed 
knowledge is generally poor, although the standard deviation suggests there is a reasonable 
amount of variation around this mean. A response close to 60% corresponds to the notion 
that the average firm reported that they were ‘somewhat knowledgeable’ about regulation, 
which is the mid-level response between ‘not at all knowledgeable’ and ‘extremely 
knowledgeable’. It is also noteworthy that Perceived Own-Firm Compliance is 
comparatively higher (as a percentage it equates to 86%), indicating that respondents felt 
they complied to a greater extent than their Perceived-Knowledge level would suggest was 
possible. Furthermore, the fact that respondents were willing to frequently disclose such low 
(self-assessed) scores suggests that respondents were unlikely being dishonest or 
deliberately answering in a socially desirable manner when completing the survey (Mendoza 
et al., 2016). Additionally, the two-dimensional Perceived-Value and Burden variables 
expand on Mendoza et al’s (2016) one-dimensional fairness variable, with Perceived-
Knowledge showing a positive correlation with Perceived-Value and a negative correlation 
with Perceived Burden as expected. 
The high means (and low standard deviations) for both Perceived Own-Firm Compliance 
and Perceived-Value, and to a lesser extent, the lower mean (and similar standard deviation) 
attributed to Perceived-Burden suggests that intentional non-compliance is low. Deliberately 
ignoring the law would be associated with lower mean values for Perceived Own-Firm 
Compliance, and theoretically also low Perceived-Value and high levels of Burden. 
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Furthermore, the relatively low level of mean Perceived-Knowledge also suggests that 
knowledge is not being used to intentionally circumvent regulation, or give the external 
appearance of complying (when deliberately not doing so) through selective implementation 
(Carter et al., 2009; Pratten and Lovatt, 2005). For example, claiming employees work fewer 
hours than they actually do in order to disguise paying below the minimum wage. 
 
4.2 Perceived Own-Firm Compliance 
Table 2 presents the regression model for Perceived Own-Firm regulatory Compliance, with 
an initial estimation (model 1) including only control variables, and the independent 







The model provides strong support for H2, that Perceived-Value is positively associated with 
Own-Firm Compliance, with a highly significant, positive result (see Table 4 for a summary 
of the hypotheses). There is however, no support for H1, that Burden is negatively associated 
 
Table 2: OLS regression. 






























































   
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.12 
 
F (5, 414) 1.92* 
 
 
F (9, 407)  7.22*** 
 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001. Note: Standard Error in parentheses. 
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with Own-Firm Compliance. Though there were a number of reasons to believe Burden 
would influence compliance, this result indicates that respondents felt they complied with 
regulation no matter the apparent costs (time or monetary). It therefore seems that regulatory 
burden is simply treated as being a ‘cost of doing business’ rather than anything more. 
Indeed, while owner-managers may complain about it (Edwards et al., 2003; IpsosMORI, 
2007), they probably have little option but to accept the costs due to the penalties associated 
with non-compliance. Furthermore, this result is not entirely unexpected, as Chapter 4 of 
this thesis also found Burden to be insignificant in a model of broadly defined micro-firm 
performance, when Value was found to have a strong association. That both models have 
found differing results for Value and Burden highlights the benefit of adopting this two-
dimensional characterisation of the attitude towards regulation. Furthermore, it is 
noteworthy that in both cases Value has been found to exhibit an association whilst Burden 
has not. 
The results also offer weak support, for H3, as the positive relationship between Perceived-
Knowledge and Own-Firm Compliance is statistically significant, but at 0.01 the coefficient 
is very close to zero suggesting a very small association. This stands somewhat in contrast 
to extant literature that implies the relationship should be stronger (Thomas et al., 2016). 
The poor mean level of Perceived-Knowledge in the sample (63.30) might offer a partial 
explanation for this finding, although the large standard deviation (16.40) suggests any such 
impact is likely to be limited. However, this low level of Perceived-Knowledge stands in 
contrast to the mean of Perceived Own-Firm Compliance (Table 1) which is relatively high 
(6.04 relative to a maximum of 7, or 86%). It therefore raises the possibility of owner-
managers exhibiting pervasive hubris since they freely admit that their knowledge is 
relatively poor yet believe their compliance to be so much higher in spite of the implied 
knowledge deficit.  
The unsolicited comments (Table 4) offer a possible explanation for these findings. The 
comments suggest that respondents feel regulation is generally designed to make them ‘do 
the right thing’ having been created with ‘good intentions’, and therefore if they do what 
they think is ‘right’ (as in ‘just’ or ‘fair’, rather than correct according to the regulation) then 
they will likely comply with regulation by default. For instance, respondent 2142 said “I 
understand that I should comply with the law and take reasonable effort to do so, however I 
rely more on treating customers as I would like to be treated and I believe this works!” 
(Table 5, ‘regulatory value’). Such an approach to compliance by micro-firm owner-
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managers may explain why Perceived-Knowledge appears to have such a tiny impact on 
Own-Firm Compliance (Table 2). While it would appear obvious that firms must know about 
a regulation if they are to comply, it would actually seem that the Perceived-Value associated 
with regulation is acting like a substitute as it was found to have a stronger association 
(coefficient 0.24). This sense of value might be enhancing the moral obligation for owner-
managers to do the right thing, and hence, be associated with actions that engender a sense 
of compliance.  
H4 is not supported as Boustras et al’s (2015) concept of the ‘reference state’ does not have 
a statistically significant impact on perceived own-firm compliance. This is somewhat 
surprising, but might simply reflect the nature of the chosen industry and/or our survey 
sample rather than suggest the concept is fundamentally wrong. With a median of 2 
employees, the majority of our sample are likely to be family-run firms (i.e. a couple) which 
therefore has little outside influence. Micro-firm owner-managers are well known to avoid 
seeking expert help from outside the business and are also poor at wider networking (Bennett 
and Robson, 1999a, b), which suggests that they might concentrate on their own situation 
when considering their compliance, rather than the actions of their competitors, much of 
which might be unknown to them. As respondent 3484 put it, “how do you judge what other 
competitors offer unless you have first-hand knowledge of their buildings and practice?” 
(Table 5, ‘competitor compliance’). Furthermore, the idea of the reference state is a broad 
concept which might include not just the perceived compliance of rivals (as explored herein), 
but also other factors such as likelihood of regulatory inspections and possible penalties for 
non-compliance. The latter concepts were not possible to explore in our case which might 
explain why the reference state was found to be insignificant. 
Larger firms (i.e. those with more employees) appear to claim higher levels of compliance, 
which may be due to firms becoming more professional in regards to regulation as they grow. 
It remains unlikely that ‘larger’ micro-firms are large enough to employ dedicated workers 
to manage regulation, especially in our sample given the mean number of employees is only 
2.23 (with a standard deviation of 0.96). It might however, be that owner-managers simply 
have more time to devote to matters of regulation when they have more employees to take 
care of other tasks, and/or that the simple act of growing in size forces greater 
professionalism in regards to regulation because of the need to accurately carry out tasks like 
processing payroll.  
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Finally, the number of years in business is only statistically significant in the initial 
estimation (when it is negative) but not the final model, indicating that more established 
firms do not have a lower level of compliance. The other control variables are insignificant 
in both versions of the model. 
 
4.3 Perceived Competitor Compliance 
Table 3 presents the regression model for Perceived Competitor Compliance, with (as 
before) an initial estimate including only the control variables and the second estimation 
adding the independent variables. 
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Unlike the models for Own-Firm Compliance (Table 2), the Perceived-Value of regulation 
has a statistically significant but negative association with Competitor Compliance, 
providing no support for H7 (indeed, quite the opposite). Similarly, Perceived-Burden 
demonstrates a statistically significant and negative association, supporting H8. This further 
highlights the benefits of the two-factor approach of the variables, as both demonstrate 
 
Table 3: OLS regression. 























































   
Adjusted R2 0.02 0.12 
 
F (5, 411) 2.62** 
 
 
F (8, 407)  7.73*** 
 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001. Note: Standard Error in parentheses. 
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different effects for Own-Firm and Competitor Compliance. Similarly, Perceived-
Knowledge has a statistically significant but negative association, but as with Own-Firm 
compliance, the coefficient is very close to zero (-0.01) suggesting a very limited impact. As 
such we suggest that H6 is only weakly supported.  
It is quite striking how poorly respondents believe their competitors comply with regulation 
(Table 1), especially as they believe their own compliance extends beyond their knowledge. 
This dichotomy suggests respondents have a particularly low opinion of their competitors 
and their industry. It is likely that the better than average effect is playing a significant role 
here.  
The Perceived-Value of regulation is found to have a negative association with Perceived 
Competitor Compliance which suggests that owner-managers believe that other firms do not 
recognise the value in regulation that they themselves do, and hence, that other owner-
managers are therefore not as compliant. This plus the similar result for the negative impact 
of the Perceived-Burden suggests a general view that competitors shirk their regulatory 
responsibilities in light of the ‘burdens’, while they themselves do not. This may be 
influenced by the negative rhetoric surrounding regulation. If all people do is complain about 
regulation, then it would be difficult to believe that they actually see the value in it, let alone 
value it more than they see it as a burden. This also links with the finding for knowledge, 
which has a similar, albeit considerably smaller, negative link. As firms learn more about 
regulation (or at least think they do), they believe other firms will comply even less 
(furthering the view of being ‘better than average’), potentially with the idea that “I have 
just learned X is required but I don’t believe other firms are doing this”.  
The models for Own-Firm and Competitor Compliance hold a further interesting parallel, in 
that the number of employees has almost the same statistically significant co-efficient, but 
operating in opposite directions. This suggests that respondents believed that as competing 
firms grow larger their regulatory compliance falls, despite believing the opposite effect 




Table 4: Summary of hypotheses 
 
H1 Perceived-Burden of regulation reduces Perceived Own-Firm 
Compliance with regulation. 
 
Not supported 
H2 Perceived-Value of regulation improves Perceived Own-Firm 
Compliance with regulation. 
 
Supported 
H3 Perceived-Knowledge of regulation improves Perceived Own-Firm 




H4 A positive reference state will improve Perceived Own-Firm 
Compliance with regulation. 
 
Not supported 
H5 Average Perceived Own-Firm Compliance will be higher than 
average Perceived Competitor Compliance. 
 
Supported 
H6 Perceived-Knowledge of regulation reduces Perceived Competitor 




H7 Perceived-Value of regulation improves Perceived Competitor 
Compliance with regulation relative to the focal firm. 
 
Not supported 
H8 Perceived-Burden of regulation reduces Perceived Competitor 


















13 The most important issue for small hospitality businesses is, in my opinion, unfair 
competition from "businesses" that are potentially unregulated as they trade using 
non-standard methods such as Airbnb (2176). 
 
I know that many small businesses (i.e. earning only about £20,00pa [sic]) are 
thinking of giving up providing accommodation because of the worries about either 
accidentally not complying with the numerous regulations or because complying 
with the regulations is becoming too onerous. Because of the rise of various non-
regulated sites where people can let accommodation while not complying with the 
regulations one begins to lose heart (4056). 
 
I feel that Airbnb have unfair advantages over small guest houses as they do not 
have to comply with legislation that small guest houses have to (4362). 
 
Accommodation ventures like Airbnb … undermine our businesses which comply 
with regulations and they undercut prices which are reasonable when a business is 




10 How do you judge what other competitors offer unless you have first-hand 
knowledge of their buildings and practice? (3484). 
 




72 Our business is not only micro, it’s miniscule! (1910). 
 
We are a 2-room bed & breakfast so pretty small on the scale! (2008). 
 





87 Regulations have a disproportionate impact on small businesses. Compliance 
sometimes has a very disruptive impact if you do the right thing e.g. maternity leave. 
We have no specialist resources to cover such things and nobody seems to 
appreciate that running a small business is like living in a turret with different types 
of regulator attacking from all sides (53). 
 
Feel many regulations designed across the board and do not always 'fit' to small 
business without incurring costs. Reduced my staff due to PAYE rules & regu-lations 
which meant more time on computer & away from hands on work (1963). 
 
The current situation is that there is so much legislation it is impossible to know & 
comply with all the regulations. Even specialist lawyers do not profess to know all 





18 Good practice in my bed & breakfast is followed as a matter of routine (1878). 
 
I understand that I should comply with the law and take reasonable effort to do so, 
however I rely more on treating customers as I would like to be treated and I believe 
this works! (2142). 
 
We do comply, as far as we are aware, with regulations associated with our business 
(6254). 
 
Note: respondent ID in parentheses. Only themes relevant to this study are included here. The question stem 
read “is there anything else you would like to tell us about any of the issues raised in this survey?” 
158 
4.4. Wider Discussion 
The dummy variable for those respondents not answering for all four areas of regulation was 
notably insignificant in both models. This not only offers further evidence that the methods 
and approach adopted herein are appropriate, but also suggests all four areas of regulation 
are of equal importance to perceived compliance. If any one area of regulation were more or 
less important relative to the other areas than this would have been picked up by the inclusion 
of this dummy, as firms excluding such a (more or less important) area would have been 
identified as having different relationships. This result of equal importance therefore 
questions the findings of the likes of Edwards et al. (2003) and Hart et al. (2008) who 
suggested that certain regulations might be particularly highly valued or prioritised (and 
therefore potentially more thoroughly implemented).  
It is of interest that trade-association membership appears to have no statistically significant 
impact on either Own-Firm or Competitor Compliance, despite the links that might be 
expected as trade-associations act as both conduits of regulatory information and potential 
networking sources to better inform owner-managers’ opinions regarding competitors 
(Battisti and Perry, 2015; BRE, 2010; Pleasance and Balmer, 2013). The results suggest that 
trade-associations are not currently particularly effective at facilitating regulatory 
compliance for firms individually, or a perception of high levels of industry compliance 
more generally. This is in line with Chapter 3 of this thesis, which found trade-associations 
to have no impact on actual knowledge levels within micro-firms. 
Similarly, the sub-sector appears to have no impact on Own-Firm or Competitor Compliance 
as it was insignificant in both models. This is somewhat surprising given the growth of 
sharing economy firms such as Airbnb, which from a consumer point of view appear to 
operate in the same market space as serviced accommodation (such as B&Bs) but not in 
some forms of non-serviced accommodation (such as caravan parks). It seems likely that 
respondents regard such sharing economy firms as belonging to a different industry that 
offers a competitive product, rather than being in the same industry, although the presence 
of such products is clearly of concern to respondents. Indeed, there was a pervasive opinion 
in the survey comments (Table 5, ‘sharing economy’) that sharing economy hosts enjoy an 
unfair competitive advantage by offering a substitute product, but without the same 
regulatory ‘burden’. For example: respondent 2176 said “the most important issue for small 
hospitality businesses is, in my opinion, unfair competition from ‘businesses’ that are 
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potentially unregulated as they trade using non-standard methods such as Airbnb”; while 
respondent 4362 adds “I feel that Airbnb have unfair advantages over small guest houses as 
they do not have to comply with legislation that small guest houses have to”.  
Such concerns are reflective of there currently being much confusion over the regulatory 
requirements of sharing economy hosts, both within that industry and also amongst 
regulatory inspectors (who uphold regulatory law) (Frenken and Schor, 2017; Guttentag, 
2017; Steinmetz, 2014; Tham, 2016). To address such concerns greater effort is firstly 
required to define and understand the regulatory requirements of hosts. These must then be 
communicated to both them and traditional serviced firms, so that the differences are clear 
and hosts are not seen as ‘unfair competition’ who inappropriately get to bypass regulation. 
Furthermore, given the results found herein, it would seem there would be much to be gained 
by making sure those working in the sharing economy have a good understanding of the 
value of the regulations that could apply to the sector as this might enhance their (voluntary) 
compliance levels5. 
Given that compliance is not seen to be perfect, and the apparent drivers for Competitor 
Compliance operate in stark contrast with those for Own-Firm Compliance, there is a 
question as to how to address the issues raised so that compliance efforts might be improved. 
Mendoza et al. (2016) pose a simple solution: perceived fairness of regulation leads to 
greater knowledge acquisition, which in turn leads to improved regulatory compliance. 
However, our results suggest improving knowledge and, to a greater extent, Perceived-Value 
may improve Perceived Own-Firm Compliance, but at the cost of Perceived Competitor 
Compliance.  
One of the issues seems to be that the appropriate and complete information on regulatory 
requirements is either not reaching, or not being absorbed by, micro-firm owner-managers. 
Chapter 3 of this thesis suggests that trade-associations are the most likely candidate to offer 
support to micro-firms, even though they found current trade-association support efforts to 
be somewhat ineffective, simply because there was a lack of viable alternatives. A similar 
lack of choice would seem to exist in terms of stimulating industry compliance efforts and 
                                                 
5 While a full consideration of the sharing economy is beyond the scope of this paper, the fact that the dummy 
for sub-sector was insignificant suggests that regulations need not be exactly the same for substitute products 
since staying in a caravan park or a B&B are substitutes that are subject to differing regulations. However, if 
some basic regulations are implemented with good intentions to (for example) make sure employees and 
consumers are both safe and treated fairly, it does suggest that sharing economy firms should be subject to at 
least the same basic regulations as micro-firms operating in the regular accommodation sector. 
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hence we would likewise conclude that a trade-association campaign might be the best 
option available.  
A trade-association (or other) campaign must include methods which provide feedback to 
owner-managers on their Perceived-Knowledge and compliance efforts, such that they can 
be sure their interpretation is correct, while also calibrating their self-assessed knowledge. 
This would likely also improve the calibration of assessing other firms, reducing the existing 
gap between Perceived Own-Firm and Competitor Compliance. Such training and feedback 
has also been shown to improve implementation directly (Boustras et al., 2015; Fernández-
Muñiz et al., 2009). Additionally, it is important for the Value (and benefits) of regulation 
to be explicitly made clear, as owner-managers generally only focus on the Burden when 
assessing information about regulation (Chapter 4 of this thesis). At a higher level, Lewis et 
al. (2015b) note that knowledge is sought to ease the complexity of regulation, but that when 
such complexity is at a low level, no help is needed. It is important then, for the regulations 
themselves to be clear and simple, both in their aims and their implementation requirements. 
This would ease the work of industry associations as they would be merely passing on 
information, rather than reinterpreting and distributing it to firms. 
Next, it is important that any scheme addresses the insular interactions of micro-firms. 
Bennett and Robson (1999a, b) (among others) note how micro-firms generally resist formal 
events, such as the training courses that trade-associations already provide. If ways can be 
found to encourage and facilitate attendance at compliance related events, then such 
activities will not only enhance owner-managers’ knowledge, but also develop their 
networking with peers. By interacting more with other firms’ owner-managers will be able 
to get a better sense of what other firms actually do and how they are implementing 
regulation. This would recalibrate their assessment of other firms’ compliance and hence 
also address their likely unfounded sense of being ‘better than average’ (Moore and Small, 
2007). In turn, this would not only improve Perceived Competitor Compliance (and hence 
potentially generate a positive reference state effect for their own compliance efforts) but 
would also mean that attempts to improve Knowledge and Value would not have such a 
profound negative impact on Perceived Competitor Compliance. Whilst detailed 
prescriptions of the way to achieve such higher attendance is beyond the scope of this paper, 
efforts might include looking at the frequency, timing, cost, location, and wider incentives 
offered for attending such events. Organisers would need to be mindful of the real and 
significant costs to micro-firms when owner-managers attend. Indeed, trade-associations 
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could instead look to more actively visit their members in order to offer direct advice and 
support, and in doing so, might use such visits as a way of engendering networking as other 
local members might be invited to attend (and who would then learn close to home in a real-
world setting similar to their own). Furthermore, such onsite events could feature as case 
studies in industry publications/communications to spread the benefits even further. This 
would highlight that other firms do, in fact, value regulation and implement it as they should, 
thus further contributing to the recalibration of Perceived Competitor Compliance (Moore 
and Small, 2007). Indeed, any information about the compliance of others would likely work 
towards this goal, such as sharing the results of this study with the participants. However, 
we acknowledge that micro-firms are fiercely independent and hence that such a scheme 
might be initially resisted and thus difficult to start. Nevertheless, the possible benefits 
suggest that it would be worth finding solutions to such challenges.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Using unique primary survey data from micro-firms, in a traditionally over-looked sector, 
we have found evidence that owner-managers of English accommodation firms have a 
generally poor level of regulatory knowledge, yet simultaneously believe their compliance 
with regulation exceeds their knowledge. Furthermore, their opinion of compliance by their 
competitors in the industry (broadly defined) is exceedingly poor. Additionally, we have 
further demonstrated the benefits of exploring both the Perceived-Value and Burden of 
regulation, which offers a more nuanced view than one-dimensional scales, such as ‘fairness’ 
(Mendoza et al., 2016), or the traditional approach of exploring regulation only through its 
burden. This study has demonstrated that Perceived-Value is the strongest driver (of the 
factors we have considered) of Own-Firm Compliance, while Burden appears to be treated 
simply as the cost of doing business, which is perhaps complained about but accepted 
nonetheless. Surprisingly, Perceived-Knowledge was found to have a limited impact on both 
perceived own-firm and competitor compliance. Perhaps most interestingly, our analysis has 
identified a paradox by suggesting attempts to improve Own-Firm Compliance, through 
improvements to Knowledge and enhancements to Perceived-Value, will likely be 
detrimental to Perceived Competitor Compliance. This is problematic as improvements in 
Perceived Competitor Compliance might create a beneficial reference state that increases 
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Own-Firm compliance efforts, and hence, general improvements in industry compliance 
levels.  
We suggest that in the absence of alternatives, trade-associations are best placed to support 
micro-firms with issues around regulatory compliance. However, any efforts by them (or 
other organisations) will likely need to develop fresh approaches to engage micro-firms, 
perhaps by taking support closer to firms, more strongly highlighting the value of regulation, 
and by encouraging better networking amongst firms. 
In drawing these conclusions, it should be recognised that a key limiting factor of this paper 
is the reliance on owner-managers’ perceived levels of regulatory compliance. However, 
such a limitation is necessary for a study that identifies such owner-manager perceptions as 
a key driver of organisational behaviour. Any concerns in this regard could be mitigated by 
a future examination or independent review of actual practices within firms to ascertain how 
strongly such perceptions influence decision-making, and also the genuine level of 
regulatory compliance within a firm. Such research could follow the pattern laid out by 
Boustras et al. (2015), who visited firms during regulatory inspections, but do so with 
reference to more areas of regulation than just health and safety. This would additionally 
create the possibility of collecting data on the impact of having inspections or enforcement 
action (by including firms subject to their first visit and those inspected previously).  
Other potential areas for further study include a deeper exploration of the notion of the 
reference state, including not only perceived levels of industry compliance but also other 
elements such as enforcement and penalties for non-compliance. A further natural extension 
would be to conduct a longitudinal study to not only consider measures to boost compliance 
efforts but also to examine the causal link that theory suggests might exist between 
Perceived-Knowledge and both Value and Burden. Any such relationship is likely to be both 
complex and somewhat cyclic, with owner-managers either learning about regulation and in 
doing so, forming opinions about its value and burden, or first forming opinions on value 
and burden with little foundation which then drive the desire to learn more about the 
regulation. Additionally, our recommendations of more localised support from trade-
associations would be more likely to be successful if such endeavours were planned after a 
thorough exploration of why owner-managers have such a low opinion of their competitors’ 
and hence general industry’s regulatory compliance. Finally, future research should explore 
the sharing economy, particularly in regards to regulators (to ascertain what regulations 
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actually apply to hosts), and the hosts themselves (to establish their level of perceived and 
actual regulatory compliance). This would address the contentious suggestion of unfair 
competition and the results may placate traditional accommodation firms. 
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Construct variable created using the following item measured on a 1-7 Likert scale (strongly 
disagree to strongly agree) for each of the (up to) four areas of regulation (employment, 
anti-discrimination, fire, and health and safety). The mean of the scores is calculated as the 
construct variable: 
 
i) I do not knowingly breach [each] regulation 
 
Note this statement was presented for each included regulation (employment, anti-
discrimination, fire, and health and safety), with the name of the regulation in place of 
[each]. Cronbach’s alpha = 0.74. Skew = -0.86. Kurtosis = 0.88. 
 
This variable, developed using Spector’s (1992) guidelines, reduces the ambiguity caused 
by (potentially) poor knowledge or understanding of regulation, by specifying only 
intentional breaches. As with the perceived level of knowledge variable (see below), this is 
a subjective, self-assessed measurement, testing only what respondents believe their 








Construct variable created using the following item measured on a 1-7 Likert scale (strongly 
disagree to strongly agree) for each of the (up to) four areas of regulation. Scores were 
reverse coded to make it comparable with the Perceived Own-Firm Compliance variable 
and the mean of the scores is calculated as the construct variable: 
 
i) I think my firm is more compliant with [each] regulation than my competitors are 
 
Note this statement was presented for each included area of regulation, with the name of 
the regulation in place of [each]. Cronbach’s alpha = 0.82. Skew = -0.75. Kurtosis = 1.66. 
 
This variable was developed using Spector’s (1992) guidelines to ensure that the construct 
was well defined and matches the desired outcome. Like Perceived-Knowledge, this 
construct is purely subjective. In a survey setting, there is little opportunity to provide the 
feedback that would be required to calibrate respondents’ views. However, the statement is 
worded such that estimates are generalised, rather than being directly compared to Own-
Firm Compliance levels, or requiring respondents to denote relative percentiles of Own-







Construct variable of self-reported knowledge using the following item measured on a 1-5 
Likert scale (not at all knowledgeable to extremely knowledgeable) for each of the (up to) 
four areas of regulation. These results were combined to generate a mean which was then 
converted to an overall percentage: 
 
i) How knowledgeable are you about [each] regulation 
 
Note this statement was presented for each included regulation, with the name of the 
regulation in place of [each]. Cronbach’s alpha = 0.79. Skew = -0.21. Kurtosis = -0.57. 
 
This variable is based upon prior literature including Stokols et al. (2001) and Eva et al. 
(2004), who both employ similar measures to test self-assessments of knowledge. 
Perceived-Knowledge is used here, rather than a test of Actual-Knowledge because 
opinions of value, burden, and compliance level are based on what owner-managers think 








Construct variable created using the following item measured on a 1-7 Likert scale (strongly 
disagree to strongly agree) for each of the (up to) four areas of regulation. Scores were 
reverse coded to make it comparable with the Perceived Own-Firm Compliance and 
Perceived Competitor Compliance variables. The mean of the scores is calculated as the 
construct variable: 
 
i) I understand it is common in my industry for [each] regulation to be ignored 
 
Note this statement was presented for each included regulation, with the name of the 
regulation in place of [each]. Cronbach’s alpha = 0.81. Skew = 0.35. Kurtosis = 0.63. 
 
Although similar in nature to Perceived Competitor Compliance, and developed to 
Spector’s (1992) guidelines, this variable measures the respondent’s overall opinion of 
compliance within the industry, thus defining their ‘reference state’ from which personal 






Construct variable created using the following items measured on a 1-7 Likert scale 
(strongly disagree to strongly agree) for each of the (up to) four areas of regulation. The 
mean of the scores is calculated as the construct variable: 
 
i) I understand why [each] regulations exist 
ii) [Each] regulations should apply to all businesses 
iii) I believe [each] regulations are good for business 
iv) [Each] regulations are a sensible control on firms 
 
Note each statement was presented for each included regulation, with the name of the 
regulation in place of [each]. Cronbach’s alpha = 0.90. Skew = -0.66. Kurtosis = 1.27. 
 
This variable, along with Perceived-Burden of regulation, was devised to explore the 
ambivalence that owner-managers may feel towards regulation. Creating variables for value 
and burden (below) allows for both feelings to simultaneously co-exist. These variables 
extend the majority of extant literature which either focuses purely on the burden, or treats 
value/burden (and similar constructs such as fair/unfair) as singular scales where only one 
or other exists. The individual items listed above (i-iv) were partly developed based on the 







Construct variable created using the following items measured on a 1-7 Likert scale 
(strongly disagree to strongly agree) for each of the (up to) four areas of regulation. The 
mean of the scores is calculated as the construct variable: 
 
i) Small businesses, such as my own, should be exempt from the full force of [each] 
regulation 
ii) The protections afforded by [each] regulations are an unreasonable burden on my 
firm 
 
Note each statement was presented for each included regulation, with the name of the 
regulation in place of [each]. Cronbach’s alpha = 0.83. Skew = -0.07. Kurtosis = 0.09. 
 
As with Perceived-Value, items were partly developed based on Edwards et al (2003) and 






Categorical to indicate the number of workers in the firm, including the owner-manager.  
 
Category 1: 1 worker (i.e. the owner-manager alone). 
Category 2: 2 workers (i.e. a couple or the owner-manager and one employee). 
Category 3: 3-5 workers. 
Category 4: 6-9 workers. 
  











Categorical to indicate the number of years that the current owner-manager has operated 
the business. 
 
Category 0: 1-10 years. 
Category 1: 11+ years. 
 
An owner-manager in category 1 may be more experienced with regulatory issues and 
changes (Carter et al, 2009), while an owner-manager in category 0 may indicate a firm in 
a different stage of its lifecycle, such as a new and expanding firm (Andersson et al, 2002). 
Furthermore, Lewis et al (2015a) found newer firms struggle with record keeping, which 






Categorical to identify the sub-industry. 
 
Category 1: serviced accommodation (such as B&Bs). 
Category 0: non-serviced accommodation (such as caravan parks). 
 
The sub-industry denotes the level of service provided by the firm and designates 
differences relating to the type, extent, and enforcement of regulation for the firm, along 







The raw number of trade-association memberships, indicating the level of engagement with 
trade-associations and hence the potential level of support received. 
 
Trade-association memberships influence Perceived-Knowledge of regulation and in the 
absence of other support, trade-associations appear to be one of the best conduits for 
improving knowledge-of and compliance-with regulation (Betton et al, 2017b). 
 





The values of the dependent and main independent variables are determined by the mean 
score of up to four areas of regulation. This categorical (0/1) variable distinguishes between 
respondents who answered for every area of regulation (cat 1) and those who did not answer 
at least one area (cat 0). It tests for any bias created by the different number of questions 
answered by the respondents, which was preferred to either forcing respondents to answer 
all areas, or treating scores at face value (such that someone scoring 15/15 is treated the 




6. Thesis Discussion 
6.1 Chapter introduction 
While each of the three papers explores a specific aspect of the multi-faceted relationship 
between regulation and micro-firms, each area is interlinked and thus the study resolves with 
a connected set of findings, from which recommendations are made to address these issues. 
This chapter begins by presenting a summary of the results (Section 6.2), such that they are 
combined, rather than presented separately, and returns to the rationales set in the 
introduction chapter (Section 1.4). It then does the same for the contributions, posing the 
overarching recommendations/contributions in a consolidated and finalised form (such that 
the evolution of recommendations is replaced by a review which takes all three papers into 
account) (Section 6.3). Following this, the apparent limitations which have been identified 
throughout the study are presented along with the ways in which future research (either of a 
similar nature to this study or original studies in similar fields and contexts) could address 
these issues (Section 6.4). Finally, potential future directions for research are considered, 
including both ways to continue to further explore the data collected for this study (Section 
6.5.1), as well as new potential research projects, many of which are likely to improve the 
analyses and recommendations herein, through greater understanding (Section 6.5.2). 
Indeed, the contentious domain of the sharing economy is given much consideration (Section 
6.5.3).  
6.2 Summary of papers and theoretical contributions 
Over the course of the three papers, three distinct strands of contributions have been 
developed: one theoretical; one empirical; and the other practical policy recommendations. 
The theoretical contributions are borne out of the innovative approach of this study, which 
challenge the previous methods of typical research into micro-firms. The practical 
contributions, discussed in Section 6.3, represent direct (policy) recommendations, again 
borne out of the research, with the aim of improving knowledge, enhancing compliance, and 
enriching performance. Although tied to the specific contribution of each paper, all of the 
recommendations are clearly interlinked, as they complement and build on each other and 
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thus demonstrate the importance of the chosen focus areas of this study: knowledge; 
performance; and compliance. 
In addition, the very existence of this study, with a successful survey and broad range of 
contributions, demonstrates that such research is indeed possible, in spite of all of the 
perceived difficulties that typically impede micro-firm research. Each individual paper and 
the methodological approach (Section 2), provide detail on the ways in which potential 
respondents were found and approached, along with the impact of trade-association 
endorsement. Therein they provide a template for future projects (several of which are 
presented in Section 6.5). 
From the very beginning of the study and throughout each of the individual papers, the focus 
has been directly on micro-firms (or at least small firms where data is absent). In doing so, 
it has repeatedly identified how micro-firms are unique, even from other ‘small firms’, 
struggling with resource and skill shortfalls, along with an unparalleled owner-manager 
driven nature. Thus, it highlights the need to consider micro-firms separately from larger and 
even ‘larger-small firms’. As noted by Tilley (2000, p.33), they are not “little big firms” and 
this consideration should be made at all points of research. Difficulties surrounding 
definitions and collecting data are not a legitimate reason to treat firms with no or few 
employees the same as SMEs with 249 employees, as their internal structure, core ethos, and 
even method of measuring performance are markedly different. As the most likely to reveal 
the effects of regulation (Edwards et al., 2003) and most abundant form of business (BEIS, 
2016a), going forward, micro-firms should be given the consideration they truly deserve. 
Perhaps a shift in research to a ‘micro-first’ approach, rather than a widespread inclination 
towards SME and larger firms, would result in a policy shift, such that new regulations begin 
with micro-firms and must be adapted to larger firms, rather than the current approach in 
which micro-firms’ considerations are an afterthought (if they are thought of at all). Indeed, 
even when the UK Government specifically sought to reduce and rethink regulation (during 
the ‘Red Tape Challenge', Cabinet Office, 2013), ‘Regulatory Impact Assessments’ (RIAs), 
which were part of the regulatory design process, frequently failed to properly evaluate the 
effects on micro-firms (despite this being a specific requirement of RIAs) (BCC, 2004; FSB, 
2004; NAO, 2001). 
The innovative methodology adopted in this study suggests a number of beneficial 
approaches for future research, while also offering an original contribution to the literature 
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and insights into existing confusion in prior findings. Beginning with Paper One, the 
Perceived- and Actual-Knowledge levels of owner-managers are explored and both are 
found to be poor. This demonstrates a pervasive level of hubris in knowingly operating with 
a shortfall of operational knowledge. Beyond this, the accuracy of self-assessment is also 
found to be poor, indicating that while owner-managers admit to some knowledge shortfall, 
they do not know the exact level of deficit. This self-assessment inaccuracy will likely 
hamper future efforts to improve knowledge because if owner-managers believe their 
knowledge to be ‘good enough’, they will not dedicate (sufficient) time towards learning. 
Similarly, it will interfere with the subject of learning, as any attempts will likely focus on 
the areas that owner-managers believe to be poor, at the expense of areas that are actually 
poor. 
The antecedents of knowledge are also explored, with particular reference to the 
independent, insular nature of micro-firms. This highlights the pervasive negative bias in the 
way regulation is reported (both within and outside of academia), along with a common 
supposition that accountants are central sources of knowledge. It remains a distinct 
possibility that the use of accountants among micro-firms is over-reported, as it would seem 
they are untrained and incongruous to provide wider regulatory support. However, they do 
provide essential financial/accounting support, which cannot easily be feigned by untrained 
owner-managers. There is prior literature to suggest that trade-associations should fulfil this 
vital role and that micro-firms in general favour membership specifically for their advice 
and regulatory support roles, yet the results herein find empirically that this does not appear 
to be the case in the chosen context, and indeed, trade-associations appear to have a limited 
impact on regulatory compliance levels as well. 
However, by exploring both Perceived- and Actual-Knowledge, this study has discovered 
that the antecedents of knowledge impact Perceived- and Actual-Knowledge in different 
ways. This not only has an impact on the practical recommendations (as each form of 
knowledge must be addressed differently, see Section 6.3), but highlights a potential error 
in existing research. The wide scale reliance on self-assessed measures may have masked 
the discoveries made here, such that trade-associations are associated with a limited 
improvement on Perceived-Knowledge and no association with Actual-Knowledge. This 
may be due to a false sense of security engendered by a constant influx of information, which 
owner-managers receive but do not actually read and/or digest. Such an influx of information 
may also create information overload, with owner-managers struggling to find the time to 
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process everything they receive and thus, contributing to the inescapable sense of 
overwhelming regulation. It is also possible that the information being received from 
different sources (be-it trade-associations or other sources) may be contradictory. This would 
not only add to the confusion and potentially lower Actual-Knowledge (as incorrect 
information is stored, but is believed to be correct), but may also result in owner-managers 
further disregarding additional information as is becomes available, because it is too 
frustrating to try to understand. In spite of this, due to the absence of credible alternatives, 
trade-associations remain likely candidates to address these issues of knowledge shortfall 
and self-assessment inaccuracy, and a number of recommendations to this effect are made 
in Section 6.3. 
Building on these themes, Paper Three investigates how regulatory knowledge remains an 
important issue, as it influences regulatory compliance. Even in micro-firms where some of 
the informalities may coincide with regulatory matters (e.g. flexible working hours), 
‘accidental’ or ‘coincidental’ compliance is rare and unlikely (even flexible working requires 
formal reporting, which micro-firms are unlikely to offer through informality). Like 
knowledge, compliance is likely affected by a number of factors, including perceived 
compliance (which, like self-assessed knowledge, may be unreliable) and the perceived 
compliance of rival firms. As Boustras et al. (2015) notes, if owner-managers believe that 
(for example) a particular regulation is widely ignored by other firms, and thus is not being 
enforced by regulators/inspectors, then personal compliance of that regulation may falter. 
This is the reference state from which compliance decisions are made. While Own-Firm and 
Competitor Compliance have been investigated in prior research, this has rarely been done 
concurrently, particularly in a micro-firm and tourism context. This study makes two distinct 
contributions here: firstly, the Perceived Own-Firm and Competitor (thereby inferring 
industry) Compliance levels are tested, demonstrating a wide disparity, with owner-
managers believing Competitor Compliance to be particularly poor, while Own-Firm 
Compliance remains high. It therefore appears that owner-manager hubris extends beyond 
knowledge, as Own-Firm Compliance is believed to be considerably higher than Perceived-
Knowledge. Secondly, that the policy avenues which could improve Own-Firm Compliance, 
have an equally strong negative link with Competitor Compliance; such that improving 
Own-Firm Compliance will likely increase the dichotomy between Perceived Own-Firm and 
Competitor Compliance. Thus, lowering the standard from which compliance decisions are 
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made. However, the results herein demonstrate no significant impact by the reference state, 
thereby suggesting this as an area for further research (see Section 6.5.2). 
Additionally, attitude towards regulation is tested using a new, innovative two-dimensional 
measure which (discussed at greater length in Section 1.4.2) explores the positive and 
negative sides of attitude in parallel, rather than one at the expense of the other. By using 
this enhanced measure to ascertain the antecedents of Own-Firm and Competitor 
Compliance a particularly interesting insight is made, which is that there is no apparent link 
between Perceived-Burden and Perceived Own-Firm Compliance. This suggests that despite 
widescale negative reporting and strong negative rhetoric, regulation is still accepted and 
implemented, even in micro-firms. This also goes some way to explaining why micro-firms 
appear to have such ongoing difficulties with regulatory matters and why measures to rectify 
the situation thus far appear to have had limited effect. By identifying this contrast, there is 
now an opportunity to further explore this new avenue, leading to better theoretical and 
practical proposals. Additionally, it is the Value of regulation that demonstrates a greater 
impact on both Own-Firm and Competitor perceived levels of compliance, with Burden only 
associated with Competitor Compliance (where all variables demonstrate a negative 
relationship). This study also posits an impact from the sharing economy (at least on the 
serviced side of the sector), this is an area that warrants further exploration (see Section 
6.5.3). 
Indeed, the benefits of exploring Value and Burden are again apparent when investigating 
the impact of regulation on business performance. Performance is of particular interest for 
micro-firms for two reasons: firstly, because owner-managers do not rely on typical financial 
measures of performance, instead favouring satisfaction towards subjective goals (which 
may of course include some financial aspirations); and secondly, because of these wider 
goals, different business decisions are made, which prior research (focusing on the financial 
aspects) may not have discovered. To quote an example from Paper Two, if an owner-
manager prizes social interaction with customers above all else, then they will make 
decisions (conscious or otherwise) which enable them to achieve that goal. That might be 
keeping the business small enough that they do not require staff so that they personally spend 
the maximum amount of time with customers rather than managing employees. Most of the 
existing research continues to focus on traditional financial measures of performance, 
despite prior evidence that such measures are not only out of step with owner-managers’ 
intentions, but in many cases, are inappropriate for such small firms. Furthermore, direct 
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comparisons with larger (even larger small) firms are undermined because different 
performance measures are appropriate for each type of firm. As noted by Greenbank (2001), 
when judged purely on financial performance, many micro-firms would be deemed as 
failures, while the owner-managers of such firms would regard them as being successful 
because they achieve the goals they set out for, hence the need to use appropriate criteria 
when judging performance. 
This study devises a metric of satisfaction towards a number of goals, which are themselves 
based on what little prior literature exists. This is not only more appropriate, but maintains a 
measurable level of comparability between firms, which is necessary for research. While 
future research may seek to refine the measure, the basic idea is an appropriate template 
which should be widely adopted. This study continues to investigate the Perceived-Value 
and Burden of regulation, such that it affects both financial and non-financial measures of 
performance. In doing so, it goes some way to explaining the existing confusion in the 
literature, where Burden is only negatively associated with financial performance. This can 
be attributed to the direct cost of implementing regulatory demands. However, the results 
herein found that Burden shows no link with non-financial measures of performance. 
Instead, it is Value which has a strong (positive) relationship with non-financial 
performance.  
Moreover, the results herein suggest that the failure of prior research to reach consensus 
could be related to the way in which ‘attitude’ is operationalised, with prior, ‘burden 
focused’ measures demonstrating a negative impact, while the balance of ‘value’ is lost. If 
regulation is merely thought of as a burden, then the cost of implementation is directly 
attributed to the bottom-line. However, if regulation is perceived as having value, then that 
cost is thought of merely as the cost of doing business, therefore it is discounted before 
reaching the bottom-line. In effect, this study has corroborated and reconciled both strands 
of research, thus opening an area for future projects to research in greater depth. 
Finally, having reviewed the results of the papers herein and their theoretical contributions, 
it is possible to return to the rationale originally set out for each paper in Section 1.4, and in 
particular, the goals which were laid out. Firstly, the thesis set out to address the general 
deficit in micro-firm research and to explore regulation in a micro-firm context, using 
original survey data. This has clearly been achieved as three papers have been generated, 
which each focus on micro-firms and a facet of regulation, using a survey developed 
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specifically for this purpose and this study. Secondly, the unique role of the owner-manager 
has been repeatedly highlighted throughout the papers, therein demonstrating how the 
opinions and perceptions of owner-managers are elevated to paramount importance within a 
micro-firm. Thirdly, each paper has contributed towards critically investigating common 
research assumptions. Paper One does this through an exploration of Perceived- and Actual-
Knowledge; Paper Two investigates not only the measures of business performance, but also 
develops a more nuanced two-dimensional measure of Perceived-Value and Burden; Paper 
Three then builds on and extends the work of the prior papers to explore perceived levels of 
compliance. Lastly, the goal to adopt a balanced (i.e. not burden led) approach has been 
achieved through both the neutral enquiry of the study and the survey, but also through the 
development of the measures of Perceived-Value and Burden, which provide equal 
prominence to both the costs (which are widely reported in extant literature) and benefits 
(which are not) of regulation. Similarly, through this summary section, it is clear that each 
of the papers has achieved its individual goals, although what has yet to be discussed are the 
practical implications and recommendations based on these findings which are now 
considered in the following section. 
6.3 Practical and policy recommendations  
From a practical perspective, a set of recommendations have been developed, aimed at 
improving knowledge-of and compliance-with regulation, along with enhancing firm 
performance. Their development was only possible through the balanced and innovative 
approaches taken within the study, such that previously unexplored avenues and connections 
have been identified. Having been presented in isolation, the recommendations are now 
drawn together in this section. That is not to say that such efforts will be easy. Many of the 
‘common’ approaches that might normally be suggested, such as training courses or similar 
group activities, are unlikely to be utilised due to the unique resource limitations of micro-
firms (as many firms simply cannot afford the time or support staff to attend). Moreover, the 
fierce independence of owner-managers often makes them view such events as unwanted 
intrusions; merely those outside the business trying to interfere (a point also raised in the 
survey comments), which may also make onsite consultancy efforts challenging to 
implement. Indeed, some unorthodox and innovative solutions may be required to overcome 
the time constraints, such as online meetings, or even the use of virtual reality (an area of 
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further research, discussed in Section 6.5.2). Additionally, there is no way to mandate 
learning, so any efforts must remain voluntary, no matter how necessary they are. 
It is of note that the results herein suggest improvements will not be straightforward. Actual-
Knowledge is poor, but increasing the amount of information available (with no guarantee 
that extra or clearer information will be read and understood) is unlikely to have a lasting 
impact. However, combining increased information with the skills to improve self-
assessment will help owner-managers to understand their shortcomings and thus, 
demonstrate to them the need to learn. This form of learning is paramount to many fields, 
such as medicine, where continuous self-assessment and learning is not only prized, but 
practitioners are specifically trained to accomplish. At present, this is largely not considered 
for micro-firms, but this study posits that it should be. Moreover, improving self-assessment 
skills would also allow owner-managers to better assess their compliance level with 
regulation, both through generally improved self-assessment skill and better Actual-
Knowledge. Therefore, their compliance efforts are equally broader (as enhanced by greater 
knowledge) and more likely to be in line with regulation (through improved understanding). 
Furthermore, by emphasising the Value (such as through highlighting the benefits of 
regulation), owner-managers will be more inclined to investigate regulation and thus, 
maintain a higher level of knowledge and compliance. Indeed, by underscoring the Value, 
firm performance (measured through goal satisfaction) should also be enhanced, while at the 
same time reducing the pervasive negativity surrounding regulation. 
However, improving these areas alone is not enough to improve knowledge, as there is 
already evidence that the current information available and the methods of communicating 
it to micro-firms are insufficient. As Paper One notes at length, while trade-associations so 
far appear to only impact Perceived-Knowledge, in the absence of credible alternatives, they 
remain best suited to this approach. Owner-managers require short, clear, simple to 
understand guidelines and instructions, which are widely consistent (no matter the source). 
To achieve this, a cross-association campaign is recommended, in which one association is 
recommended to lead such a campaign, ensuring that a consistent message is delivered to all 
firms. In the tourism context explored herein, the Tourism Alliance, a ‘trade-association of 
trade-associations’, might be best positioned to take-on such a role. Furthermore, non-
industry association support is also recommended, such that tourism trade-associations (the 
BBA and BH&HPA, for example) tailor guidance for industry concerns, while small 
business trade-associations (such as the Federation of Small Businesses) tailor guidance to 
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small (and therefore) micro-firms. However, the guidance itself must be more than a simple 
checklist as it should incorporate some form of feedback element so that it will assist with 
self-assessment calibration and help to ensure that owner-managers correctly interpret the 
information they are given. This could perhaps be achieved through tools such as quizzes, 
inducements to participate or, given owner-managers preference for person-to-person 
contact, follow up telephone calls with specialists from the trade-associations. Furthermore, 
such guidance should demonstrate and highlight the practices of other firms within the 
industry, thereby improving owner-managers’ impressions of Competitor Compliance. 
In addition, networking is not recommended for its own sake, but for the benefits it brings 
to several different aspects. At the trade-association level, networking aids the cross-
association campaign and inter-context (tourism and small firm) cross-over. Beyond this, it 
is necessary to convene with micro-firms where they already seek information, which is not 
limited to trade-association publications. Many micro-firms rely on accountants (though the 
exact nature of their support is poorly understood). Therefore, the second point of 
networking is to disseminate the ‘consistent message’ through support firms, such as 
accountants. This could include the guidance itself, using accountants (and similar) as 
information conduits, thereby not putting additional pressures on accountants to broaden 
their personal support efforts (or exposure) which they would likely neither want nor relish. 
Additionally, accountants could be used as agents to promote trade-association membership, 
using the guidance as an example of the support available, while also highlighting the other 
numerous benefits that membership can bring (such as further support for business and 
marketing aims, and bulk purchasing). Accountants could also share (non-confidential) 
information about the compliance efforts of their other clients, again thereby improving 
owner-managers’ impressions of Competitor Compliance. 
The third level of networking is that which takes place between firms within the industry. 
Given the insular nature of micro-firms, this is again a difficult issue to mollify (which is 
likely why it is an issue to begin with) and may further require somewhat unorthodox and 
innovative solutions (an area of potential future research, which is discussed in Section 
6.5.2). In addition to the points which have already been discussed, at which competitor 
compliance efforts could be communicated to owner-managers, if a workable solution is 
found to allow micro-firms to attend training or networking events, a component on 
compliance would also help to shape the opinions of industry compliance levels. This would 
offset the negative impact that existing remedies will have on Perceived Competitor 
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Compliance and thus, may create a beneficial reference state from which owner-managers 
make their compliance related decisions. Direct networking between micro-firms should 
also be encouraged, not only because they are well suited to support each other, but because 
this will again elevate the perceptions of competitor compliance. It will however, remain 
necessary to ensure that micro-firms are provided with clear, consistent guidance, so that the 
‘wrong interpretation’ of one owner-manager does not permeate throughout a group of 
(networking) micro-firms. 
In addition, further efforts are required to investigate the regulatory requirements and 
compliance levels of sharing economy firms. This would address the widespread perception 
of ‘hosts’ as ‘unfair competition’. An in-depth analysis of this issue and potential solutions 
remains outside the scope of this study, but they are identified as natural future research 
possibilities in Section 6.5.3. 
6.4 Hindsight and resolving limitations 
This thesis has successfully accomplished its goals, contributed to extant literature and 
generated three independent papers. However, it is fair to say that no piece of research is 
perfect and no amount of planning can account for the wealth of hindsight that develops 
throughout a study. It has already been noted (in Section 2.4.1) that the pilot for this study 
led to many changes in the survey that was ultimately used, particularly in regards to length. 
The final survey itself has generated several ideas to incorporate into future work. This 
ranges from the structural notion of incorporating wider questions to inform the Actual-
Knowledge indicator, at the expense of focusing on fewer regulations; and broadening the 
exploration of self-assessed knowledge, perhaps more comparatively with other studies, 
such as asking what percentage respondents think they will score on the Actual-Knowledge 
test (as is popular in student self-assessment literature); to more nuanced changes. Several 
of unsolicited comments directly noted concern over the revenue bands in the survey. These 
were designed to allow for variation in results (and identify firms which do not match a 
criterion for micro-firms), while reducing the apprehension caused by demanding too much 
detail. The bands were chosen based on an analysis of the revenues found in the Business 
Population Estimates report (BEIS, 2016a; BIS, 2012). However, the lowest band of ‘up to 
£75,000’ appears to have irritated many respondents who felt their time had been wasted 
because their revenue was dramatically lower. Obviously, this should be addressed. 
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Conversely, there were very few negative comments regarding the operationalisation of the 
other financial performance measures, indicating that they were acceptable to respondents. 
However, they are rather simplistic in their current form and the analysis of financial 
performance would be enhanced by a more detailed measure, such as providing a greater 
number of smaller revenue bands, requesting exact revenue changes for multiple prior years, 
and recording profit as a percentage of revenue. Although, the reluctance of micro-firms to 
provide detailed financial information, must still be considered when developing the 
indicators. Additionally, greater emphasis could be given to the sources of regulatory 
knowledge and support, thereby exploring the roles of trade-associations and accountants. 
Furthermore, a block of questions on social desirability were included, with the intension of 
exploring social desirability bias in the responses (given the informal character of owner-
managers and the nature of the survey). However, these questions were frequently skipped 
with many vitriolic comments noting the ‘personal intrusion’ and the dichotomy between 
‘business’ and ‘personal’ questions in the survey. Such questions either need to be 
redeveloped or simply removed from future work. Ultimately, there remains a delicate 
balance between including more areas of interest (such as the role of accountants), along 
with requesting more detailed information (such as exact revenue), and the likelihood of a 
survey actually been completed by respondents. This study has presented a number of 
changes which will be considered for any future work. 
Beyond changes to the survey, perhaps the principle limitation is the sole reliance on single-
point survey data. While there is a growing trend for multi-point survey collection in 
research, the micro-firm target of this study makes that all but impossible. Of the respondent 
firms, 21.5% consisted of only the owner-manager, while another 30.5% had only one 
further worker; and given the context and the unsolicited comments, the majority of these 
were likely couples rather than employer-employee relationships. Collecting multiple 
surveys per firm is thus futile, however a series of interviews would have greatly bolstered 
the analysis. While interviews were considered for this study, time became a limiting factor 
and so the statistical analyses utilised the unsolicited comments to explore causality and 
respondent motivations. This may be imperfect, but the fact that this was possible (with 
unsolicited comments) not only justifies their use (as the thematic analysis matches the 
quantitative one so closely), but also hints at the possibility of rich interview data for a 
genuinely mixed-methods approach. 
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While a rich dataset of 706 responses was achieved, further development of the database and 
the addition of extra firms would aid the generalisability of the results. Indeed, VisitEngland 
(2016) estimate a total of 67,666 accommodation firms in England alone (though they 
decline to share the list). Additionally, the number of responses could have been broadened 
if wider trade-association support had been achieved. It is noteworthy that the association 
which provided both endorsement and direct access to members (Farm Stay UK) had the 
overall greatest response rate of 33.4%. That is not to say that efforts were not made; EASCO 
simply ignored every communication, made through every medium (and their postal address 
is a PO box, otherwise an impromptu in-person visit would have been considered). The 
biggest disappointment and surprise (due to their prior support of research and initial 
enthusiasm) was the failure to secure an endorsement from the BH&HPA, which would have 
greatly improved the response rate from their members. This was largely due to a breakdown 
in communication (the notion of ‘testing actual knowledge’ was disapproved-of) and time 
constraints. It is hoped that having completed this study (and demonstrated the value of 
testing knowledge), future collaboration will be possible and such overtures will soon be 
made. 
One area which could be viewed as a limitation is the restriction of the sample to firms within 
England. It has already been explained that this was deliberate to avoid confusion and 
complication between different regulations in the devolved UK regions. To address this, the 
chosen regulations, and thereby the questions included in the survey, could be drawn from 
areas which exhibit harmony across the devolved regions, thus reducing the complication. 
However, there would still be a risk, particularly with accompanying interviews, that 
differences in regulator attitude and enforcement would affect results. Unless exploring 
regional differences in a single study, it is likely that future work would benefit from a 
similar regional limitation, though England does not have to remain the focus. Indeed, 
comparative studies in other regions (devolved UK or broader) would not only explore these 
issues in other, well defined contexts, but would allow for the additional analysis of regional 
differences as a separate factor. For example, an exploration of one of the devolved UK 
regions, which could ascertain not only the regulatory differences and firm-level differences, 
but also the ability (and success) of the regions’ government in disseminating information to 
micro-firms. 
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6.5 Future directions for research 
6.5.1 Further exploration of existing data 
The study thus far has generated a number of interesting analyses from the available data, 
but that is not to say that the three papers herein comprise the sum total of the insights that 
the data presents. There are several potential avenues for further exploration of the data 
which has already been collected. Perhaps the most obvious future direction would be to 
explore the impact of Perceived Own-Firm and Competitor Compliance on performance. 
This was not attempted in Paper Two in part to allow the paper to thoroughly explore the 
issues around performance measurements and to dedicate adequate space to developing the 
goal based measures that were ultimately used. Given the wide range of issues, particularly 
relating to burden, it would be interesting to see how the existing results play out (such that 
Perceived-Burden has no impact on goals) and if Own-Firm Compliance follows this pattern. 
It would stand to reason that compliance efforts would present a financial cost (thus 
demonstrating an association with financial performance), however given the evidence that 
certain costs are discounted as ‘the cost of doing business’, the strongest association may be 
between compliance and goal satisfaction. Having already developed each of the measures 
of the primary variables, there would be a greater opportunity to explore their relationships, 
including via interaction effects, which have so far not been factored into the analysis (i.e. 
an interaction between Perceived-Burden and Own-Firm Compliance). Further to this, and 
particularly in relation to interaction effects, the measures of Perceived- and Actual-
Knowledge could also be explored to allow for a broader overall analysis of each of the key 
variables included in the study thus far and the ways in which they interrelate. Such a paper 
would make an interesting companion to the work herein, and would be targeted for 
publication either in Tourism Management or the Annals of Tourism Research. 
In a similar vein, the models utilised in Paper One could be expanded to replace the one-
dimensional attitude variable with the holistic Perceived-Value and Burden variables which 
have demonstrated a more nuanced understanding of the issues at hand. Indeed, the 
relationship between the single and dual variables warrants further exploration in and of 
itself. A preliminary analysis suggests, somewhat unsurprisingly, that attitude positively 
correlates with Perceived-Value, while it negatively correlates with Burden; highlighting the 
limitations of a one-dimensional scale and the strength of Value over Burden. It would be 
interesting therefore to investigate the effect on the relationships that have been identified 
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thus far. Such an investigation would serve an interesting companion and expansion to the 
existing first paper, providing a better understanding of the impact of attitude on knowledge, 
while also further exploring the advantages of a two-dimensional variable. As a companion 
to the work herein, and given the focus on improved learning (both in and of itself and in 
relation to the Paper One) it might be targeted at an outlet such as the Academy of 
Management, Learning and Education journal. 
At present, Perceived- and Actual-Knowledge levels are only explored at the overall level 
(i.e. by combining of the four areas of regulation) using summary statistics and bivariate 
correlations in Paper One. There is a further opportunity to explore the existing data in 
greater depth, which was not possible in Paper One due to the need to establish a base case, 
limitations of space, and the need to explore and define the variables. Currently there is 
almost no analysis of the individual areas of regulation, and while there are limitations to 
what is possible due to the number of questions for each area of regulation, a more in-depth 
exploration remains possible. This does not need to remain purely econometric as the results 
for each question (which are already given in Paper One) warrant further analysis. For 
example, the overall Actual-Knowledge score for Employment regulation is markedly lower 
than for the other areas. Given that only employers were presented with these questions, it 
is not simply the case that this block of questions is biased (as detailed in Paper One, the 
correlations between each area and the overall measure are consistent). Similarly, the 
question on fire service consistency was only answered correctly 43% of the time, despite 
this being both a contentious issue (which was frequently mentioned in the unsolicited 
comments, presumably by those who answered correctly) and one which partially led to the 
very creation of two trade-associations. This warrants a further exploration. Additionally, 
while direct comparisons between Perceived- and Actual-Knowledge scores remain 
difficult, due to the nature of their underlying respective scales, it remains possible to 
broaden the analysis through a number of means. It is common for similar studies to use 
percentiles to do this, such as Meeran et al. (2016). The existing measures for both 
Perceived- and Actual-Knowledge could be transformed into percentile rank order, thus 
allowing for a comparison between the percentile that each respondent’s Perceived-
Knowledge score put them in, against the percentile for their Actual-Knowledge score, 
thereby allowing for a more in-depth analysis of the forecasting error and perhaps, a better 
understanding of the relationship between forecasting error and trade-association impact. 
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Such a paper would be an interesting companion to Paper One and could therefore be 
targeted at the British Journal of Management. 
As intimated in Section 1.3, the survey included questions to account for each of the ‘full’ 
micro-firm definition criteria (as part of the wider SME definition), namely the number of 
employees, turnover, balance sheet total, and autonomy. The papers herein have thus far 
only considered the most widely adopted definition of 0-9 employees (based on UK 
Governmental reports). Existing evidence notes both the difficulty in implementing the ‘full’ 
definition and the impact that doing so may have on analyses (Centre for Strategy and 
Evaluation Services, 2012). Having established the validity of the data collected for this 
study, along with developing the models used in each of the papers, the next step is to explore 
these analyses by using the existing models with subsets of respondents corresponding with 
each criteria of micro-firm definition, along with different employee headcounts. Doing so 
will produce a truly rare examination of the impact of micro-firm definition on econometric 
results and the resulting analyses. Thus, exploring the wider understanding of micro-firms 
at a time when EU regulations (and therefore legal definitions) are being reviewed and 
repatriated to the UK. This paper could be targeted at an outlet such as the Entrepreneurship, 
Theory and Practice journal, and it would be interesting to note if and how the existing 
analyses are impacted by each definitional criterion, along with the practical implications of 
such a review. 
Each of the research ideas noted so far have focused on the rich dataset collected for this 
study, either extending the existing papers with greater detail and wider context, or using the 
existing papers to explore the wider issue of micro-firm definitions. There is also an 
opportunity to explore the methods of the study itself, most particularly in regards to data 
collection. There are a number of papers and books (such as Dillman et al., 2008; Dillman 
et al., 2014) which were used to inform this study at its earliest stages, that detail the methods 
and frequency of contact with prospective respondents. The database that was used as part 
of this study includes details on every communication sent-to and received-by every 
prospective respondent, whether they completed the survey or not. This presents the 
opportunity to assess which versions of letters and emails were most successful in resulting 
in survey responses, along with the relative time-of and time-between the messages (for 
example it may be possible to ascertain that “chases sent X days after initial emails resulted 
in X% more responses”). The content of each message could also be examined, such that 
“the addition of another trade-association endorsement led to X% more responses”, for 
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example. Furthermore, the medium of each message, such that postal surveys had a greater 
response rate but the number available was limited by the funds available for postage. While 
perhaps not the most exciting study, especially compared to the others detailed in this 
section, this would not only assist future researchers (in the way existing similar studies 
assisted this one), but would also help to inform the data collection of new research in this 
exact field, including the ideas noted in the next section. This would be targeted at a more 
methodologically inclined journal, such as the Journal of Business Research. 
6.5.2 New research 
It almost goes without saying that any new research in this field should take into account not 
only the approach that has been taken here (i.e. the balanced wording, not relying on self-
assessment, and recognising micro-firm performance measures), but also the appropriate 
lessons which have been learned and detailed in Section 6.4 (relating to the method and 
improvements to the measures). Throughout the undertaking of this study, a number of areas 
for entirely new research projects have been conceived, which are discussed here in addition 
to the exploration of existing data detailed above. Indeed, it is likely that in completing the 
suggested work of Section 6.5.1, the following concepts will be reinforced, while further 
areas will become apparent as well. 
One possible path for new research would rely on the practical recommendations herein 
(Section 6.3) being put into practice. This could be tracked from inception, through to 
exploring different avenues for cross-association support, the potential role of accountants, 
disseminating information, and ensuring it is appropriately comprehended by owner-
managers, thus examining the validity and success of the recommendations and this study. 
Indeed, the research would likely begin with a more thorough exploration of the existing 
information which is available (such as government advice and trade-association 
publications), in order to ascertain how it can be improved. In addition, it would be possible 
to survey owner-managers are multiple points throughout the process, to provide a 
longitudinal assessment of the process. Such a project would require considerably greater 
co-operation from trade-associations, not only for access to the associations and their 
members, but also encourage them to undertake the recommendations in the first place. 
A further suggestion for future research would be to rerun this existing study (making note 
of the evaluative changes identified in Section 6.4) in either another region (UK or 
otherwise) or in another industry. This would serve to broaden the knowledge gained by this 
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study, and both validate and expand its findings through duplicating its method elsewhere. 
The additional studies would both stand on their own right and allow for direct comparisons, 
thus further exploring the issues of regulation and micro-firms. Moreover, as recommended 
in Paper One, making the study longitudinal, through rerunning this survey (or devising a 
similar one) in the same industry, using the same respondents would allow for an exploration 
of the regulatory issues over time, such as the posited notion of Perceived- and Actual-
Knowledge diverging over time, and the potential impact of the number of years of 
ownership. Such future repetitions of the study would need to update the questions used to 
test actual knowledge (for regulatory changes and to avoid the risk of repeated questions 
being pre-empted with specific research) and considerable effort would be required to ensure 
that the new questions are of equal standard, such that they remain comparable over time. 
Additionally, a longitudinal study would offer insight into other regulatory changes and 
initiatives (beyond those suggested here), similar to the existing Business Regulation 
Perception studies run by BEIS (and its equivalents over time), such as BEIS (2016b) and 
BIS (2014). Furthermore, reruns of the existing study could shift the focus to other areas of 
regulation (while maintaining comparability with existing questions) as a number of 
respondents to the survey expressed a wish to explore alternative regulations. In particular, 
food regulations were highlighted as a concern, although at the time of the survey, new 
regulations were coming into force (such as the need to proactively highlight allergens), 
which was seen as an undue burden on micro-firms who, for example, only offer a small 
number of breakfasts. 
In addition to these variants of the existing study and exploring the recommendations herein, 
wider areas of research are also apparent. It has already been noted how causality is difficult 
to ascertain and that interviews with owner-managers could offer further insight. One area 
that would benefit from a dedicated approach, would be to thoroughly explore the causal 
links between knowledge with Perceived-Value and Burden. Indeed, it may be that these 
variables share a convoluted, non-linear, and cyclic relationship, such that a little knowledge 
(which may or not be accurate, instead shaped via media outlets and unconsciously informed 
by the negative reporting bias) leads to a poor attitude towards regulation (i.e. it is seen as a 
burden with limited benefits), which in turn reduces the desire to learn further, thus 
negatively impacting knowledge, which remains ill-informed and hence the cycle repeats. 
Alternatively, a positive attitude towards regulation may lead to a genuine desire to learn 
about regulation (and an understanding that knowledge is required to ensure compliance 
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efforts are valid), such knowledge then feeds the positive attitude, and thus, an alternative 
cycle. Furthermore, and apparent only if different regulatory areas are investigated, the 
relationship may be further muddied by different opinions about different regulations; such 
that one regulation boosts attitude (perhaps a crackdown on the sharing economy, in the 
context of B&Bs), while another decreases attitude (perhaps a further tightening of fire 
regulations requiring specific, expensive equipment). Through such a study, it would be 
possible to identify the best point at which to enter the attitude-knowledge cycle and apply 
methods to improve both. 
Networking has already been found to enhance knowledge (Kitching, 2006), which has been 
factored into the recommendations herein. However, there is also considerable evidence that 
micro-firms do not value and participate in networking to the same extent as larger firms. 
Much of this appears to stem from an isolationist nature in owner-managers and a lack of 
resources (time and employee cover) to afford the opportunity. There is another potential 
(somewhat linked and complementary) study specifically into this area, not only into the 
potential learning benefits of networking and attending events (such as training courses) but 
also the impact on perceived levels of competitor (i.e. industry) compliance. Such a study 
would go beyond just speaking with owner-managers, to dealing with the those who set up 
such events (i.e. the training course arrangers and trade-associations) to try to find ways 
around the resource limitations that micro-firms face. Indeed, of all the possible studies 
detailed here, this one has the broadest potential for involving unorthodox methods and 
exploring innovative solutions, such as online teleconferencing or even virtual reality (thus 
allowing owner-managers to be somewhat present in both the session and at their business 
at the same time). The networking (and by extension, training effort) aspects are of particular 
importance as they influence knowledge directly (that being the point of training) and they 
impact upon the perceived level of compliance in the industry, which may create a beneficial 
reference state from which compliance decisions can be made and furthermore, as 
demonstrated in Paper Three, it appears that other efforts to improve knowledge are actually 
detrimental to Perceived Competitor Compliance, so direct efforts to improve the perception 
are required. 
An additional research project could explore the somewhat unexpected finding of Paper 
Three regarding the lack of a relationship between the reference state and Own-Firm 
Compliance. As is posited in the paper, this may be due to the context of the industry or the 
sample. It also suggests that the reference state is a broader concept which incorporates wider 
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aspects, such as the likelihood of inspection and the possible penalties for non-compliance, 
rather than being purely Perceived Competitor Compliance driven, as it has been treated 
herein. Therefore, the opportunity remains for a more thorough exploration of this concept. 
Another potential research project would address a limitation of Paper Three while following 
the pattern laid out by (Boustras et al., 2015), that of actual regulatory compliance. While it 
may be possible to ascertain this using a test similar to that for Actual-Knowledge, perhaps 
true/false questions are presented in the form “I undertake [a specific behaviour]” (and thus, 
ascertain if compliant actions are being taken within the firm); this would rely heavily on 
the truthfulness of the response (which is not to question the honesty of owner-managers, 
but simply notes the obvious limitation of the method). An alternative solution would be 
some form of independent examination of business practices to ascertain actual compliance. 
Following Boustras et al. (2015), this could take the form of an investigator attending 
regulatory compliance inspections with a licenced inspector. It would be imperative that the 
investigator was seen only as an observer, so micro-firms would need to be selected via the 
inspector, such that the research followed the inspection, rather than lead to the perception 
that a compliance inspection was only taking place because of the research. 
There are several offshoots to this proposal as well. By involving inspectors, there would be 
an opportunity to discover an external and objective view on industry compliance, which 
could be compared to the internal owner-manager perception. Additionally, it would be 
possible to observe the actions of the inspector and their interactions with owner-managers 
(and any employees), such that another potential form of external support could be 
investigated. This can then be taken forward to visits with firms who are not being inspected, 
to ascertain the value of the owner-manager-inspector relationship. BRE (2010) notes that 
an unintended consequence of reducing widescale inspections, appeared to be the loss of an 
important information source, leading to lower compliance through ignorance. Such a 
consequence could be tested. Furthermore, the wider impacts of inspections and enforcement 
actions could be explored through the comparison of inspected and non-inspected firms, or 
indeed, regularly inspected and first-time inspected firms. It would also be possible, having 
attended inspections, that the investigator would somewhat acquire the experience to 
perform inspections on their own, such that they could visit a non-inspected firm and make 
a reasoned judgement on the compliance level, thereby broadening the potential number of 
firms included and offering a wider comparison between inspected and non-inspected firms. 
This project would carry a stronger qualitative factor than the others mentioned so far, with 
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a much greater emphasis on interviews with owner-managers and inspectors, although a 
quantitative aspect would be included as well. Beyond the geographic restrictions of the 
existing study, the proposed project would likely need to focus down even further, limiting 
to a select few local authorities, to ensure the appropriate level of access to inspectors and 
firms, while also allowing for comparisons to be made in order to ensure that discussions 
and recommendations were not being driven by the peculiarities of one authority or 
inspector. Indeed, support from local authorities and regulatory inspectors would be essential 
for such a study. This would also explore the popular contention that between regions and 
authorities, inspectors, particularly fire inspectors, apply their own interpretations of the 
regulations. 
Following the more qualitative proposal detailed above, a further proposal would augment a 
widescale survey with a range of in-depth interviews, perhaps even case studies. Again, a 
further exploration of one of the issues discovered in this study and inspired by previous 
research, in this case Kitching (2006), there is an opportunity to more thoroughly explore 
the process by which owner-managers acquire knowledge and from this, how information 
about regulations is disseminated to firms. From the former perspective, that of firms, this 
would involve working with owner-managers to ascertain from where they get their 
regulatory knowledge (i.e. trade-associations and other sources), then how this is processed 
within the business and finally, how the regulatory requirements are implemented. One 
logical possibility, is this exploration would perhaps present a path such that regulatory 
knowledge is first noted via the media, perhaps then tempered by official guidance (if it 
should exist or become available), before being solidified via trade-association support, 
which is industry tailored and suitably simplified. However, without any data on which to 
base this, the pathway may in fact be quite different. From such an analysis, it would be 
possible to define the points of communication failure (i.e. a failure for government guidance 
to arrive in time or reach micro-firms at all), thereby allowing for recommendations to be 
made to rectify the situation. It would also highlight how owner-managers currently receive 
knowledge and what appears to work best for them (i.e. if they seek it out or rely on 
communications proactively sent to them). From the latter perspective, that of regulators and 
supporting firms (such as trade-associations and accountants) this would involve working 
with legislators, inspectors, trade-associations, and indeed, every noted potential source of 
information; in order to ascertain how guidance is devised and disseminated. This would 
involve tracking regulation (perhaps focusing on one new piece of regulation throughout its 
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development) from initial inception, through to legal commencement, where other 
organisations (e.g. trade-associations) review and develop their own guidance, then 
distribute it to their members. Again, this would highlight areas where communication 
between the different participants (throughout the process) breaks down (perhaps 
government guidance is unclear, leading to confusion when trade-associations tailor advice 
for their members). By identifying these issues, it will be possible to find ways to address 
them, thereby improving the knowledge of micro-firms (indeed, larger firms as well). 
To complement such a project, a further study could address the earliest stages of regulatory 
development. There is already evidence from this study and prior literature that owner-
managers widely feel regulators do not understand micro-firms and that regulations are 
written with larger firms in mind (BEIS, 2016b; BRE, 2010). As above, this requires a two-
pronged approach. From the perspective of the regulators, this would begin with the 
inception of the regulation, where the very idea starts, and exploring why it is believed to be 
necessary and what it is hoped to achieve. Then following this as it develops, being passed 
between governmental departments and subject to consultation. The very methods of 
consultation (i.e. focus groups and email comments) and how the consultation is promoted, 
then how the results are integrated into the finalised regulatory framework. Indeed, this may 
be the most important point (discussed below). It would also be necessary to investigate 
support firms, such as trade-associations to explore at what point they get involved and what 
actions they undertake (i.e. lobby with regulators directly, form an overarching consultation 
response of their own, or promote the consultation for members to respond individually). As 
with the previously suggested project, this would highlight areas where communication 
breaks down and allow for remedies to be developed. From the perspective of micro-firms, 
this would involve exploring the level of firm involvement from an early stage and looking 
at how that involvement is brought about. Perhaps the media discusses proposed legislation, 
or a trade-association highlights a consultation in progress, which in turn leads owner-
managers to voice their opinion. Furthermore, it would explore the ability of micro-firms to 
take part in the regulatory development process. It is already understood that owner-
managers lack the resources to learn about regulations, so it stands to reason that they lack 
the resources to get involved in shaping them. Indeed, one of the role of trade-associations 
is to collectively lobby on behalf of smaller firms, given the likely limited impact that the 
voice of one micro-firm can be expected to have on the development of a regulation. This 
project may be able to identify how regulations seem to diverge away from the realities of 
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micro-firms. For example, if only a small handful of owner-managers are able to take part 
in a consultation, how much credence will their views be given in shaping a law which also 
affects much larger firms with their own lobbying abilities. Moreover, what role do trade-
associations currently (and possibly) have in lobbying on behalf of their members and how 
can this be better strengthened. Given what this study has demonstrated about the Perceived-
Value and Burden of regulation, such that the Value appears to outweigh the Burden, 
combined with the sheer number of micro-firms in the economy, it would seem that a ‘small 
first’ approach may in fact be better for all firms. If regulators do not appropriately engage 
micro-firms or if those attempts are not successful (which this project would explore and 
highlight) then it will not be possible to improve the situation, however this project could 
present an alternative which is better for all concerned. 
6.5.3 The sharing economy: a project in hand 
One area of particular interest for future study is the burgeoning domain of the sharing 
economy. It has been noted at various points in this study that the accommodation industry 
is undergoing a shock due to the rise of the sharing economy, in this case, ‘hosts’ for firms 
such as Airbnb and HomeAway. From the perspective of consumers (i.e. guests), these hosts 
appear to offer a similar, if not identical, facility to those of ‘traditional’ accommodation 
firms (such as B&Bs). Yet, there is much confusion around the regulatory expectations of 
hosts. The focus of this research project would be on small B&Bs and self-catering 
accommodation providers, for they offer a directly comparable product/service (i.e. a small 
number of rooms, often in the owner-manager’s own home in the case of the former and a 
small number of (various) types of segregated accommodation in the latter)17. The issues 
surrounding sharing economy hosts (named as such herein, to distinguish them from 
traditional ‘firms’) are particularly contentious, both for the relevant trade-associations and 
for individual competitor firms. Indeed, as detailed in Section 2.5, the unsolicited comments 
box of the survey for this study drew 13 unsolicited comments which directly referred to the 
sharing economy and the ‘unfair competition’ it represents. Furthermore, having discovered 
the original study, one Airbnb host got in contact because they had been visited by a fire 
inspector who demanded considerable changes costing up to £30,000 in order to ensure 
compliance, thus they were considering closure. Meanwhile the BBA reported similar 
                                                 
17 Whereas, there is currently little evidence of a sharing economy equivalent to caravan parks, and certainly 
nothing on the same scale as firms such as Airbnb. 
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inspectors who simply refused to even visit similar hosts, viewing them to be exempt from 
regulation (BBA, 2014). 
As a new field, there is limited, but rapidly growing research currently available. This 
proposal presents a unique opportunity to contribute to the field through an independent 
research project which is also comparable to the study presented herein. It would include the 
same assessment of Perceived- and Actual-Knowledge and crucially, the level of 
compliance. Such results would therefore be directly comparable with this study and thus 
offer an unprecedented view of knowledge and compliance levels between these very similar 
industries. 
In order to broaden the results and address the contention of unfair competition, an 
exploration into the regulatory expectations of hosts could also be included. This would 
likely consist of interviews with regulators and inspectors, to gain an understanding of how 
they view firms and hosts, thereby ascertaining exactly the expected compliance level of 
hosts, along with the actual level of inspection. Further interviews could be made with the 
sharing economy firms themselves, to ascertain what regulations they believe their hosts 
should and do comply with. This would then cover the actual requirements, an area currently 
mired in confusion (although there is a risk that it would simply demonstrate, rather than 
resolve the confusion), while also investigating knowledge and compliance. Furthermore, it 
would present a direct comparison between traditional firms and hosts. 
At this point, it should be noted that such an undertaking would be rather difficult, more-so 
than for this study, because it relies exclusively on support from the sharing economy firms 
to facilitate contact with their hosts. For the study herein, accommodation firms advertise 
themselves in various ways, which were used to build the database of potential respondents 
and contact them. Trade-association support and endorsement greatly aided these efforts, as 
has already been detailed, but direct access to firms remained irrespective of trade-
association support. However, sharing economy firms act as brokers for their members, so 
it is impossible to contact individual hosts without using their proprietary contact methods. 
As solicitation is against many of these firms’ terms and conditions of membership, and as 
contact is generally made through online forms, it is not possible to bypass sharing economy 
firms and contact hosts en-masse through either online or postal means.  
Indeed, a pilot for this research project has already been undertaken. A modified version of 
the survey used herein was developed which does not include employment regulations but 
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does include tailoring to the sharing economy sector. This pilot survey was launched and 
endorsement was sought from many of the principle sharing economy firms (at the time), 
along with the newly established trade-association for sharing economy firms, Sharing 
Economy UK, but found limited success. While two firms (Compare and Share, whom have 
since ceased operations, and RoomLaLa) endorsed the study and sent details to their hosts, 
larger firms, including Airbnb and HomeAway did not. There are many potential reasons for 
this reluctance, which were highlighted during early discussions with Airbnb. Firstly, Airbnb 
appeared keen to distance themselves from a perception that their hosts operate outside of 
regulation (a claim common to many facets of the sharing economy) and thus, a study into 
regulatory knowledge and compliance was not one they wished to promote at the time. 
Secondly, the study herein and its relationship with traditional firms and trade-associations 
was deemed a potential conflict of interest, with a fear that a study associated with, for 
example, the Bed and Breakfast Association may not be objective. This greatly limited the 
available pool of hosts and a total of 83 responses were received of which only 23 were more 
than 80% complete. Furthermore, all but five respondents were referred by RoomLaLa 
(identified with a branded link) and several responses were deemed invalid as the 
respondents were either outside of the UK or because they were made by guests rather than 
hosts18.2 The few usable responses, combined with increasing time pressures, led to a focus 
solely on the original survey and study, as is presented herein. However, upon completion 
of this study, given the knowledge gained and the amount of time since the original survey 
was completed, it is possible that progress could be made by repositioning the sharing 
economy study as an original counterpoint, in no way affiliated with ‘traditional’ firms or 
their trade-associations. A revised survey could be developed, taking into account the 
hindsight of the original, with greater tailoring to the target hosts (now that there has been 
further research into them during the intervening time), while ensuring a high level of direct 
comparability to the original. Furthermore, the results and publications of the original study 
would serve to demonstrate the unbiased, thorough, and innovative approach, which would 
be extended to the new domain, thereby allaying the fears already laid out. 
                                                 
182Indeed, several further respondents somehow appeared to mistake the endorsement of an independent survey 
for a RoomLaLa hosted survey seeking feedback on their services. 
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6.6 Chapter summary 
This chapter has brought together the analyses of the three papers and in doing so, listed the 
many theoretical and practical contributions which have been made. Returning to the 
rationale set out in Section 1.4, the papers, and indeed the entire thesis, have achieved their 
respective goals. Furthermore, the chapter included an evaluation of the methodology used 
in the study, which can be used to enhance any future work. Indeed, several potential papers 
are discussed using the existing data collected thus far, which expand upon and enhance the 
three papers herein; while several entirely original research projects are also identified and 







7. Conclusion and Final Remarks 
Regulation is omnipresent, both in the way it controls businesses and affects almost all 
aspects of life (Silbey, 2013). While there has been much prior research work investigating 
regulation from a variety of perspectives, there is a pervasive negativity towards regulation, 
which extends from academia into the public domain. Such a view limits the understanding 
of the impact of regulation, in particular when considering micro-firms, which are generally 
under-researched despite their prominence in many industries. This thesis has undertaken a 
study which explores a wider assessment of regulation, including both its burden and 
benefits, using original survey data from an often-overlooked industry. In doing so, three 
independent papers have been developed, the results of which this thesis has brought 
together. 
Ultimately, this study identifies that regulation and micro-firms share a complex set of 
relationships, with different aspects interacting with each other in various ways. It is not 
enough to say that regulation has a negative impact on business, or even that such ‘red-tape’ 
is a burden. Instead, this study has uncovered the need to carefully consider how concepts 
are operationalised, thereby challenging existing preconceptions (such as the ‘burden-
centric’ approach to researching regulation and the inappropriate use of financial 
performance measures for micro-firms). Owner-managers have poor knowledge of 
regulation and prevailing attempts to improve this have found limited success, which this 
study notes is, in part, due to the complex and contrary relationship with between Perceived- 
and Actual-Knowledge, along with Perceived Own-Firm and Competitor Compliance. 
Moreover, while there are valid concerns about the burden of regulation, the strong negative 
rhetoric has an impact of lower magnitude than the (almost always overlooked) notion of 
value, which not only has a positive impact on the performance measure that matters for 
micro-firms, but also affects compliance efforts. This study has taken an innovative and 
challenging approach to researching a difficult to investigate subject in the problematic 
domains of regulation and micro-firms. In doing so, it has not only highlighted a number of 
conclusions, leading to recommendations for change and improvement, but also a number 
of potential future research projects. Furthermore, this study presents a template and starting 
point for future studies into regulation and, most importantly given the difficulties found in 
extant literature, research into micro-firms. Given their prominence in most industries and 
importance to the economy, such firms deserve greater recognition in research and policy. 
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Appendix 1: Database Relationship Diagram 
The following diagram presents each of the tables contained within the participant database, 
as described in Section 2.4.3, along with their various relationships to each other. 
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Appendix 2: Study Support Website 
The following screenshots are from the support website in the time leading up to the launch 
of the survey. Although they appeared as one continuous page online, they have been cut 





The following screenshots are from the support website towards the end of the survey period. 







The following screenshots are from the support website at the time of writing, therefore after 








Appendix 3: Postal Survey 
The postal survey was presented as a 12-page A4 booklet. Each page is reproduced here, 
resized to fit within the page margins of the thesis. The original survey page numbers are 
included at the bottom of each reproduced page, while the thesis page numbers remain at the 















































Appendix 4: Online Survey 
The online survey was presented across nine pages. Each page is reproduced here, resized 
to fit within the page width of the thesis. As some survey pages extend across multiple 
printed pages, each survey page begins with the University of Bath School of Management 
logo and ends with the footer “Survey Powered By Qualtrics”. For reference, the logo and 


















































The following page was presented to respondents if they followed any of the links to the 
survey after it was closed. 
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Intentionally blank 
 
